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1.1. Introduction
In February 2015, a number of large strikes took place. In the United States, more 
than 6,500 workers of the largest oil refinery participated in a strike (Wallace, 2015). 
In London, bus drives participated in a strike that disrupted public transportation 
severely (Hartly-Parkinson, 2015). Both strikes received a lot of attention, both before 
and during the strike. In November 2014, Belgian rail employees went on strike for a 
number of days. On November 6th, protests by unionists against planned austerity 
measures gripped the Belgian nation. The unions planned several other strikes, all 
cumulating into a national strike on December 15th 2014. The goal of this general strike 
was to ‘lock down’ Belgium, in order to make the government change her plans (NOS, 
2014; Reuters, 2014). Previous to these strikes, a heated debate took place between 
opponents and proponents of the austerity measures: the government versus the 
unions. The government tried to convince workers of the necessity of the measures 
and attempted to prevent the strikes, whereas the unions provided information with 
the hope of getting as many people as possible to participate. 
 The examples above illustrate how people are put under pressure by opposing 
groups during a (looming) protest. In the specific example from Belgium, some actors 
wanted to mobilize Belgian workers for a strike, while others attempted to withhold 
people from participation. One of the ways both the union and the government could 
have tried to influence workers’ decision, is by providing information about the 
conflict, for example about why the strike was necessary or not, or about the costs 
and benefits of participation. This situation of contradictory pressures can apply to 
many different kinds of protest, such as demonstrations or even protests as large as 
the Arab Spring or the protest in Ukraine in the last months of 2013: both proponents 
and opponents of protest provide information about the conflict issue, aiming to 
influence peoples’ participation decision. Information from these different sources 
can drive individuals in different or even opposite directions. It is then up to the 
individual to make a decision based on the, often contradictory, information. 
 Basically, we do not know how individuals make participation decisions when 
faced with information from both opponents and proponents simultaneously. 
Theories that explain participation in collective protest mostly focus on the effect 
of information from proponents of the protest, i.e. the mobilizing actor (e.g., 
Klandermans, 2002), while other sources of information and their effects have not 
yet been specified or explicitly investigated. Without taking into account multiple 
sources of information — that offer (possibly) contradictory information — it is 
difficult to explain variation in participation behavior. 
 In this thesis, I aim to explain how people make a participation decision by taking 
into account their social context in which several groups with potentially opposing 
demands about participation try to influence individuals’ decision by providing them 
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with information. This will improve our knowledge of how individuals make a 
participation decision when they are confronted with information from both 
opponents and proponents of the strike. This may explain why some people chose to 
participate, while others do not and as such provide an explanation for variation in 
protest participation. Thus, in this thesis I investigate how an individual’s participation 
decision is affected by information from different actors to explain variation in 
participation.  
1.2. Theoretical background  
When individuals have to make a participation decision, they are faced with a 
uncertain situation. They have to make a decision about their own behavior, as well 
as trying to assess what others around them will do. The first step to reduce this 
uncertainty is the collection of (additional) information (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). In 
times of a looming protest, several actors are likely to provide information, for 
example about the costs and benefits of participation or the behavioral choices of 
others. The actors providing information can be both proponents and opponents of 
the protest. It is then up to individuals to make a decision based upon this, possibly 
contradictory, information. 
 In this section I elaborate on three theories that I will use to help me find an 
answer as to how individuals make a participation decision. The first theory is 
collective action theory, which tells us that people need a selective, individual 
incentive to make the decision to participate. Second, I will use mobilization theory, 
which provides mechanisms that will help explain which actor (or in other words, 
which source of information) an individual will follow when faced with opposing 
pressures. Thirdly, I discuss social network theory, which adds two elements to the 
discussion of mobilizing individuals for participation, namely that networks serve as 
channels for information and interaction, and second that these networks of 
interaction between group members create a shared identity. 
Individual participation in collective action, such as strikes, has been a subject of 
research for decades (e.g., Brown Johnson & Jarley, 2004; Buttigieg, Deery & Iverson, 
2008; Klandermans, 1984, 1986, 2004; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Olson, 1965; Van 
Zomeren, Spears & Leach, 2008). Collective action is defined as an action by 
(individual) group members, who act as representatives of their group, which is aimed 
at improving the conditions of the group as a whole (Tausch & Becker, 2013; Van 
Zomeren, Spears & Leach, 2012; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990). A theory often 
used to explain the decision to participate is collective action theory (e.g., Olson, 
1965). This theory considers potential participants as rational actors, who are self- 
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interested. Before people make a decision about whether or not to participate, they 
rationally weigh the (individual) costs and benefits of participation. Olson (Ibid.) 
argues that under the assumption of rationality, people are unlikely to participate in 
collective action: obtaining the collective good requires a costly, individual investment, 
while those who do not participate will also benefit from the collective good. Hence, 
free-riding is argued to be the more beneficial option. Olson (Ibid., p.51) therefore 
argues that “only a separate and selective incentive will stimulate a rational individual 
[…] to act in a group-oriented way”. These incentives are meant to make a distinction 
between those who participated and those who did not, to create additional benefits 
for participants and as such stimulate participation. Thus, people participate because 
it is in their own interest to do so (Anthony, 2005; Coleman, 1990; Macy, 1991): 
regardless of the collective good, there ought to be an individual incentive to 
participate. Through interactions with others, the possible rewards and sanctions are 
assessed. The individual choice to participate is the result of a multiplicative function 
of perceived consequences (both positive and negative) of participation (Olson, 1965).
Thus, participating in collective action is said not to be rational, unless there is an 
individual, selective incentive that makes the distinction between those who 
participate and those who do not. The incentive should make the benefits of 
participation greater than the costs. An important incentive to participate is group 
norms: belonging to a social group brings about norms about the right course of 
action. These norms prescribe how individuals should behave in a particular situation 
(Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Ferh & Fishbacher; 2004; Opp, 2001). A group norm arises 
when individual behavior creates externalities for the group (Coleman, 1990; Opp, 
2001). This is the case when the success of a protest, such as a strike, is dependent on 
the number of participants. The group norm affects the relative costs and benefits of 
an individual’s actions (Coleman, 1990); compliance to a social norm provides 
benefits, whereas defecting from a norm produces social costs. Thus, through norms, 
others in the social environment can influence the participation decision of potential 
participants. The possible social rewards and sanctions by group members or 
‘significant others’ constitute an important selective and individual incentive for 
overcoming the free-rider problem in collective action (Janky & Takács, 2010; 
Klandermans, 1984; Olson, 1965).
 An important condition for group norms to guide behavior, is that group 
members’ behavior is visible for other members. Individuals need to know what is 
expected of them, but more importantly, if behavior is visible norm conforming 
behavior can be rewarded and norm defecting behavior can be punished. As Olson 
(1965) argues, the visibility of an individual’s choice of participation behavior will 
prevent him or her from free-riding: defecting from the preferred behavior can have 
severe consequences. For example, during a strike, workers will know exactly which 
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of their colleagues participated and which colleagues did not participate. If this is the 
case, the individual contribution cannot go unnoticed and due to its visibility, non- 
participation can have severe consequences. Gächter and Fehr (1999) provide the 
example of a miner’s strike in Great Britain: workers who did not participate in the 
strike were punished by their colleagues and that punishment went beyond the work 
floor. The free-riders were excluded from sports teams, public buildings etc. Thus, 
through the social norms persisting in the group an individual belongs to, possible 
visibility of non-participation prevents free-riding. 
However, individuals may be subjected to different, contradictory norms simultaneously, 
when opposing norms exist within their group, or the different subgroups, they are 
member to (Coleman, 1990). For instance, among workers there may also exist a 
norm to contribute to the task assigned to their team – a different collective good – 
and thus to continue working. It is therefore possible that individuals are confronted 
with a norm that favors participation to protest as a collective good, while another 
norm proscribes him or her not to participate. The latter norm effectively proscribes 
non-participation to the protest. 
 Thus, when others around the potential participant are actually in favor of 
non-participation, participation will lead to costs, as participation is then the behavior 
that will lead to dismissal by others. Hence, non-participation becomes the most 
beneficial choice, not because participation is costly because of investments the 
individual has to make, but rather because the norm is non-participation. In other 
words, non-participation can also be the more rational choice, whereas previous 
research focuses on participation being the rational behavior. The potential social 
costs associated with both choices of behavior (i.e. participation and non-participation) 
cannot be excluded when investigating how different actors influence an individual’s 
participation decision. If individuals are faced with norms from different groups 
which creates different pressures (i.e. different choices of behavior), how do these 
individuals make a choice about which group to follow? 
Mobilization theory aims at explaining individual participation in protest (and is 
especially used by social psychological scholars) and can provide an answer to the 
question which group norm an individual would follow. Mechanisms specified by 
mobilization theory predict that an individual will follow the norm of a given group 
depending on the relative importance of that social group to the individual, in 
comparison to other groups the individual belongs to at the time of a looming protest. 
The key determinant in this theory is social identification (Kelly, 1998). Social 
identification determines the social costs and benefits that an individual experiences 
from following the prevalent norm or defecting from it, because the relative 
importance of the group (and thus the prevalent norm within that group) is assessed 
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through social identification. Not following the norms of the group one belongs to, 
can have severe consequences, such as exclusion from this group or other forms of 
punishment by group members. Mobilization theory therefore predicts that social 
identification with the mobilizing actor (e.g., the union that calls for a strike or a social 
movement) increases the likelihood of participation and makes free-riding less 
attractive (Klandermans, 2002; Klandermans, Sabudeco, Rodriguez & de Weerd, 
2002). Social identification offers an explanation of why people want to act in the 
interest of their group (Van Zomeren et al., 2012). Thus, identification with the 
mobilizing actor creates social pressure to act as others in that same group do.
 However, people can identify with multiple groups simultaneously (Charness, 
Rigotti & Rustichini, 2007; Ellemers, de Gilder & Haslam, 2004). Moreover, identities 
are not fixed, but fluid; they can become more or less salient depending on a given 
situation (Cornelissen, Haslam & Blamer, 2007). The salience of identification with 
one group in one situation can mean that another group becomes less important (Ng 
& Feldman, 2008). Even though the mechanism of social identification thus can 
provide an answer to the question of which group norm an individual will follow, 
mobilization theory has a strong, and sometimes even exclusive, focus on the 
mobilizing actor(s) as the main group an individual can identify with, while in times of 
protest, potential participants can identify with multiple actors simultaneously. In 
such instances, the predictive power of social identification as a determinant for 
participation is less straightforward than considered so far: it raises the question of 
how potential participants choose between the multiple groups they identify with.
    
Social identity theory alone cannot explain under what conditions identification with 
one group is higher than with another group when a protest is looming. I therefore 
complement the insights from collective action theory and mobilization theory with 
the concept of structural embeddedness of individuals in groups. This concept of 
embeddedness originates from social network theory, which mechanisms can help to 
explain participation in protest (Marwell, Oliver & Prahl, 1998; Schussman & Soule, 
2005; Snow, Zurcher & Ekland-Olson, 1980). Social network theory adds two elements 
to the theoretical insights I proposed thus far. First, social networks serve as channels 
for information about different group norms, and thus the social rewards and costs 
associated with behavior, but information may also be about practical things, such 
as how many others participate or monetary costs and benefits. As a channel of 
information, social networks, in turn, will help individuals to “overcome selfish 
interests and promote contribution to the collective good” (Kitts, 2000, p.244). 
Second, networks of interactions between group members create a shared identity. 
As Bosco (2001, p.307) argues: networks “play a crucial role in […] collective 
identity construction”. It seems plausible that the more embedded an individual is 
in a social group, the more likely it is that this individual will highly identify with 
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the group and thus, that this group’s norm towards participation in protest will 
be dominant.  
 However, empirically, the effect of embeddedness in social networks with different 
norms – heterogeneous networks - on the participation decision of individuals is 
unclear. Research about the effect of being embedded in heterogeneous networks on 
participation behavior provides mixed results (e.g., Kitts, 2000; Santoro, Vélez & 
Keogh, 2012 vs. Tindall, 2002). Therefore, we do not know under what conditions 
embeddedness in a heterogeneous network hinders or promotes participation. 
 Our understanding of effects of heterogeneous networks is further limited by 
the selection bias in the majority of empirical studies. Most research up to now 
focuses on networks of mobilizing actors, such as social movements, or networks of 
activists. Due to this selection bias, the effect of demobilizing actors or actors with 
norms opposing protest participation is difficult to assess (Kitts, 2000; McAdam & 
Paulsen, 1993; Siegel, 2009). Thus, drawing conclusions about why non-participants 
choose not to participate is difficult. Therefore, research attempting to explain 
participation in protest will benefit from including the effect of actors who oppose 
participation in people’s network. 
To summarize, an individual faced with making a participation decision is faced with 
an uncertain situation. To reduce this uncertainty, information is necessary. The 
individual is likely to receive information from opposing groups though and then he 
or she has to make a choice about which group to follow. Theory about participation 
in protest shows that individuals base their participation decision on social norms 
persistent in the group they belong to, that social identification (with the mobilizing 
actor) increases the likelihood of participation because individuals will follow the 
norms of the group they identify with, and that networks serve as channels for 
mobilization. 
 However, in previous research there is a strong focus on identification with the 
mobilizing actor, whereas other groups do not receive as much attention, nor how 
contradictory social pressures affect the decision to participate. In this thesis, I thus 
investigate how the mechanisms proposed by collective action theory, mobilization 
theory and social network theory apply when potential participants are confronted 
with multiple actors who attempt to influence their participation decision by providing 
information. As such, this thesis contributes to our knowledge about how individuals 
make a participation decision when they are faced with multiple, opposing, pressures 
from opposing groups that provide information about what the choice behavior 
should be. This will further our understanding of variation in participation behavior. I 
will investigate multiple sources of information simultaneously and how the 
well-known mechanisms that are expected to lead to participation have an effect 
when focusing on more than one group in the individual’s social network. 
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1.3. Empirical context
The empirical context of this thesis is that of labor strikes. Strikes provide a convenient 
social context to compare the (participation) decisions of individuals: the goals of, for 
example, a protest organized by social movements can differ significantly per protest. 
For strikes, the goals (e.g., a wage increase or better working conditions) are more or 
less equal. The same applies to the investments workers have to make when they 
participate in strikes (Akkerman, Born & Torenvlied, 2013). In previous research, 
variation on the dependent variable is often absent (Buttigieg et al., 2008; Kitts, 
2000; Martin, 1986; McAdam & Paulsen, 1993), which allows for limited generalization. 
A focus on strikes enables cross-sectional analysis while controlling for the opportunity 
to participate. Moreover, strikes provide a context in which non-participants may be 
easier to find (they often work in the same organization as those workers who did 
participate) than for others forms of protest. This makes the problem of selection on 
the dependent variable easier to overcome. Finally, strikes provide a situation in 
which individuals are very likely to be confronted with information from actors who 
take opposing stances in the mobilization process.
 Strikes are still an important mean of protest, both due to the occurrence of 
strikes, as well as the social and economic consequences (Van der Velden & Verrela, 
2013). A quick search on the internet indicates that it is still a very relevant and often 
occurring phenomenon nowadays. In February 2015, more than 6,500 workers at the 
United States’ largest oil refinery went on a strike for better safety and labor 
conditions (Wallace, 2015). In the same month, London bus drivers went on a strike 
that disrupted public transport in the city (Hartley-Parkinson, 2015). In the last weeks 
of 2014, multiple national and regional strikes were organized in Belgium and it was 
expected this wave would continue in 2015 (Kriek, 2014). In the Netherlands, an 
important money-transport company went on strike in December 2014, affecting 
many Dutch citizens as ATM-machines were empty all through the country (ANP, 
2014). Strike statistics show an increase in strikes, both for strikes directed at 
employers and those directed at the government. The number of working days lost 
because of strikes in the Netherlands in 2012 was the highest number since 2002 
(CBS, May 2013). In total, 219.000 workdays were lost due to strikes. About half of 
these days were caused by a strike amongst cleaners. 
 The economic and social impact of strikes thus must not be underestimated. 
Costs of the strike by Air France pilots, which lasted two weeks in September 2014, 
were estimated at around 350 million Euros. Because of the strike, Air France-KLM 
experienced a 16 percent fall in passenger traffic compared to the same month in 
2013 (Clark, 2014). Thus, strikes can have severe economical costs, both short-run 
productivity losses caused directly by the strike, as well as long-run productivity 
losses, which are caused by worsening relations between management and 
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(subgroups of) workers (Mas, 2006; Krueger & Mas, 2003). The Air France strike is 
also exemplar of the social impact of strikes: more than 8500 flights were cancelled 
and the journeys of nearly one million passengers were affected. Another example of 
the societal effect of strikes is the strike by Walmart employees in October 2014: 
employees took action for higher wages, inspired by the fast-food movement (Tabuchi 
& Greenhouse, 2014). Their demands were met and employees received a wage 
increase above the federal minimum wage. This successful strike is expected to cause 
many more wage demands in other companies and sectors, such as the health care 
sector, child care sector, and by employees of restaurants (Krugman, 2015; Morath, 
2015; Neate, 2015). Strikes have long been considered a mean workers have at their 
disposal to solving work-place grievances (Fowler, Gudmundsson & Wicker, 2009; 
Nicholson & Kelly, 1980), but the examples above show that strikes are also an 
important mean for economic and social change. 
1.4. Research questions
To answer the main question of how an individual’s participation decision is affected 
by information from several actors, I have formulated four research questions, which 
will guide the remainder of this thesis. These four questions will be introduced below.
1.4.1.  Question 1: Do individuals obtain information from possible  
opposing sources of information in their network and how are these 
sources of information assessed? 
Making a decision about whether to participate in a protest or not, is probably for 
most people an uncertain situation. A way to cope with such a situation and reduce 
uncertainty is the use of information (Hewstone & Stroebe, 2001): individuals will 
attempt to find additional information to reduce uncertainty and to help them make 
a decision (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). Without any information, it is fairly impossible to 
calculate the costs and benefits of participation and as such, it is unlikely an individual 
will participate at all (Klandermans, 1997; Schussman & Soule, 2005). Individuals need 
information about the reason for protest, the material costs and benefits, but also 
about the prevalent social norms on participation that effectively determine the 
social cost and benefits of participation. The information potential participants use, 
can come from different sources; from informal, personal relations, or through 
non-relational sources, such as the media (Biggs, 2005; McAdam & Rucht, 1993). So, 
potential participants will attempt to find information to reduce their uncertainty and 
to give them guidelines of expected behavior, whereas mobilizing actors will provide 
information to affect individuals’ decisions. 
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As I explained above, research that attempts to explain participation in protest, 
has a strong focus on the main mobilizing actor (e.g., a social movement or union): 
protest-opposing actors are not often taken into account. However, these actors will 
also provide information to affect an individual’s participation decision. As such, 
individuals will be subjected to information in favor of the protest and information 
with the goal to prevent the protest. Strikes provide a useful context in which different 
groups, with potentially opposing social norms, provide information to individuals, 
such as the union, management or colleagues, or strikers in labor conflicts elsewhere 
(Conell & Cohn, 1995; Jansen, Akkerman & Sluiter, 2014). Thus, we must look beyond 
the main mobilizing actor and consider a broader context of information provision 
(c.f. Blyton & Jenkins, 2013) to understand why individuals come to the decision to 
participate or not. 
 However, with the strong focus on mobilizing actors, it is not mapped out which 
other sources will provide information and which information individuals will use. 
The use of information depends, firstly, on access to information and, secondly, on 
the assessment of the source of information (Mohanty & Suar, 2014; O’Reilly, 1982). I 
investigate to which sources of information workers have access in times of a looming 
strike and I explore how these different sources are assessed. By investigating 
question 1, I systematically identify the sources of information workers use when they 
are faced with making a participation decision.
1.4.2. Question 2: What filters of information are used? 
When workers receive information from different sources, they will have to make 
their participation decision based on this (possibly) contradicting information. As stated 
above, information is not necessarily in favor of participation. An important question, 
if workers receive opposing information, is how workers filter the information they 
receive from these different sources and how this affects their willingness to 
participate.
 When individuals receive information about a potential protest, they need to 
assess if this information is useful (Klandermans, 2004). To make this assessment, 
several so-called ‘filters’ of information can be used. I argue that social identification 
is one of the key mechanisms to assess the usefulness of information. Identification 
with the source of information increases the likelihood that this information is 
evaluated as useful and that the information is used for decision making (c.f. McAdam 
& Rucht, 1993). Moreover, through social identification, norms are formed within a 
group: people expect in-group members to assess situations and stimuli in similar 
fashion as they do themselves. This influences how decisions are made and how 
problems should be solved (Rink & Ellemers, 2007). Thus, via social identification, 
information is assessed to decide what the right course of action is. As such, social 
identification provides guidelines about how to assess information and how to act on it.
18
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A second filter that is used to assess information is trust. Trust is considered as an 
important mechanism to influence the behavior from one person towards another 
(Robinson, 1996). Because of trust, people will share knowledge and exchange 
information (Kerkhof, Winder & Klandermans, 2003; Robert Jr., Dennis & Hung, 
2009). When people trust each other, they expect those trusted others to provide 
honest information, whereas information from untrusted others is likely to be 
“rejected or at the very least severely devalued” (Priester & Petty, 2003, p.409). 
When individuals have to make a participation decision, they will use trust to assess 
the source of information. Especially in times of conflict, trust will help people to 
decide whom to rely on (Kane, Argote & Levine, 2005). Thus, trust is an important 
filter of information. 
 To summarize, I will investigate whether and how the two filters of information 
(social identification and trust) are used. Moreover, I will investigate how the filter of 
trust interacts with social identification. Consequently, the present study contributes 
to our understanding of participation in protest by extending current theory, both by 
investigating the interplay of different filters of information simultaneously as well as 
taking into account not only the mobilizing actor (e.g., the union), but also an actor 
that likely wants to prevent participation (e.g., management). 
1.4.3.  Question 3: How does social support from colleagues affect 
participation willingness? 
The importance of others in the decision to participate in protest has been supported 
by ample empirical evidence. For example, Klandermans (1984) argues the importance 
of ‘significant others’. He explains that potential participants will make an assessment 
whether or not these significant others will approve or disapprove of the collective 
action. Oegema and Klandermans (1994) studied participation in a Dutch peace 
movement. For these potential participants, their significant others consisted of 
friends and family and the researchers found that people who had stated to be willing 
to participate switched to non-participation when their social environment did not 
support their decision. Thus, it is necessary not only to look at individual preferences, 
but to take into account group-processes as well (Hirsh, 1990). 
 When studying strikes, colleagues are an important group to take into account: 
workers in an organization are part of a group of colleagues, both the colleagues that 
work in the same organization, but also those specific colleagues the worker closely 
works with, such as team mates. Colleagues thus constitute a crucial part of the 
worker’s social environment. Workers will assess whether their colleagues will 
support their decision to participate; it is this group of others with whom a worker 
will have to work on a daily basis and defecting from the preferred behavior of this 
group can have severe consequences for future relations. In turn, these colleagues 
are likely attempt to influence the worker’s participation behavior. 
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Thus, a worker’s choice of behavior can have consequences for the (future) relations 
with his or her colleagues. As explained above, Olson (1965) argues that participation 
in collective action is unlikely in a large group, as the individual contribution is small 
and is less likely to be noticed others. However, when it comes to a strike, the 
individual contribution is likely to be noticed irrespectively of the size of the group. 
The individual contribution during strikes will be noticed by (some of the) colleagues: 
workers are very aware of whom of their colleagues participated in the strike and 
who did not. If strike behavior is visible to colleagues, colleagues will know if a worker 
did not participate in the strike. If this is the case, free-riding can become very costly 
instead of the most beneficial choice (as Olson argues). Yet, in this argument it is 
implicitly implied that non-participation is constituted as free-riding and that 
non-participation is the defecting behavior. In mobilization research it is often 
(implicitly) implied that participation is the norm workers have to follow. In the case 
of a strike, this would mean that social support for participation from colleagues 
constitutes an important benefit of participation. The lack of support, on the contrary, 
may prevent workers from strikes. However, support for non-participation may also 
have an effect on the participation decision (e.g., Klandermans, 1984). Participation 
brings about social costs as well: protest-opposing colleagues may sanction participation. 
This will impose costs on participation and as such reduce the willingness to 
participate (cf. Opp & Roehl, 1990). Therefore, in chapter 4, I will simultaneously 
investigate how the different effects of social support for participation and social 
support for non-participation, as well as the social costs of both participation choices, 
will affect a worker’s participation decision. 
1.4.4.  Question 4: Which mechanisms determine the decision to 
participate in protests if people have ties to different opposing 
groups?
A network structure is a prerequisite for any form of collective action, such as a strike, 
to diffuse (Roscigno & Danaher, 2001). Belonging to a network makes people conform 
their behavior to that of the group they belong to (Bosco, 2001). Dixon and Roscigno 
(2003) summarize the literature so far and argue that especially communication 
networks are a necessary conduit for strikes. Networks serve as channels of 
information (Snow et al., 1980) and facilitate access to information about, for example, 
the possible costs and benefits of (non-)participation and about norms within the 
group. As such, they help people weigh the options of their decision (Diani, 2004; 
Mannarini, Roccato, Fedi & Revere, 2009; Van Laer, 2007).  
 In the case of a potential strike, work-place networks are crucial: it is not only the 
opposition towards management that makes an individual choose to strike, but 
workers have to assess whether or not their colleagues will support their participation 
decision. Within a network of colleagues, people may decide to act differently in 
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times of a strike (i.e. not all colleagues make the same choice). As I stated above, it is 
not clear if heterogeneous networks hinder or promote participation (e.g., Kitts, 2000; 
Santoro, Vélez & Keogh, 2012 vs. Tindall, 2002). A network of colleagues provides a 
clear example of a situation in which potential participants could be faced with both 
opponents and proponents of the protest. I will investigate whom of their colleagues 
workers will follow when they are confronted with heterogeneous (communication) 
networks.
 Answering this question contributes to the understanding of individual participation 
and the role of networks as channels for protest diffusion. First, it offers an initial 
explanation for the effect of different communication networks (Diani, 2003) and a 
trust network on protest participation. Second, most prior research has focused on 
networks of activists only. Research designs with little or no variation in the individuals’ 
social context regarding participation allows for limited generalization (Kitts, 2000; 
McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; Siegel, 2009). By investigating a full network of both 
participants and non-participants, answering this question allows for an analysis of 
a mixed social context and its affect on individuals’ participation decision.
1.5. The research model 
The model presented in Figure 1 provides an overview of the relations that will be 
investigated in this thesis. I included five predictors in the model, namely (sources of) 
information, social identification and trust as filters of information, social support and 
social (communication) networks. By investigating these predictors, I will attempt to 
explain how workers’ participation decision is affected when they are confronted 
with information from (possible) opposing groups. The arrows and predictors in the 
squares and the assigned numbers in Figure 1 indicate in which chapters the particular 
independent variables in the model will be investigated. The dependent variable in 
the following chapters is (willingness for) strike participation.  
1.6. Outline of this thesis
The four research questions are the guidelines of this thesis in order to answer the 
main question of how an individual’s participation decision is affected by information 
from different, opposing groups. This will gain inside into how individuals make the 
decision to participate or why they choose not to participate. Table 1 outlines 
the content of the four (empirical) chapters in which the research questions will be 
answered. 
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Chapter 2 addresses question 1 and aims to unravel the different sources of 
information workers use in times of a looming strike. I investigate which sources of 
information are used by workers and I explore if union membership and previous 
strike experience affect the access and assessment of informational sources. To answer 
question 1, I use survey data of 725 Dutch workers, collected in 2010. 
 In chapter 3, I investigate how information from two different sources, the union 
and management, is filtered and how this affects willingness to participate (in a 
strike). In line with social identity theory, I expect that information is filtered on the 
basis of social identification. Moreover, I expect the use of information to depend on 
the trustworthiness of the source. I conduct this study using a dataset consisting of 
468 Dutch union members (collected in 2010) and use structural equation modeling 
to investigate how information from the two sources is filtered. This chapter covers 
question 2.
 Chapter 4 tests how colleagues affect workers’ decision to participate in an 
attempt to answer question 3. In this chapter, I do not only focus on support for 
participation, but also on support for non-participation. Moreover, I investigate how 
expected costs of (non-)participation affect the willingness to act. I use data obtained 
from 725 Dutch workers, both union members and non-members, collected in 2010. 
By use of a structural equation model, I investigate how the (relations between) 
different independent variables affect workers’ willingness to participate in a strike. 
Figure 1  Overall research model for (willingness for) strike participation
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By focusing on costs and benefits for (non-)participation, provided by colleagues, 
I attempt to answer question 3. 
 In Chapter 5, I use network data of 59 Dutch employees within one organization 
to answer question 4. I investigate how interaction amongst workers affects their 
participation in a strike; I expect workers’ communication networks and trust network 
to affect their participation decision. This allows me to investigate which mechanisms 
determine the decision to participate in protest if people are part of heterogeneous 
networks (question 4) and to what extent this leads to the imitation of strike behavior. 
The network data offers me the opportunity to investigate a full network and how 
different network actors affect each other. The research question of this chapter 
could not have been answered with the survey data used in previous chapters. 
I explore several network characteristics and perform a regression analysis (MRQAP 
and MLR) to investigate how different communication networks and a trust network 
Table 1  Contents of thesis
Chapter Research  
question
Dependent  
variable
Independent 
variables
Design
2 Which sources  
of information do 
workers use?
·	 Sources of 
information
·	 Access to 
information 
from sources
·	 Assessment 
of sources of 
information
·	 Survey data  
(N = 725)
·	 Bivariate analyses
3 How is information 
from different 
sources filtered?
·	 Willingness  
to participate  
(in a strike)
·	 Information
·	 Social 
identification
·	 Trust
·	 Survey data 
(N = 468)
·	 Structural 
Equation 
Modeling
4 How does social 
support affect 
willingness to 
participate in a 
strike?
·	 Willingness  
to participate  
(in a strike)
·	 Support for 
participation
·	 Support for non-
participation
·	 Expected costs
·	 Survey data 
(N = 725)
·	 Structural 
Equation 
Modeling
5 How does 
embeddeness in 
a heterogeneous 
network affect  
the participation 
decision? 
·	 Same strike 
behavior
·	 Communication 
networks
·	 Trust network
·	 Network data 
(N = 59)
·	 Network analysis 
(MRQAP)
·	 Multinomial 
Logistic 
Regression
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affect workers’ same strike behavior. In this chapter, the dependent variable is based 
on actual strike behavior. 
 In the final chapter, chapter 6, I will summarize the results of the different empirical 
studies and discuss how this answers the main question of how an individual’s 
(willingness to) participation in protest is affected by information from different, 
opposing actors. Further, I will discuss the theoretical and methodological implications 
of my research and offer suggestions for future research.
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2.1. Introduction
In this study, I explore to what extent workers obtain information from possible 
opposing sources of information in their network and how they assess these sources of 
information. In the situation of a looming or growing protest, people must decide 
whether to participate. The decision to participate in a protest is often made in an 
uncertain situation. To cope with this uncertainty, individuals need information (Lipshitz 
& Strauss, 1997). This information is necessary to determine, for example, the costs 
and benefits of participation or the reason for the protest. When people have no or 
insufficient information about these conditions, they must have access to sources 
that are able to provide such information (Klandermans, 1997; Schussman & Soule, 
2005). Such information can be acquired through (personal) social relationships or 
from non-relational sources such as the media (Biggs, 2005; McAdam & Rucht, 1993). 
 Research about protest participation has a strong bias toward studying the 
effects of information provided by the mobilizing actor as the primary source (e.g., 
Klandermans, 2002); the effects of information from protest-opposing actors are 
seldom considered. This exclusive attention for pro-protest information is an 
omission. Opponents of the protest also provide information, information that may 
discourage participation. Hence, different sources of information ‘direct’ individuals’ 
decisions in different directions. 
Before I can answer the main research question of this thesis (how is an individual’s 
participation decision affected by information from different actors?), I have to explore 
to what extent workers receive information from protest-favoring actors and protest- 
opposing actors simultaneously. Individuals do not always have access to various 
sources of information or sources that are accessible to the individual differ by 
person. Individuals use their own networks to obtain information about protests 
(Kitts, 2000), and these networks are not the same for all potential participants. 
Some individuals are members of different (i.e., multiple) networks that apply 
contrasting pressures (McAdam & Paulsen, 1993) stemming from different sources of 
information. 
 In this study, I therefore address the following research question: to what extent 
do individuals obtain information from possible opposing sources of information in 
their network, and how are these sources of information assessed? First, I explore 
whether individuals have access to information from multiple sources that may have 
an opposing stance on the protest and whether there is a difference between groups 
of individuals concerning access to information from these sources. Second, I explore 
how individuals assess these different sources of information; i.e., do individuals 
identify with the source of information (cf. Klandermans, 2002), and do individuals 
perceive the sources to be credible and, thus, trustworthy (cf. Klandermans, 1997)?
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The empirical context of this study is that of labor strikes. A strike provides a situation 
in which it is likely that individuals receive information from opposing sources. I use 
pooled data, collected in 2010, consisting of data about the use of information in 
times of a looming strike. Thus, this study contributes to the understanding of 
participation in protests by exploring the potential different sources of information 
individuals have access to in times of a looming protest and how these sources of 
information are assessed. 
 
2.2. Theoretical framework
2.2.1. Information from multiple sources
Individuals use information about a protest to make their participation decision. 
Deciding whether to participate is likely to be a rather uncertain situation for most 
people. In times of uncertainty, individuals must select between different behavioral 
options (i.e., participation versus non-participation). Each choice of participation 
behavior will bring about different consequences (e.g., different outcomes or different 
costs and benefits of behavior). One method of coping with this uncertainty is the use 
of information (Hewstone & Stroebe, 2001). Therefore, a first step to reduce 
uncertainty is the collection of (additional) information (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). 
Once information is obtained, the individual must decide whether the information is 
usable and which information he or she will use in the decision-making process. In 
other words, the information must be evaluated (Klandermans, 2004). One means of 
processing the information obtained in times of uncertainty is by the use of heuristics. 
This makes the processing of information easier because the information itself need 
not be analyzed; instead, heuristics such as the expertise of the source are used to 
analyze the usefulness of information (Mohanty & Suar, 2014). People are likely to use 
sources from their own network, to which they have close access (Culnan, 1984; 
Zimmer, Henry & Butler, 2007). O’Reilly (1982, p.758) states that access to a source of 
information “often is the critical determinant of its use”. 
 In the case of a looming strike, the information workers receive can come from 
different sources; in the period before a strike, several (opposing) groups will attempt 
to influence the individual worker. Workers will thus be subjected to information in 
favor of the strike, for example from the union, and information meant to keep 
workers from striking, such as information from the employer. To investigate whether 
these different sources affect the participation decision, I initially must establish to 
which sources of information workers have access. I start with a description of the 
most common sources that provide information when a strike is looming. I explore 
sources inside the organization, such as management or colleagues, and sources 
outside the organization, such as the union, media or other workers outside the own 
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organization. I explore access to different sources and possible factors that might 
affect a difference in access to these sources between workers. I focus on two 
different characteristics of workers: union membership and previous strike 
experience. For example, union membership or previous experience with a strike 
may have affected a worker’s network. Union members are not only a member of the 
organizational network but also of the network of the union. Non-members may lack 
these network connections and therefore lack the information provided by the union. 
Thus, they may be more dependent on (other) sources inside their organization. 
Union membership can therefore create a difference between workers concerning 
access to sources of information. The same argument can be applied to workers with 
previous strike experience. Workers who have previous experience with a strike may 
have a different demand for information (for example, they have a need for more or 
less information) because of their knowledge of what occurred during a previous 
strike in their organization. Thus, I explore whether access to sources of information 
differs between (groups of) workers. 
 
2.2.2. Sources within the organization
A first possible source of information is the management of the organization by which 
a worker is employed. When a strike is looming, management will not sit back; 
I expect management to provide information to prevent workers from striking. This 
can be information about its view on the strike, the collective bargaining process or 
the consequences of satisfying the union’s demands (Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, 
1995). Moreover, management might provide information about why going on strike 
is not the correct course of action and what the consequences of participation will be. 
Not all workers may have equal access to information from management; for example, 
management may be hesitant to share information with certain (particularly militant) 
workers. I explore whether there is a difference concerning union membership or 
concerning previous strike experience. 
 Shop stewards inside an organization are a second possible source of information. 
A shop steward is an employee in an organization who not only represents his fellow 
workers but also is a union official. I describe this specific group of colleagues because 
shop stewards are often involved in the mobilization process. Information from shop 
stewards is most likely meant to involve workers in the strike and to justify 
participation (Klandermans, 1986). To influence workers’ participation decision, it is 
important for the union to have a means to communicate their goals within an 
organization (Reshef, 2004). Unions therefore perceive their shop stewards to be of 
critical importance; they are “the critical “linking pins” between levels of decision 
making” (Nicholson, Ursell & Lubbock, 1981, p.163) and “the embodiment of […] 
openness and accessibility” (Klandermans, 1986, p.195). Shop stewards can thus be 
important actors for the diffusion of information from the union to workers. Shop 
34
CHAPTER 2
stewards must translate the need for involvement into actual participation, and they 
must be capable of framing the situation so that collective action is considered a 
justifiable means by workers (Nicholson et al., 1981; Klandermans, 1986). Kelloway 
and Barling (1993) state that workers’ participation is linked to the effectiveness and 
skills of shop stewards. Hence, I distinguish shop stewards as a separate source of 
information. Workers’ access to a shop steward is likely to differ between union 
members and non-members, and between workers with and workers without 
previous experience with a strike. 
 Colleagues constitute a crucial part of the worker’s social environment because a 
worker must work with his or her colleagues on a daily basis and must continue doing 
so after the strike is settled. Therefore, colleagues will attempt to influence other 
workers’ decisions (Goeddeke Jr. & Kammeyer-Mueller, 2010). For a strike to be 
successful, a large group must participate; thus, colleagues are dependent on others 
to make the strike successful. Therefore, they will provide information to persuade 
other workers to follow their own decision. When colleagues work (closely) together 
in the same environment, many opportunities to share information arise, both 
formally in meetings, and in informal settings, for example during a lunch or coffee 
break. In particular, direct colleagues may be an important source of information 
because team members are expected to share information and work together 
constructively (Janssen & Huang, 2008). Therefore, I explore whether colleagues 
(both direct colleagues and other, more distant colleagues) serve as a source of 
information in times of a looming strike and whether some groups of workers have 
more access to information from their colleagues.
 A fourth source of information within the organization is the work council. Work 
councils are elected bodies consisting of workers who represent all of the workers in 
an organization. Work councils have rights to information and consultation and in 
some cases can co-determine worker conditions. Due to their role, work councils are 
often involved with negotiations that could lead to strikes and thus have access to 
information about the conflict, which they share with the other workers in the 
organization. Workers can use the council to provide information about their 
preferences to management. In turn, management can use the council to provide 
information to workers (Freeman & Lazear, 1994). The union is often represented in 
the work council (Rogers & Streeck, 1995); work councils have a dual role because 
they are expected to represent workers while simultaneously having to provide 
information from the employer. I expect work councils to provide information when 
a strike is looming because they are privy to information from both the union and the 
employer and they may diffuse this information to workers within the organization. I 
explore whether access to information from work councils differs between groups of 
workers. 
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2.2.3. Sources outside the organization
An important source of information during the mobilization for a strike is the union. 
The union often is the main mobilizing actor because it must call for a strike. Previous 
studies have shown that union activities, for example via union organizers, play a vital 
role in the mobilization of workers (Blyton & Jenkins, 2013; Brown Johnson & Jarley, 
2004; Buttigieg, Deery & Iverson, 2008). The union will offer information about why 
a strike is necessary, why people should participate and what can be gained by the 
strike (e.g., Klandermans, 1986). The union can provide this information to its 
members face-to-face, indirectly via shop stewards, or through campaigns using 
leaflets or mass media (Conell & Cohn, 1995). Unions also increasingly use new forms 
of media to spread information to a wider audience (Bimber, Flanagin & Stohl, 2005). 
As for the other sources I described above, I will explore whether there are differences 
between groups of workers concerning access to information from the union.
 I consider workers with the same profession who work in other organizations to 
be a second source of information outside the organization. Workers are not only 
part of the group of colleagues working within their organization but also members 
of a larger group of workers with the same profession. These other workers can be 
used as a source of information. Workers may acquire information about strikes and 
conflicts elsewhere and thus learn about the possibility of success of their own strike 
(Biggs, 2002, 2005; Conell & Cohn, 1995; Soule, 2004). Access to information from 
this source may differ between groups of workers; such access depends on the 
network of a worker. For example, union members might be part of a network of 
members spread out over different organizations. Due to previous experience with 
strikes, some workers may have strikers from other organizations in their network. 
Thus, I will explore whether there are differences between groups of workers 
concerning access to this source. 
 A last potential source of information is the media. Through the media, workers 
may acquire information about negotiations, the looming strike or the expected 
success of strikes elsewhere. Jenkins (1983) showed that the media has a strong 
influence on opinions that are formed about unions and labor conflict. Particularly 
now, with contemporary forms of media such as the internet, it is easier for workers 
to acquire and share information in times of mobilization and looming conflict. 
Concerning other sources of information, there may be differences in the access of 
information between different groups of workers. 
2.2.4.  Assessment of usefulness of information: social identification  
and trust
If workers receive information about a (looming) conflict, they must assess this 
information (Klandermans, 1984); that is, people must assess whether they find the 
available information to be credible and usable and allow the information to enter 
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their participation decision. Individuals will use information for decision making when 
they assess the source to be of high quality, i.e., when they find that the source will 
offer information that is reliable and accurate. If the decision maker finds the source 
of information credible, he or she will expect a decision based on information from 
this source to be correct (O’Reilly, 1982). Thus, information can make people conform 
their behavior to that of the source of information (Hewstone & Stroebe, 2001) and 
affect the participation decision. I distinguish two mechanisms that workers (can) use 
to assess information: social identification and trust. 
Social identification
Social identification is considered one of the main predictors of participation in 
protests (e.g., Klandermans, 2002, 2004). Through identification with others, 
guidelines about appropriate behavior in times of looming protests exist within a 
group of workers; people expect group members to assess situations and stimuli in 
the same way that they do. Defecting from the own group can have severe costs. 
Social identification thus explains why people want to act in the interests of their 
group (Van Zomeren, Leach & Spears, 2012).
 However, people can identify with multiple groups simultaneously (Charness, 
Rigotti & Rustichini, 2007; Ellemers, de Gilder & Haslam, 2004). Moreover, identities 
are not fixed, but fluid; they can become more or less salient depending on a given 
situation (Cornelissen, Haslam & Blamer, 2007). The salience of identification with 
one group in one situation can mean that another group becomes less important (Ng 
& Feldman, 2008). Therefore, workers might be subjected to information from 
multiple sources they identify with simultaneously. I explore whether this is indeed 
the case. Moreover, I explore whether different groups of workers (based on union 
membership and previous strike experience) differ concerning their identification 
with sources of information.
Trust 
Trust is a mechanism that helps workers make a decision concerning whom to rely on 
in times of conflict (Kane, Argote & Levine, 2002). Trust is used as a frame of reference 
to exchange and simplify information and knowledge (Kerkhof, Winder & Klandermans, 
2003; Robert Jr., Dennis & Hung, 2009). Thus, trust is an important mechanism to 
assess information. When the source of information is perceived as trustworthy, it is 
expected that the source will offer appropriate knowledge, will tell the truth and will 
provide an unbiased version of the possible conflict (Hertzum, Andersen, Andersen & 
Hansen, 2002; Priester & Petty, 2003). In times of conflict, people will rely on those 
whom they trust to provide correct information and guidelines about what their own 
behavior should be (Goeddeke Jr. & Kammeyer-Mueller, 2010). Thus, trust between 
people can influence behavior from one person toward another (Robinson, 1996). 
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Furthermore, trust affects the perceived credibility of a source of information; when 
workers must decide whether they want to participate in risky behavior such as a 
strike, they will look to others for affirmation and reinforcement. When trust is low 
between the worker and a source of information, the ability of the source to influence 
the recipient is low. Without trust, it is unlikely a worker will use information from 
that particular source; thus, the worker will not be influenced by it. I assume that 
trust is not limited to one group; workers can trust more than one source 
simultaneously. In this study, therefore, I explore whether workers indeed trust more 
than one source at a time or different groups of workers vary concerning assessment 
of the trustworthiness of information sources. 
2.3. Methods
2.3.1. The sample
For my explorations, I use a pooled dataset of 725 Dutch workers. In October 2010, a 
web-based survey was distributed among 800 panel members of the Christian Dutch 
Trade Union Confederation (CNV). The panel consisted of a representative set of 
randomly selected CNV members. Respondents who completed the questionnaire 
could win a 25 Euro voucher. In total, 468 members completed the questionnaire, 
which is a response rate of 58%. In December 2010, the same web-based survey was 
sent to 1500 Dutch employees who were members of a panel that is surveyed 
periodically. The sample selection was stratified on gender, age and region to enhance 
representativeness on these three criteria. Then, the sample was again checked for 
representativeness on gender, age and region. A total of 257 respondents completed 
the questionnaire, after which access to the questionnaire was closed. These two 
datasets were pooled, providing me with a dataset of 725 Dutch employees.
 Of the respondents, 68.8% were male (N = 494), and 30.5% were female (N = 221). 
Ten respondents did not specify whether they were male or female (1.4%). The average 
age of the respondents was 49.76 years (SD = 11.66). Due to the combining of the 
two datasets, a large number of respondents were members of the CNV trade union 
confederation (65.9%; N = 478); 7.2% of the respondents were members of the FNV 
trade union confederation (N = 52), whereas 18 respondents were member of another 
Dutch union (2.5%). The remainder, 177 respondents, were not union members 
(24.4%).
2.3.2. Measurements
To measure workers’ access to information, I asked them about the amount of 
information they received from different sources. I used one item, namely “do you 
receive information from…”. Respondents were asked to rate the amount of 
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information they received from different sources of information for two different 
situations. First, they were asked to answer this question for a normal, daily situation. 
Second, they specified whether the amount of information they received “in times of 
a looming conflict about a collective agreement” differed from the normal situation 
and, if so, what the amount of information in times of that looming conflict was. The 
respondents were asked to rate the amount of information they received on a Likert 
scale from 1 (“no information”) to 5 (“plenty of information”) for each of the 
distinguished sources: management, shop stewards, direct colleagues, other 
colleagues, the work council, the union, workers with the same profession who work 
in another organization and the media.
 Union membership was measured by asking respondents about their union 
membership. It was obvious that respondents from the CNV panel were members of 
a union. I asked the respondents of the panel consisting of Dutch employees whether 
they were members of one of the Dutch unions. For my analyses, I used a dichotomized 
variable (0 = non-member; 1 = member).
 For previous strike experience, I asked whether respondents had ever had the 
opportunity to strike in their organization (0 = previous opportunity to strike, N = 166; 
1 = no opportunity, N = 482). Please note that having experience does not necessary 
mean that these workers actually participated in the strike; I asked workers whether 
they had the opportunity to strike in their organization, i.e., whether a strike occurred 
in their organization. If no strike occurred, workers did not have the opportunity to 
strike. 
 Social identification was measured with a scale consisting of three items: 
“I belong to …”, “I feel related to …” and “If feel connected to…”. These items were 
rated on a five-point Likert scale and validated by previous research on identification 
with groups (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans & van Dijk, 2011; Van Zomeren, Spears, 
Fischer & Leach, 2004; Van Zomeren, Spears & Leach, 2008). Respondents were 
asked to rate identification with the different sources of information in a normal 
situation and specifically “in times of a looming conflict about a collective agreement”. 
I could not ask the respondents to what extent they identified with all of my defined 
sources of information. For example, identification with the media was not measured 
because it is not likely that people feel they identify with ‘the media’ in general. For 
my exploratory analyses, therefore, I focused on identification with management and 
the union, two opposing sources of information.
 I measured trust in the different sources of information using three items (Butler, 
1991; Kramer & Tyler 1996; Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995): “Do you trust … will 
keep their word,” “Do you trust … is honest” and “Do you trust the advice of…”. These 
items measured whether workers trust that the sources of information are credible 
(Klandermans, 1997). Again, respondents were asked to rate trust in these sources of 
information in a normal situation and specifically “in times of a looming conflict about 
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a collective agreement” on a five-point Likert scale. For my exploratory analyses, I 
once again focus on trust in management and trust in the union, two opposing 
sources of information.
2.4. Exploratory Analyses
2.4.1. Sources of information in times of a looming conflict: accessibility
My first step was to explore from which sources workers receive information in times 
of conflict. The respondents state that they receive information from all potential 
sources of information I defined. In other words, they have access to all sources. 
However, the amount of information they receive from the sources differs (see table 1). 
My respondents receive the most information from their direct colleagues (M = 3.59) 
and the media (M = 3.41). The least information comes from people with the same 
profession who work in other organizations (M = 2.57). 
 Next, I explored whether the amount of information workers receive differs 
between a normal (conflict-free) situation and in times of a looming conflict. I found 
that workers receive more information from the union and shop stewards in times of 
a conflict than in times without conflict (union: M
D
 = .020; p = .001; shop stewards: M
D
 
= .023; p = .011). An important finding is that when a strike is looming, workers state 
they receive less information from management (M
D
 = .040; p = .008). I found no 
differences concerning the other sources of information. 
2.4.2. Difference between groups of workers
In the next step, I explored whether there is a difference between union members 
and non-members concerning access to my defined sources. Overall, for most 
sources, the amount of information members say they receive is greater than the 
amount of information non-members receive. The results can be found in table 1. The 
largest difference I found is the difference concerning information from the union; 
I found that members (M = 3.67) receive more information from the union than 
non-members (M= 2.16; M
D
 = 1.51; p = .000). Members (M = 3.06) also receive more 
information from shop stewards than non-members (M = 1.96; M
D
 = 1.09; p = .000). 
Members (M = 3.54), and non-members (M = 3.02) also differ significantly on the 
amount of information they receive from the media (M
D
 = .51; p = .000). Finally, I 
found a significant difference in information from work councils; members (M = 2.91) 
that state they receive more information than non-members (M = 2.43) say they do 
(M
D
 = .48; p = .000). These results indicate that members receive more information 
from mobilizing sources, such as the union and shop stewards. I found no differences 
concerning information from management, colleagues and people with the same 
profession who work in another organization.
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I repeated the same exploration for workers who experienced a strike in their 
organization versus workers who did not. Overall, workers who have experienced a 
strike in the past receive more information in times of a looming conflict from all of 
the sources I defined. I found the largest differences for information from the union 
and information from shop stewards. Workers with strike experience (M = 3.76) 
receive more information from the union than workers without experience (M = 3.13; 
M
D
 = .63; p = .000). The same is true of information from shop stewards; workers with 
strike experience (M = 3.19) receive more information from shop stewards than 
workers without experience do (M = 2.64; M
D
 = .56; p = .000). These results can be 
found in table 1.
Table 1   Mean values for access to information by membership and previous strike  
experience (Independent sample T- test)
Amount of 
information
Management Shop 
Stewards
Direct  
colleagues
Other  
colleagues
Work 
council
Union Media People with  
same profession
All respondents 3.06 (1.20)
N = 646
2.78 (1.33)
N = 646
3.59 (1.07)
N = 648
3.07 (1.07)
N = 648
2.79 (1.34)
N = 647
3.29 (1.26)
N = 646
3.41 (1.11)
N = 646
2.57 (1.13)
N = 648
Difference  
Union membership
Members 3.06 (1.27)
N = 482
3.06(1.28)
N = 483
3.59 (1.05)
N = 484
3.08 (1.05)
N = 484
2.91 (1.33)
N = 483
3.67 (1.02)
N = 483
3.54 (1.04)
N = 482
2.59 (1.09)
N = 484
Non-members 3.06 (1.17)
N = 164
1.96 (1.13)
N = 163
3.58 (1.17)
N = 164
3.07 (1.13)
N = 164
2.43 (1.29)
N = 164
2.16 (1.29)
N = 163
3.02 (1.21)
N = 164
2.52 (1.25)
N = 164
Mean Difference n.s. 1.09***
t = 10.30
n.s. n.s. .48***
t = 4.09
1.51***
t = 14.25
.51***
t = 4.88
n.s.
Difference  
strike experience
Strike experience 3.20 (1.15)
N = 166
3.19 (1.22)
N = 166
3.72 (.94)
N = 166
3.19 (.97)
N = 166
2.99 (1.23) 
N = 166 
3.76 (1.06) 
N = 166
3.75 (…) 
N = 165 
2.83 (1.09) 
N = 166 
No strike 
experience
3.01 (1.21)
N = 480 
2.64 (1.34)
N = 480 
3.54 (1.12) 
N = 482 
3.03 (1.11)
N = 482 
2.72 (1.36) 
N = 481 
3.13 (1.28) 
N = 480 
3.29 (…) 
N = 481 
2.48 (1.13) 
N = 482 
Mean difference .19*
t = 1.89
.56***
t = 4.93
.18**
t = 2.03
.16* 
t = 1.71 
.27** 
t = 2.39 
.63*** 
t = 6.27
.46*** 
t = 5.22
.35***
t = 3.56 
Note: *** p< .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10 ; n.s. = no significant difference found.
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2.4.3. Information from conflicting sources
Above, I offered a general exploration of the sources workers receive information 
from in times of a looming conflict. However, I began this study with the question of 
whether workers receive information from opposing sources. To answer this question, 
I explored to what extent workers receive information from the union (and/or shop 
stewards) and management simultaneously. 
First, I created a new variable to explore whether workers simultaneously receive 
information from the union and information from management. Information from 
management was divided into ‘small amount of information’ and ‘large amount of 
information’. I used a median split to divide information from management into these 
two categories. A score at or below the median was classified as ‘small amount of 
information from management’ (N = 410). A score above the median was interpreted 
as ‘large amount of information from management’ (N = 236). I repeated this 
Table 1   Mean values for access to information by membership and previous strike  
experience (Independent sample T- test)
Amount of 
information
Management Shop 
Stewards
Direct  
colleagues
Other  
colleagues
Work 
council
Union Media People with  
same profession
All respondents 3.06 (1.20)
N = 646
2.78 (1.33)
N = 646
3.59 (1.07)
N = 648
3.07 (1.07)
N = 648
2.79 (1.34)
N = 647
3.29 (1.26)
N = 646
3.41 (1.11)
N = 646
2.57 (1.13)
N = 648
Difference  
Union membership
Members 3.06 (1.27)
N = 482
3.06(1.28)
N = 483
3.59 (1.05)
N = 484
3.08 (1.05)
N = 484
2.91 (1.33)
N = 483
3.67 (1.02)
N = 483
3.54 (1.04)
N = 482
2.59 (1.09)
N = 484
Non-members 3.06 (1.17)
N = 164
1.96 (1.13)
N = 163
3.58 (1.17)
N = 164
3.07 (1.13)
N = 164
2.43 (1.29)
N = 164
2.16 (1.29)
N = 163
3.02 (1.21)
N = 164
2.52 (1.25)
N = 164
Mean Difference n.s. 1.09***
t = 10.30
n.s. n.s. .48***
t = 4.09
1.51***
t = 14.25
.51***
t = 4.88
n.s.
Difference  
strike experience
Strike experience 3.20 (1.15)
N = 166
3.19 (1.22)
N = 166
3.72 (.94)
N = 166
3.19 (.97)
N = 166
2.99 (1.23) 
N = 166 
3.76 (1.06) 
N = 166
3.75 (…) 
N = 165 
2.83 (1.09) 
N = 166 
No strike 
experience
3.01 (1.21)
N = 480 
2.64 (1.34)
N = 480 
3.54 (1.12) 
N = 482 
3.03 (1.11)
N = 482 
2.72 (1.36) 
N = 481 
3.13 (1.28) 
N = 480 
3.29 (…) 
N = 481 
2.48 (1.13) 
N = 482 
Mean difference .19*
t = 1.89
.56***
t = 4.93
.18**
t = 2.03
.16* 
t = 1.71 
.27** 
t = 2.39 
.63*** 
t = 6.27
.46*** 
t = 5.22
.35***
t = 3.56 
Note: *** p< .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10 ; n.s. = no significant difference found.
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procedure to split information from the union into the same two categories: ‘small 
amount of information from the union’ (N = 329) and ‘large amount of information 
from the union’ (N = 317). Cross-tabulation showed that 129 respondents receive a 
large amount of information from management and from the union; in other words, 
129 respondents receive contradictory information. The results can be found in table 2. 
Next, I created a new variable with four categories (0 = ‘small amount of information 
from both sources’; 1 = ‘large amount of information from the union, small amount of 
information from management’; 2 = ‘small amount of information from the union, 
large amount of information from management’; and 3 = ‘contradictory information’). 
I used this variable to explore whether certain groups are more likely to receive 
contradictory information than are others. 
 I started by studying the difference between union members and non-members. 
I performed a chi-square test and found a significant difference between union 
members and non-members concerning contradictory information from the union 
and management. Union members are more likely to receive a large amount of 
information from the union or contradictory information. Non-members, however, 
are more likely to receive a large amount of information from management or little 
information from both sources (χ2 =113.5; df = 3; p< 0.001). Thus, union members are 
more likely to receive contradictory information than non-members. I depicted the 
results in figure 1.
Next, I explored the difference between workers with previous strike experience and 
those without previous strike experience using a chi-square test. The differences 
between these groups are significant. I found that workers with strike experience are 
more likely to receive information from the union and are more likely to receive 
contradictory information. Workers without strike experience are more likely to 
Table 2   Cross-tabulation of ‘information from union’ by ‘information from 
management’
Information from union
Information from management Low High Total
Low
% of total
N = 224
34.6%
N = 187
28.8%
N = 411
63.3%
High
% of total
N = 108
16.7%
N = 129
19.9%
N = 237
19.9%
Total N = 332
51.3%
N = 316
48.7%
N = 648
100%
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receive a large amount of information from management or to receive small amounts 
of information from both sources (χ2 =27.8; df = 3; p< 0.001). The results are depicted 
in figure 2. The difference between workers with strike experience and workers 
without previous strike experience are smaller than the differences I found concerning 
union membership. Based on the results of Cramer’s V test, I found that the 
relationship between contradictory information and union membership (Cramer’s 
V = .42) is stronger than the relationship between strike experience and contradictory 
information (Cramer’s V = .21).
Figure 1  Contradictory information by union membership
Note: Categories of contradictory information: 0 = ‘small amount of information from both sources’; 1 = 
‘large amount of information from the union, small amount of information from management’; 2 = ‘small 
amount of information from the union, large amount of information from management’; 3 = ‘contradictory 
information’.
Figure 2  Contradictory Information by previous strike experience
Note: Categories of contradictory information: 0 = ‘small amount of information from both sources’; 1 = 
‘large amount of information from the union, small amount of information from management’; 2 = ‘small 
amount of information from the union, large amount of information from management’; 3 = ‘contradictory 
information’.
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2.4.4.  Contradictory information and the relationship with identification 
and trust
Next, I was interested in whether workers who receive contradictory information 
score differently on identification with the union and management or differently on 
trust in the union and management. First, I needed to know more about identification 
and trust in general. Therefore, I started with a more general exploration of 
identification and trust. 
 I performed explorations for identification with management and identification 
with the union similar to those I did for information. Workers identify more with the 
union (M = 9.14) than with management (M = 7.61). In times of a looming conflict, 
identification with management decreases in comparison to times without conflict 
(M
D
 = -.069; p = .016). Workers identify more with the union in times of a looming 
conflict than in times without conflict (M
D
 = .058; p = .021).
 Next, I explored whether there are differences between union members and 
non-members. For identification with management, I found no significant differences 
between members and non-members. The two groups do differ significantly on 
identification with the union: members (M = 10.43) score significantly higher than 
non-members do (M = 5.33; M
D
 = 5.09; p = .000). I also explored the difference 
between workers with previous strike experience and those workers without such 
previous experience. I found that workers who experienced a strike in their 
organization (M = 8.06) significantly identify more with management than do workers 
without experience (M = 7.45; M
D
 = .61; p = .077). This is a remarkable finding because 
it implies that a previous strike does not harm identification with management. 
Moreover, workers with previous experience (M = 10.78) significantly identity more 
with the union than do workers without experience (M = 8.57; M
D
 = 2.21; p = .000). 
The results of these analyses can be found in table 3.
Next, I repeated the above explorations for trust. Trust in the union (M = 10.56) is 
higher than trust in management (M = 8.87). In times of a looming conflict, trust in 
management decreases in comparison to times without conflict (M
D
 = -.04; p = .009). 
I found no significant difference between trust in the union in a conflict-free situation 
and trust in the union in times of a looming conflict.
 Next, I explored whether there are differences between members and 
non-members. For trust in management, I found that non-members (M = 9.28) have 
significantly more trust in management than in union members (M = 8.75; M
D
 = .53; 
p = .080). The two groups also differ significantly on trust in the union; members 
(M = 11.37) score significantly higher than non-members (M = 8.04; M
D
 = 3.33; p = .000). 
Furthermore, I explored the difference between workers with previous strike 
experience and those workers without previous experience. I found that workers 
who experienced a strike in their organization (M = 9.23) have significantly more trust 
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in management than workers without experience (M = 8.75; M
D
 = .48; p = .085). 
Moreover, workers with previous experience (M = 11.28) have significantly more trust 
in the union than workers without experience (M = 10.31; M
D
 = .97; p = .000). The 
results of these analyses can be found in table 4. 
With the above information about identification and trust, I performed several Anova 
analyses to investigate whether the four groups I defined (concerning contradictory 
information) scored differently on identification with the union or management and 
trust in the union or management. 
 I found that workers who receive contradictory information score significantly 
higher on identification with management (M = 9.98) than workers who receive a 
large amount of information from the union and a small amount of information from 
management (M = 6.44; M
D
 = 3.56; p = .000). Moreover, workers who receive 
contradictory information score significantly higher on identification with 
management than those workers who receive small amounts of information from 
both sources (M = 6.16; M
D
 = 3.83; p = .000). There was no difference between 
Table 3   Mean values for identification by membership and previous strike 
experience (Independent sample T- test)
Identification Management Union
All respondents 7.61 (3.80)
N = 648
9.14 (3.92)
N = 648
Difference 
Union membership
Members 7.52 (3.77)
N = 484
10.43(3.32)
N = 484
Non-members 7.88 (3.90)
N = 164
5.33 (2.98)
N = 164
Mean Difference n.s. -5.09***
t = 18.35
Difference 
strike experience
Strike experience 8.06 (3.84)
N = 163
10.78 (3.36)
N = 166
No strike experience 7.45 (3.78)
N = 482 
8.57 (3.94)
N = 482 
Mean difference -.61*
t = 1.77
-2.21***
t = 6.98
Note: *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; n.s. = no significant difference found.
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workers who receive contradictory information and workers who receive high 
amounts of information from management. These results can be found in table 5. 
 For identification with the union, I found similar results. Workers who receive 
contradictory information (M = 11.06) score significantly higher on identification with 
the union than workers who receive high amounts of information from management 
(M = 6.36; M
D
 = 4.70; p =.000). Additionally, workers who receive contradictory 
information score significantly higher on identification with the union than workers 
who receive low amounts of information from both sources (M = 7.27; M
D
 = 4.39; 
p = .000). The results can be found in table 5. 
 These results show that workers score higher on identification with sources from 
which they receive a high amount of information. Performing another chi-square 
test, I found that workers who receive contradictory information are more likely to 
score high on identification with both the union and management than are those 
workers who do not receive contradictory information. Of the workers who receive 
contradictory information, 41.9% also fell into the category of high identification with 
both sources (χ2 =356.13; df = 9; p < 0.01; Cramer’s V = .428). 
Table 4   Mean values for trust by membership and previous strike experience 
(Independent sample T- test) 
Trust Management Union
All respondents 8.87 (3.14)
N = 634
10.56 (3.19)
N = 626
Difference 
Union membership
Members 8.75 (3.07)
N = 479
11.37(2.67)
N = 473
Non-members 9.28 (3.32)
N = 155
8.04 (3.35)
N = 153
Mean Difference .53*
t = 1.76
-3.33***
t = 11.22
Difference 
strike experience
Strike experience 9.23 (3.01)
N = 164
11.28 (2.63)
N = 161
No strike experience 8.75 (3.18)
N = 470 
10.31 (3.33)
N = 482 
Mean difference -.48*
t = 1.73
-97***
t = 3.75
Note: *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; n.s. = no significant difference found.
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Next, I performed additional Anova tests to explore whether those workers who 
receive contradictory information scored differently on trust in management or in 
the union. First, I found that workers who receive contradictory information (M = 
11.39) score significantly higher on trust in management than workers who receive 
low amounts of information from both management and the union (M = 7.32; M
D
 = 
4.07; p = .000) or workers who receive high amounts of information from the union 
(M = 7.83; M
D
 = 3.56; p = .000). The results can be found in table 5. 
 For trust in the union, I found that workers who receive contradictory information 
(M = 12.53) score significantly higher on trust in the union than workers who receive 
low amounts of information from both sources (M = 8.57; M
D
 = 3.96; p = .000) and 
workers who receive high amounts of information from management (M = 9.29; M
D
 = 
3.24; p = .000). The results can be found in table 5. 
 Thus, it seems that workers score high on trust in those sources from which they 
receive information. Just as I did for identification, I performed another chi-square 
test to explore whether workers who receive contradictory information are more 
likely to experience high levels of trust in both management and the union. Indeed, I 
found that 69.8% of the workers who receive contradictory information also score 
high on simultaneous trust in the union and trust in management (χ2 =357.12; df = 9; 
p< 0.01; Cramer’s V = .429).
Table 5  Contradictory information, identification and trust
Identification 
management
Identification 
union
Trust 
management
Trust
union
Mean
(N)
Mean
(N)
Mean
(N)
Mean
(N)
Small amount information
both sources
6.16
(224)
7.27
(224)
7.32
(219)
8.57
(218)
Large amount information union; 
small amount information 
management
6.44
(187)
11.66
(187)
7.83
(184)
12.34
(177)
Large amount information 
management; small amount 
information union
9.82
(108)
6.36
(108)
10.95
(105)
9.29
(104)
Contradictory information 9.98
(129)
11.06
(129)
11.39
(126)
12.53
(127)
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2.4.5. Simultaneous identification and simultaneous trust
In the theoretical framework of this study, I stated that people can simultaneously 
identify with multiple sources and that they can trust multiple sources at the same 
time. To explore whether workers experienced these possibly opposing types of 
pressures, I explored whether there are workers who identify highly with both 
management and the union simultaneously. I followed the same procedure as I did 
when exploring contradictory information. I created a variable with four categories: 
0 = ‘low identification with both sources’ (N = 266); 1 = ‘high identification with the 
union, low identification with management’ (N = 195); 2 = ‘low identification with the 
union, high identification with management’(N = 85); and 3 = ‘simultaneous 
identification’ (N = 102). Thus, 102 workers state that they simultaneously identify 
highly with both management and the union. 
 Next, I performed a chi-square test to explore whether the categories differ 
between members and non-members. The chi-square test was significant (χ2 =121.7; 
df = 3; p< 0.001). I found that non-members are more likely to have low identification 
with both sources or to identify highly with management (and have low identification 
with the union). Members are more likely to identify highly with the union or to 
identify highly with both sources. The Cramer’s V of this test is .433, which shows that 
union membership is a likely indicator of the category to which a worker belongs. The 
results are depicted in Figure 3. 
 I performed another chi-square test to explore the difference between workers 
with previous strike experience in their organization and workers without previous 
experience. The groups differ significantly on my four categories (χ2 =39.1; df = 3; 
p < 0.001). I found that workers who did experience a strike in their organization 
Figure 3   Simultaneous identification with management and the union by union 
membership
Note: Categories of simultaneous identification: 0 = ‘low identification with both sources’; 1 = ‘high 
identification with the union, low identification with management’; 2 = ‘low identification with the union, 
high identification with management’; 3 = ‘simultaneous identification’.
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identify more with the union and identify with the union and management simultaneously. 
Workers without strike experience either fall into the category of low identification 
for both sources or identify highly with management. Cramer’s V is .246, which 
implies that having previous strike experience is a less strong predictor of simultaneous 
identification than is union membership. The results are depicted in figure 4. 
Furthermore, as I did for information and identification, I created four categories to 
explore how many workers have high trust in both management and the union 
simultaneously (0 = ‘small amount of trust in both sources’; 1 = ‘large amount of trust 
in the union, small amount of trust in management’; 2 = ‘small amount of trust in the 
union, large amount of trust in management’; and 3 = ‘simultaneous trust’). Next, I 
studied the difference between union members and non-members. I performed a 
chi-square test and found a significant difference between union members and 
non-members concerning simultaneous trust in management and the union. Union 
members are more likely to highly trust the union and highly trust in both the union 
and management simultaneously, whereas non-members are more likely to highly 
trust management or have little trust in either source (χ2 =123.4.5; df = 3; p< 0.001, 
Cramer’s V = .436). The results are depicted in figure 5.
 I performed another chi-square test to explore the difference between workers 
with previous strike experience in their organization and workers without previous 
experience. The groups differ significantly on my four categories concerning 
simultaneous trust (χ2 =12.4; df = 3; p< 0.01; Cramer’s V = .138). I found that workers 
who did experience a strike in their organization highly trust the union or trust the 
Figure 4   Simultaneous identification with management and the union by previous 
strike experience
Note: Categories of simultaneous identification: 0 = ‘low identification with both sources’; 1 = ‘high 
identification with the union, low identification with management’; 2 = ‘low identification with the union, 
high identification with management’; 3 = ‘simultaneous identification’.
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union and management simultaneously. Workers without strike experience either fall 
into the category of little trust in management and the union or they highly trust 
management. These results are depicted in figure 6. 
2.4.7. Work council
When describing the different sources of information, I explained that work councils 
have a dual role in organizations; they represent workers and at the same time must 
provide information to and from the employer. Therefore, I explored this source of 
information a little further. I already showed that union members receive more 
Figure 5  Simultaneous trust in management and the union by union membership
Note: Categories of simultaneous trust: 0 = ‘small amount of trust in both sources’; 1 = ‘large amount of 
trust in the union, small amount of trust in management’; 2 = ‘small amount of trust in the union, large 
amount of trust in management’; 3 = simultaneous trust’. 
Figure 6   Simultaneous trust in management and the union by previous strike 
experience
Note: Categories of simultaneous trust: 0 = ‘small amount of trust in both sources’; 1 = ‘large amount of 
trust in the union, small amount of trust in management’; 2 = ‘small amount of trust in the union, large 
amount of trust in management’; 3 = simultaneous trust’.
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information from the work council than non-members and that workers who 
previously experienced a strike within their organization receive more information 
from the work council than workers without such experience (see table 1). 
 Of my respondents, 211 workers (32.6%) receive a large amount of information 
from the work council. Cross tabulation showed that 107 workers (16.6%) receive 
large amounts of information from both the work council and management. 
Moreover, 155 workers (24.0%) simultaneously receive large amounts of information 
from the work council and the union. I also explored whether there are workers who 
simultaneously receive large amounts of information from management, the union 
and the work council; I found that this scenario applies to 76 workers (11.7%). 
 Finally, I explored whether workers who receive a large amount of information 
from the work council differed from those who receive little information from the 
work council concerning their identification with and trust in management and the 
union. I found that workers who receive a large amount of information from the work 
council score significantly higher on identification with management (M = 8.17) and 
identification with the union (M = 11.04) than workers who receive a small amount of 
information from the work council (identification management: M = 7.35; M
D
 = .813; p 
= .011; identification union: m = 8.22; M
D
 = 2.82; p = .000). For trust, I found that 
workers who receive a large amount of information from the work council (M = 9.59) 
score significantly higher on trust in management than workers who receive a small 
amount of information from the work council (M = 8.55; M
D
 = 1.04; p = .000). The 
same applies to trust in the union; workers who receive a large amount of information 
from the work council (M = 11.92) score significantly higher on trust in the union than 
workers who receive a small amount of information (M = 9.90; M
D
 = 2.02; p = .000). 
2.5. Discussion and conclusion
I began this exploratory study with the question of whether workers have access to 
information from possibly opposing sources and how these sources are assessed. I 
expected that workers use more sources than only the union, and I indeed found that 
both sources within the organization (management, colleagues, shop stewards and 
the work council) and sources outside the organization (the union, people with the 
same profession elsewhere and the media) are used in times of a looming conflict.
 I found that, in times of looming conflict, the union is not the source that provides 
most information; workers receive most information from their direct colleagues and 
from the media. I also found that, overall, union members receive more information 
from the sources I defined than non-members. The same applies to workers with 
previous strike experience; these workers receive more information from the sources 
I explored than workers without experience. Due to previous strike experience, 
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workers are likely to have built an informational network that leads them to receive 
more information than their counterparts.
 An important finding is the difference between workers with and without 
experience concerning the information they have access to from people with the 
same profession outside the own organization. Workers with experience receive 
more information from people with the same profession elsewhere than those 
without strike experience. Biggs (2002) suggests that workers use information from 
strikes elsewhere to assess the likelihood of success of their own strike. This spread of 
information seems to depend on previously militant workers. Workers without 
previous experience may lack the (network) connections that those with experience 
have obtained during previous strikes. 
 An important finding of this study is that information from management, 
identification with management and trust in management are reported to decrease 
in times of a looming conflict. Although it could be beneficial for management to keep 
workers from participating in a protest and thus to engage in counter-mobilizing 
behavior, workers report management to be ‘more silent’ and a less credible source 
of information than in regular times.
 I found that workers do receive contradictory information in times of a looming 
conflict, and they do receive information from multiple sources at the same time. I 
also explored to what extent workers receive high amounts of information from two 
likely opposing sources, namely the union and management. I found that union 
members are more likely to receive contradictory information; these workers have 
greater access to information from the union than their counterparts and receive 
more information from management in the organization for which they work. 
Workers who have previously experienced a strike in their organization are also more 
likely to receive contradictory information, although this relationship is less strong.
 I also found that workers who receive contradictory information score high on 
identification with and trust in both management and the union simultaneously. In 
my theoretical framework, both identification and trust are mechanisms that are 
used to assess information. This indicates that workers experience pressure not only 
from receiving contradictory information but also from identifying with both 
management and the union simultaneously. Workers can identify with more than one 
group simultaneously (Charness et al., 2007; Ellemers et al., 2004), and this then 
raises the question of how identification is used as a filter of information. Future 
research should therefore investigate how the two mechanisms are used as filters of 
information if workers are confronted with pressures from both of these sources (i.e., 
management and the union). 
My exploratory study contributes to research in protest participation because it 
shows that those individuals who must make a participation decision likely receive 
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information from multiple, possibly opposing actors. This could lead to different 
pressures; both mobilizing and de-mobilizing actors can provide information to affect 
the individual’s decision. This study provides a first insight into the multiple actors 
that will all provide information to individuals in times of a looming protest. I found 
that workers receive information from many sources that are likely to take opposing 
stances concerning the strike. Focusing solely on the union as the mobilizing actor 
that will affect workers’ participation decision is therefore too limited; many more 
sources will offer information and might try to influence workers’ decisions. Therefore, 
future research should consider more sources than only the union as a mobilizing 
actor.
This explorative study has several limitations that should be addressed in future 
research. First, I asked workers to make a distinction between information in a normal 
(conflict-free) situation and information they receive in times of conflict. Although I 
find differences between the amount of information received from the union and 
shop stewards in a normal and a conflict situation, this difference is based on 
responses at one point of measurement. In fact, to investigate whether there is a 
difference in information received at different points in time, longitudinal research 
should be conducted; with longitudinal research, information flows before, during 
and after the strike can be investigated. Second, the investigation of sources of 
information would benefit from nested groups; the amount of information that flows 
between colleagues, how management responds to information from the union and 
vice versa can be researched more accurately without relying on cross-sectional data. 
Third, future research should consider the information content. I made assumptions 
about the goal of my defined sources of information and about whether they would 
be proponents or opponents of the strike. However, without knowing the content of 
the information, the stance of the sources of information concerning strike 
participation cannot be stated with certainty. Finally, although this exploratory study 
offers a first indication that workers use multiple sources of information in times of 
conflict, the question remains concerning how workers address this (possibly 
contradictory) information and how it affects workers’ participation decisions. Future 
research should investigate how workers decide which source(s) to use.
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3.1. Introduction 
For decades, individual participation in collective protest has been a subject of 
research (e.g., Klandermans 1984; Olson 1965; Van Zomeren and Spears 2009). Yet, 
the question of why some individuals actively and voluntarily participate in collective 
protest, and others choose not to get involved, is not fully understood. Researchers 
have offered a number of complementary explanations for individual participation, 
such as identification, efficacy, and injustice (for an overview see: Van Zomeren, 
Spears, & Leach, 2008). Social identification is considered a strong predictor of 
participation in collective protest (De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999). When people 
identify with a group that is treated unjustly or identify with the mobilizing actor, 
participation is more likely (De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Klandermans, 2002, 
2004). The perceived injustice then translates into action via social identification 
(Kelly, 1998). Social identity is defined as a person’s sense of self derived from different 
social groupings to which the individual belongs (Ashfort & Mael, 1989; Kelly, 1998). 
A shared identity can develop among individuals who experience the same grievances 
or injustice and attribute these to another group. Social identification is used to 
assess information that individuals receive during times of potential collective 
protest. Individuals need to assess whether the information they receive is useful 
(Klandermans, 2004). Individuals tend to evaluate the information from members of 
their own group as more useful and will more likely use the information from sources 
they regard as similar to themselves (McAdam & Rucht, 1993). Moreover, group 
members are perceived to be more trustworthy than others (Kane, Argote & Levine, 
2005). An individual’s decision about participation will depend on whether the source 
of information is perceived as trustworthy. 
 Previous studies on the relation between social identification and participation 
in collective protest focus on identification with one group exclusively: the mobilizing 
group, such as a union or social movement. Social identification in most empirical 
contexts, however, is not necessarily restricted to one exclusive social group; 
individuals are part of different groups, and they may identify with these different 
groups simultaneously (Charness, Rigotti & Rustichini, 2007; Ellemers, de Gilder & 
Haslam, 2004). 
 During labor strikes, the empirical context of this study, workers may not only 
identify with the union, but also with several other social groups such as their team, 
the workers of the organization, or even with management. When a strike is looming, 
potentially all of these different groups will call upon the worker to follow their lead 
(Krackhardt, 1999). This clamoring from various groups creates a situation in which 
the worker is confronted with diffuse and conflicting information from groups with 
whom he or she identifies. Tindall (2002) argues that more research is necessary to 
better understand the influence of several groups in mobilization processes. Previous 
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research exclusively focused on identification with the mobilizing group, obscuring 
our understanding of how identification affects participation decisions of individuals 
who identify with multiple groups and preventing detailed empirical testing of the 
underlying mechanisms of identification and trust as filters of information (Griffin, 
Wallace & Rubin, 1986). In this study, we explore the role of social identification with 
two groups that are potentially important for a worker during strikes: (a) the union 
and (b) management. Does the worker follow the group with whom he or she identifies 
most, as social identity theory predicts? 
 We will investigate the effect of the amount of information workers receive from 
both the union and management on their willingness to participate. Subsequently, 
we analyze the underlying mechanisms of social identification and trust as filters of 
information. This study contributes to our understanding of individual participation 
in collective protest by investigating the role of information from groups workers 
identify with and trust, as well as what happens when individuals are confronted with 
conflicting information from these groups. We use survey data of 468 respondents, 
collected in October 2010. 
3.2. Theory
3.2.1. Information from multiple groups during mobilization
If workers need to make a decision about participation in a possible strike, the first 
prerequisite is information about the conflict gleaned from the union and 
management. We argue that when a strike is looming, both the union and management 
may attempt to inform workers about the conflict and consequences of participation. 
First, we investigate the union, which is likely to offer information about why a strike 
is necessary to make the employer concede to the union’s demands. Second, we 
focus on the management, which may provide information on the consequences of 
the union’s demands or their own view of the collective bargaining process 
(Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, 1995). The amount of information available from the 
union and management may vary between workers. For example, unions may spread 
information to mobilize workers by a direct appeal to its members or indirectly via its 
shop stewards, or through campaigns using union leaflets or mass media (Connell & 
Cohn, 1995). This information may be more accessible for members of the union than 
for non-members. Likewise, management may be reluctant to share information with 
certain (especially militant) workers. Because we assume that management will want 
to prevent workers’ participation in a strike and unions will want to stimulate workers 
to participate in it, we expect that information from the union will positively affect 
willingness to participate, whereas information from management will have a 
negative effect. This leads to the following hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 1a: The more information a union provides, the more workers are 
willing to participate in a strike. 
Hypothesis 1b: The more information management provides, the less workers are 
willing to participate in a strike. 
In addition to these generally clear-cut situations, workers are subject to information, 
opinions and pressures from both the union and management simultaneously during 
a looming strike. Considering their conflicting intentions, we assume that information 
provided by the union and management is contradictory. The theory of cross-pressures 
argues that when individuals experience conflicting pressures from others in their 
social network, these cross-pressures lead to feelings of stress and discomfort (Horan, 
1971). As a result, individuals experiencing this kind of stress are likely to avoid making 
a decision (Mutz, 2002). Cross-pressure is therefore considered “an inhibitor of 
participation” (Powell, 1976, p.2). Moreover, Tindall (2002) and McAdam and Paulsen 
(1993) make the theoretical assumption that participation is more likely when there is 
no opposition from other groups important to the individual. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1c: The positive effect of information from the union on willingness to 
participate will decrease as the amount of information from management increases. 
3.2.2. Social identification
Although information is the first prerequisite for making a decision about participation, 
workers need to evaluate this information. We argue that workers use social 
identification, as proposed by social identity theory, to assess the information they 
receive. Social identification is considered a main determinant for participation 
(Klandermans, 2002, 2004). Through social identification, norms are formed within a 
group; people expect group members to assess situations and stimuli in the same 
way as they do. In the empirical context of this study, workers can identify with 
multiple groups, and we therefore elaborate on identification with the union and 
management.
 First, the union will call upon workers to participate in a strike. Empirical research 
shows that ample variation in union identification among employees and union 
members exists (Dawkins & Frass, 2005; Metochi, 2002) and that the likelihood of 
participation increases when one identifies with a union (Buttigieg, Deery & Iverson, 
2008; Simon & Klandermans, 2001). We argue that management also makes efforts 
to counter the mobilization of the union (Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, 1995), and 
almost certainly wants to prevent a strike, for example, by attempting to restore or 
establish cooperative relationships with its workers (Heery & Simms, 2010). We 
expect that high management identification will decrease the willingness to strike. 
The above considerations lead to the following hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 2a: The level of identification with the union positively affects 
willingness to participate.
Hypothesis 2b: The level of identification with management negatively affects 
willingness to participate.
If identification with a group is the main determinant for participation, which group 
will a worker follow when he or she identifies with several groups simultaneously? 
Social identity theory offers a solution to this question by arguing that individuals 
who identify with multiple groups at the same time will follow the behavior of the 
group they identify with most (Ashfort & Mael, 1989; Haslam, 2001). When a union 
calls for a strike and a worker identifies mostly with the union, we expect, ceteris 
paribus, on the basis of social identity theory, that a worker will participate in the 
strike. Assuming that management wants to prevent the strike, we expect that 
highest identification with management will have a negative effect on a worker’s 
willingness to participate in a strike. We argue that the theory of cross-pressures also 
applies to social identification, and we investigate what happens when workers 
experience cross-pressures in the form of identification with both the union and 
management. We expect that when workers identify with both management and the 
union simultaneously, they experience cross-pressures from these two different 
groups, which will lead to a decrease in participation willingness, since cross-pressu-
res work as “an inhibitor of participation” (Powell, 1976, p.2).1 This leads to the 
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2c: The positive effect of identification with the union on willingness 
to participate will decrease as identification with management increases. 
3.2.3. Trust
Although the effect of identification is supported by ample empirical research, we 
argue the effect of simultaneous high identification with conflicting groups may be 
less straightforward and that two additional processes affect the mechanisms of 
identification with conflicting groups. Ashfort and Mael (1989,p.31) report that dealing 
with two identities simultaneously can lead to “double standards and apparent 
hypocrisy” and “selective forgetting.” They provide an example of a foreman who 
forgets the previous standards to which he formerly abided when he was still a 
worker. The processes of double standards and selective forgetting may be considered 
to be ways of reducing conflict between two identities. 
 In addition, Williams (2001) argues that in situations in which individuals have to 
deal with conflicting groups they identify with, ‘negative beliefs’ are necessary to 
mobilize individuals for one of the groups. Competitive interdependence is necessary 
for the creation of negative beliefs about the other group. Such a competitive inter-
dependence arises when one of the groups presents a threat to reaching the goals of 
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the other group, while both groups need each other to reach their goals. Labor 
conflict is a quintessential example of such a competitive interdependence: 
management refuses to concede to the union’s demands, while both union and 
management need each other to reach a collective agreement. On the basis of the 
suggested mechanism of competitive interdependence, we argue that in a situation 
in which workers have to choose between the union and management, the key 
mechanism is trust: the belief people have that others, even with conflicting goals, 
will not act in a way that hinders them in reaching their own goals. Trust will enable 
people to decide who they can and should rely on during conflict (Kane et al., 2005). 
Thus, the decision of workers to participate in a strike is based on identification and 
on the level of trust they have in each of the conflicting groups. Workers need to trust 
that the union and management are credible sources of information (Klandermans, 
1997). We expect that in times of a looming strike, trust in the union will positively 
affect one’s willingness to participate in a strike. In addition, while keeping the 
assumption that management wants to prevent a strike and strives for a peaceful 
solution to the conflict, we expect that trust in management negatively affects one’s 
willingness to participate in a strike. 
 We want to investigate whether the theory of cross-pressures also holds for 
trust; when workers both trust the union and management to act in their best 
interest, is the positive effect of the union on willingness to participate weakened, as 
Mutz (2002) and Powell (1976) argue? This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a: High levels of trust in the union positively affect willingness to 
participate.
Hypothesis 3b: High levels of trust in the management negatively affect willingness 
to participate. 
Hypothesis 3c: The positive effect of trust in the union on willingness to participate 
will be weaker as trust in management increases. 
3.2.4. Interaction identification and trust 
Although some social psychology scholars who investigate trust (Kramer, 1999; 
Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer 1998; Wicks, 
Berman & Jones, 1999) consider it a separate construct from social identification and 
state that several conditions are necessary for trust to develop, Burke and Stets 
(1999) and Voci (2006) argue that trust is closely related to social identification. When 
individuals identify strongly with a group, they may ascribe positive attributes to 
other members of that group. One of those potential attributes includes trust (Burke 
& Stets, 1999), and group members are often perceived to be more trustworthy than 
nongroup members (Kane et al., 2005). Trust is then attributed based on group 
membership rather than past experience (Peteraf & Shanley 1997) — that is, members 
of one’s own group are trusted because they are members of the group, not 
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necessarily because they exhibited trustworthy behavior in the past. The theories 
elaborated in the works of these authors therefore imply that social identification 
and trust are related. Even though we expect autonomous effects of both identification 
and trust, we also expect an interaction effect between the two mechanisms because 
the two may also be related and enhance each other’s effect. This knowledge leads to 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4a: The positive effect of identification with the union on willingness 
to participate increases when trust in the union is higher. 
Hypothesis 4b: The negative effect of identification with the management on 
willingness to participate increases when trust in the management is higher. 
Figure 1 depicts our conceptual model and the hypothesized effects. The model 
predicts that social identification and trust are used to assess the information given 
by the union and management. This model will be used to investigate whether this 
assumption holds true—that is, we analyze whether there are direct effects of 
information on willingness to participate and whether identification and trust are 
used to filter information. 
3.3. Data and methods
Since Dutch union members are the subjects of our empirical analysis, we offer a brief 
description of the Dutch labor relations. Approximately 24 percent of Dutch employees 
are union members: of these, around 90 percent hold membership in one of three 
union confederations, while the remaining 10 percent belong to an independent union. 
About 60 percent of union members are older than 45, and 70 percent are male (Van 
Cruchten & Kuipers, 2008). Union membership is voluntary, and union membership 
can be based on occupational level, profession, or denomination. Strikes are official 
and legal when organized by a union. Although employers are allowed to withhold 
salary,2 other punishments for strike participation, such as firing, are illegal. Unions 
usually compensate their members for their loss of income during the strike, albeit 
usually only partly. Employees joining the union during a strike usually receive a lower 
strike benefit. The hiring of temporary workers to replace strikers is not allowed.3
3.3.1. The respondents
The hypotheses are tested using data from 468 members of the Christian Dutch Trade 
Union Confederation (CNV), the second largest union in the Netherlands. The CNV 
organizes 350,000 employees in both the private and public sectors.4 Considering 
age and gender, our sample represents the CNV union members and the Dutch union 
population fairly well. 
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A web-based survey was designed to study several aspects of the respondents’ 
willingness to participate in collective protest. The survey was distributed to 800 
panel members. Respondents who fully completed the questionnaire had the chance 
to win a 25 Euro voucher.5 In total, 468 members completed the questionnaire, which is 
a response rate of 58 percent. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of these 
respondents.
3.3.2. Dependent variable
The overall dependent variable in this article is willingness to participate in a future 
strike for a wage increase. The respondents were asked to rate their willingness to 
participate in a future strike for a wage increase on a Likert scale, ranging from 1 (“not 
at all”) to 5 (“highly likely”). Several authors have criticized the use of intended 
participation in a hypothetical future strike to measure individual willingness since 
intended participation would not be the same as actual participation (Gallagher & 
Strauss, 1991; McClendon & Klaas, 1993). One could avoid this problem by questioning 
respondents the moment an actual strike breaks out, but this is difficult to realize as 
strikes are hard to predict, and gaining access to strikers has proven to be problematic 
(Klandermans & Smith, 2002). One could also use past participation as a measure. 
Such a research design, however, brings about serious causality problems, as shown 
by research on social identification and participation. Some researchers pose the 
question of whether employees express more willingness to participate in a strike 
because they identify with the union, or whether this identification is caused by 
previous participation (Klandermans & Smith, 2002; Simon & Klandermans, 2001). 
We can make a similar argument relating to trust: did trust in the union as an 
information source cause past participation, or is this trust caused by earlier 
participation? To avoid these biases, we use intended participation. Fishbein and 
Ajzen (1975), in their theory of reasoned action, state that intentions are congruent 
with actions. Moreover, this theory argues that intended participation is the second 
best predictor of actual participation, after past participation (Kelloway, 1998). Hence, 
we argue that for the purpose of this paper willingness to participate in a future strike 
for a wage increase is the most valid measure available.6 We chose wages because 
wage disputes are the most frequent cause of strikes in the Netherlands (Van der 
Velden, 2000).
3.3.3. Independent variables 
The amount of information was measured using one item, namely “do you receive 
information from…” Respondents were asked specifically to rate the information 
given by the union and management “in times of a looming conflict about a collective 
agreement.” The respondents were asked to rate the amount of information they 
received from the two groups (the union and management) on a Likert scale from 1 
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(“no information”) to 5 (“plenty of information”). We created an interaction variable 
to test hypothesis 1c, which predicts that the positive effect of information from the 
union on willingness to participate will be weaker as information from management 
increases. We centered both variables—that is, information from the union and 
information from management—by subtracting the mean from each score. The scales 
are centered to create a variable in which zero is a meaningful value. This modification 
makes the results easier to interpret and avoids a high correlation between the 
product term and the two predictors of which the product term consists (Aguinis, 
2004; Aiken & West, 1991). 
 Social identification with the union (α = .940) and management (α = .928) was 
measured on a scale consisting of three items based on previous research on 
identification with groups (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans & van Dijk, 2011; Van 
Zomeren, Spears, Fischer & Leach 2004; Van Zomeren et al., 2008;): “I belong to…,” 
“I feel related to…,” and “I feel connected to…” Again, we specifically asked 
respondents to rate identification with both the union and management “in times of 
a looming conflict about a collective agreement.” Identification with each group was 
rated on a five-point Likert scale. We made a sum scale of identification by adding 
these three items together. We created another interaction variable, in a similar 
fashion as described for the information variable, to test hypothesis 2c, which predicts 
that the positive effect of identification with the union on willingness to participate 
will be weaker as identification with management increases. 
 We measured trust in the union (α = .889) and management (α = .911) using three 
items (Butler, 1991; Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Mayer et al., 1995): “Do you trust…will keep 
their word,” “ Do you trust…is honest” and “Do you trust the advice of….” These items 
measure whether workers trust that the union and management are credible sources 
Table 1  Characteristics of respondents
Characteristics Percentage (N)
Contract Tenured
Nontenured
Unemployed
79.1
4.5
14.8
370
21
69
Education Elementary school
Lower secondary education
Higher secondary education
Tertiary education
2.8
18.8
33.0
44.7
13
88
151
209
Male 77.4 362
Age 52.4 years SD = 8.8 year
Note: Unemployed respondents were either looking for a job, unemployed due to illness, or retired.
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of information (Klandermans, 1997). Again, respondents were asked to rate these 
groups “in times of a looming conflict about a collective agreement” on a five-point 
Likert scale. We made a sum scale of trust by adding these three items together. 
We created another interaction variable, in a similar fashion as described for the 
information and identification variables, to test hypothesis 3c, which predicts that 
the positive effect of trust in the union on willingness to participate will be weaker 
as trust in management increases.
To test hypotheses 4a and 4b, which state that the positive effect of identification on 
willingness to participate will be stronger as trust increases, we created two more 
interaction variables, consisting of the identification and trust scales. Since we 
centered the scales, the correlation between the product terms and the interaction 
variable remains low. 
 Table 2 shows the correlation analysis of the dependent variable and the 
independent variables. This analysis reveals that the correlations between social 
identification and trust are higher than .50 and significant (p < .01) for both the union 
(R = .555) and the management (R = .617). 
 To determine statistically that our social identification and trust scales indeed 
measure two different constructs, we performed principal component analyses with 
Varimax rotation for both groups. These analyses showed two different factors with 
an Eigenvalue greater than 1 for social identification and trust. Table 3 shows the 
results of these analyses and supports the construct validity of our measures. Hence, 
we deem the different scales valid to measure social identification and trust as two 
different constructs. 
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3.4. Results
One of the main questions addressed in this study is whether workers use identification 
and trust to assess the information they receive in times of a looming strike. Structural 
equation modeling allows us to investigate whether identification and trust are used 
as filters of information and how this affects the willingness to participate in a future 
strike. We perform a path analysis using Lisrel 8.80. We test our conceptual model 
(see figure 1) against an alternative model. In the second model we test, identification 
is not a filter of information, but rather information is assessed only by trust, as 
Klandermans (1997) argues that individuals assess information by determining the 
trustworthiness of the source of information.7 We use maximum likelihood testing 
because this technique is generally consistent when testing larger samples (Kelloway, 
1995). 
 First, we test our conceptual model, in which we assess if identification and trust 
are used as filters of information. In other words, we test for direct effects of 
information on willingness to participate and for indirect effects of information via 
identification and trust — that is, is information mediated by identification and trust? 
The fit indices for this analysis can be found in table 4. Our conceptual model does 
not offer a very good fit. In this model, identification with the union seems to be a 
Table 3  Results of principal component analysis of identification and trust scales
Identification 
with the union
Trust in  
the union
Identification with 
management
Trust in 
management
Factor 1
Eigenvalue:
4.00
Factor 2
Eigenvalue:
1.15
Factor 1
Eigenvalue:
4.18
Factor 2
Eigenvalue:
1.00
Percent squared loadings 
(after rotation)
44.57% 41.22% 43.43% 42.89%
1.  I belong to… .893 .260 .897 .237
2.  I feel related to… .921 .287 .889 .327
3.  I feel connected  to .900 .270 .864 .356
4.  Do you trust that…  
will keep their word?
.273 .863 .285 .881
5.  Do you trust that …  
is honest?
.207 .904 .287 .891
6.  Do you trust the 
advice of…?
.315 .830 .316 .845
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filter for information from the union, yet we have to be cautious drawing conclusions 
about the model because it does not have an outstanding fit.
 In addition to our conceptual model, we tested an alternative model in which 
trust is the filter of information instead of identification. Klandermans (1997) argues 
that a source’s perceived credibility is important when individuals assess information. 
This model proves to be a much better fit for the data than our conceptual model (see 
table 4).
The χ2 statistic is still significant, and while a nonsignificant χ2 indicates a good fit 
(Kelloway, 1995), this result could be caused by our sample size, which is greater than 
2008 (Kelloway, 1998). The RMSEA (.057) shows a good fit to the model, as it is below 
the threshold of .06 (Hu & Bentler, 1999; MacCallum, Browne & Sugawara, 1996; 
McDonald & Moon-Ho, 2002). The GFI (0.95), the AGFI (0.93) and the CFI (0.92) all 
meet the required standards of 0.90 (Hooper, Coughlan & Mullen, 2008). The NFI 
(0.88) has a value slightly below the thresholds of 0.90 and 0.95 (Hooper et al., 2008). 
The PNFI (0.80) and the PGFI (0.73) are both higher than those found in our conceptual 
model, which indicates this alternative model is better than the conceptual model: 
ideally, these indices should be closer to 1 (Kelloway, 1998). Thus, model 2 is considered 
a good fit for the data and a vast improvement over our conceptual model. Model 2 
is shown in figure 2.
3.4.1. Direct and interaction effects
Model 2 provides interesting results. The model shows that hypothesis 1a is confirmed; 
more information from the union increases one’s willingness to participate. 
Hypothesis 1b, which indicates that more information from management leads to a 
decrease in willingness to participate, is rejected; the amount of information from 
management does not have a significant effect on willingness to participate. This 
implies that offering information is a successful strategy for the union to increase 
workers’ willingness to participate, whereas for management, offering information to 
prevent workers from striking does not matter. Hypothesis 1c, which states that the 
positive effect of information from the union on willingness to participate weakens 
Table 4  LISREL fit indices for the conceptual model and model 2
χ2(df) p GFI AGFI RMSEA NFI CFI PNFI PGFI
Conceptual 
Model
202.54
(56)
0.00 0.92 0.89 0.081 0.83 0.86 0.70 0.66
Model 2 138.73
(60)
0.00 0.95 0.93 0.057 0.88 0.92 0.80 0.73
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when information from management increases, is rejected. We expected to find a 
negative effect of information from both the union and management simultaneously, 
that is, workers experience cross-pressures in the form of information, yet we find no 
such effect. 
 Hypothesis 2a, which states that identification with the union leads to an increase 
in willingness to participate, is confirmed. This is consistent with the findings of 
previous research, which demonstrates that identification with the union increases 
participation willingness (e.g., Klandermans, 2002, 2004) We expected to find an 
opposite effect for identification with management, namely, that it would decrease 
willingness to participate (hypothesis 2b) because management wants to prevent a 
strike. However, no such effect was found, and hypothesis 2b is rejected. Moreover, 
the interaction variable that measures the cross-pressures of identification, that is, 
identifying with both the union and management, does not have a significant effect 
on our dependent variable. Therefore, hypothesis 2c is also rejected: the positive 
effect of identification with the union on willingness to participate is not decreased 
by simultaneous identification with management. 
 Hypothesis 3a states that trust in the union increases willingness to participate in 
a future strike. This hypothesis is rejected. Trust in management does have a 
significant negative effect on willingness to participate, however, which leads us to 
accept hypothesis 3b. This implies that workers’ beliefs that the union will act in their 
best interest do not do much to increase workers’ participation willingness, whereas 
trust in management does significantly decrease workers’ willingness to participate. 
The variable that measures the cross-pressures of trust also does not produce a 
significant effect. Consequently, hypothesis 3c is also rejected. Again, the positive 
effect of trust in the union on willingness to participate is not weakened by 
simultaneous trust in management. 
 Hypothesis 4a states that the positive effect of identification with the union on 
willingness to participate increases when trust in the union is higher. This hypothesis 
is confirmed: the interaction variable of identification and trust in the union has a 
significant direct effect on willingness to participate. This means that workers who 
both identify with the union and trust the union are more willing to participate than 
those workers who either only identify with or only have trust in the union. However, 
while interpreting this interaction we should bear in mind that the two variables are 
considerably correlated (R = .555). The interaction variable for identification with and 
trust in management, however, does not offer significant results. Hypothesis 4b has 
to be rejected.9 Table 5 summarizes the results of tests of the alternative model 2 (as 
well as the results of the conceptual model).
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3.4.2. Indirect effects
Structural equation modeling also allows us to test whether information is filtered by 
trust. We find that information from the union is not filtered by trust; the indirect 
effect of information via trust is not significant. Interestingly, trust in management is 
a filter for information from management. The indirect negative effect of information 
on willingness to participate via trust is significant (t = -1.90, p < 0.10).
Table 5  Standardized parameter values of tested models based on LISREL analyses
Parameter Conceptual  
model
Model 2
All respondents Workers with strike 
experience
Workers without 
strike experience
γ
1,2 
0.13**  0.13**  0.15***  0.12*
γ
1,3 
-0.09 -0.09 -0.16*** -0.25***
γ
1,4
-0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10*
γ
1,5
 0.13**  0.13**  0.16***  0.15**
γ
1,6
-0.07 -0.07 -0.10* -0.12*
γ
1,7
-0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08
γ
1,8
 0.06  0.06  0.06  0.18**
γ
1,9
-0.13** -0.13* -0.12* -0.11
 γ
1,10
 0.07  0.07  0.07  0.14*
 γ
1,11
 0.10**  0.10**  0.10**  0.14***
 γ
1,12
 0.07  0.07  0.07  0.15**
γ
5,2
 0.44***  n.a n.a  n.a 
γ
6,3
 0.51***  n.a  n.a  n.a
γ
8,2
 0.43***  0.43***  0.42***  0.44***
γ
8,5
 0.37***  0.37***  0.38***  0.35***
γ
9,3
 0.44***  0.44***  0.45***  0.47***
γ
9,6
 0.39***  0.39***  0.38***  0.36***
Indirect effects model 2
 γ
1,(8,2)
n.a  0.03 0.03 0.08**
 γ
1,(8,5)
n.a  0.02  0.02  0.06**
 γ
1,(9,3)
n.a -0.06*  -0.05*  -0.05
 γ
1,(9,6)
n.a -0.05*  -0.05*  -0.04
Note: * < .10 (t between 1.65 and 1.96); ** < .05 (t between 1.96 and 2.58); *** < .01 (t greater than 2.58)
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One possible bias that could influence these results is whether or not the union 
members in our dataset ever experienced a strike in their organization before. 
Workers who never experienced a strike have to rely on hearsay or have to come up 
with answers about how to deal with a possible future strike. To control for such a 
bias, we retested model 2 separately for workers who did experience a strike in their 
organization in the past (N = 117) and workers who never experienced a strike in their 
organization before (N = 286). Please note that experiencing a strike in the organization 
does not necessarily mean that the respondent participated in that strike. When 
testing the model with union members who experienced a strike before, the results 
of the whole sample are reproduced with only one exception: information from 
management does have a significant negative effect on willingness to participate for 
union members that already experienced a strike in their organization. 
 For workers who never experienced a strike, however, the model turns out quite 
different. For these workers, only information from management has a significant 
negative effect on willingness to participate, whereas only trust in the union positively 
affects our dependent variable. Interestingly, for the inexperienced union members 
we do find cross-pressure effects. Information from both the union and management 
indeed inhibits participation willingness. This confirms hypothesis 1c for the inexperienced 
union members. More importantly, when these workers experience high trust in both 
the union and management, their willingness to participate increases. This means 
that when these workers experience cross-pressures in the form of trust, this does 
not inhibit participation (as expected), but it increases participation willingness. The 
results of this analysis can be found in table 5. A possible explanation for this finding 
is that the workers who did not experience a strike in the past lack experience with 
management’s response to strikes: inexperienced workers might believe that 
management will understand their decision to strike and trust that management will 
not hold their participation against them. Thus, the testing of these two groups 
separately shows that there is indeed a difference between those workers who did 
experience a strike before and workers who never experienced a strike. 
5. Discussion
We began our study with two questions: (1) how do identification and trust work as 
filters for information and how do they affect willingness to participate in a strike? 
and (2) how do cross-pressures affect the willingness to participate? Our research 
shows that although social identification with the union has, up until now, been 
considered a main determinant of individual participation, filtering mechanisms are 
more complex. 
 We found that the amount of information from the union and identification with 
the union have significant effects on willingness to participate, while trust in the 
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union does not seem to matter for participation. For management, these effects are 
opposite: neither the amount of information from management nor identification 
with management affect willingness to participate, whereas trust in management 
does decrease union members’ willingness to participate. We found no indications of 
cross-pressure effects: high levels of information, identification, and trust in both 
management and the union simultaneously, did not change workers willingness to 
participate significantly. Furthermore, we found a significant interaction effect 
between trust in the union and union identification. Union members with high levels 
of trust in and identification with their union are more willing to participate in a strike. 
 When separating our respondents into a group that experienced a strike in their 
organizations and a group that never experienced a strike, we found that in the latter 
group - those without experience - these cross-pressures do have an effect. For 
“inexperienced” workers the positive effect of information from the union on 
willingness to participate is indeed weakened when they also obtain information 
from management. We also found a cross-pressure effect for high levels of trust in 
both the union and the management for inexperienced workers, although for trust 
this leads to an increase in willingness to participate. Possibly, having no previous 
experience with management’s response to a strike makes these inexperienced 
workers trust that their management will act in their interest even when they 
participate in a strike. We found no such cross-pressure effects for experienced union 
members. 
 As for the filtering of information, we found that trust is used as a filter, while 
identification is not. Identification with management does not have a direct effect but 
only exerts an influence on willingness to participate when it is mediated by trust in 
management. The effect of information provided by management is also mediated by 
trust in management. This implies that workers must consider management to be a 
credible source of information (Klandermans, 1997) in order to follow its lead. Thus, 
for management, creating trust is a crucial strategy to reduce workers’ willingness to 
participate. If the union wants to mobilize workers in times of conflict, providing 
information and making an appeal to workers’ identification with the union seem to 
be successful methods. This implies that for the mobilizing actor - that is, the union - 
social identification is indeed an important determinant for willingness to participate, 
as previous research suggests (De Weerd & Klandermans ,1999; Klandermans, 2002, 
2004). More generally, we draw the following important conclusion from these 
results: the mechanisms by which information is filtered depend on the group that 
provides the information. This study contributes an important finding to mobilization 
research: management and the union should use different strategies for counter- 
mobilization and for mobilization. For management, creating trust is crucial to decreasing 
workers’ willingness to participate, whereas the union has to provide information and 
make sure workers identify with the union in order to successfully mobilize these 
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workers. These results show that workers assess information differently depending 
on its source. One explanation for this could be the fact that our dataset consists 
solely of union members. In the Netherlands, union membership is voluntarily; hence, 
we argue that it is likely these union members identify with the union, although we 
do find variation in union identification in our dataset.
 Our study further contributes to mobilization research in several ways. First, our 
research shows that when investigating worker mobilization, taking into account 
both the mobilizing actor and an actor that may counter the mobilizing efforts 
provides new insights regarding filtering information during protest mobilization 
(Griffin et al., 1986). Moreover, our research extends current research by providing 
empirical evidence for the effects of other mechanisms that influence individuals’ 
willingness to participate in collective protest. Whereas in previous research, 
identification was the main determinant of participation willingness (Klandermans, 
2002, 2004), we show that information and trust also have a significant influence on 
willingness to participate. Furthermore, union members use different filtering 
mechanisms for information from the union than for information from the 
management. Finally, we find different filtering and interaction effects for different 
groups: union members who never experienced a strike in their organization are 
subject to cross-pressures, while we do not find such cross-pressures for experienced 
union members. To our knowledge, such an experience effect is a new finding in the 
research on cross-pressure in mobilization. 
 The relevance of our findings, based on a strike situation, may be extended to 
other union mobilization processes, for instance union drives in the U.S. These 
campaigns are to gain the right to represent workers in an organization; employers 
often try to counter the unionization efforts of the union to avoid union entrance in 
their organizations (Bronfenbrenner, 1997).
 Obviously, our research has several limitations that should be addressed in future 
research. First, our hypotheses are tested based on a dataset consisting solely of 
union members. While this allows us to hold union membership constant, theory 
development and testing will benefit from a dataset that offers a more representative 
set of respondents. Second, future research would benefit from a nested dataset in 
which these different mechanisms can be tested within one group of workers in one 
organization. With a nested group of respondents, the mobilization attempts made 
by the union and attempts by management to prevent workers from striking can be 
researched more elaborately, without solely relying on self-reports. Third, future 
research could replicate our model in different empirical contexts.
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Notes
I However, an opposite effect of identification with management and the union simultaneously can be 
argued as well. González and Brown (2003, 2006) introduce the “dual identity model” and argue that 
when individuals experience identification with two different groups as oppositional, these individuals can 
create a dual identity, so they feel part of a more inclusive group, while maintaining the distinction 
between the ingroup and the outgroup (González & Brown, 2003, 2006; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). Empirical 
research finds that people with a dual identity are then more inclined to participate in collective action 
(Klandermans, van der Toorn & van Stekelenburg, 2008; Simon and Ruhs 2008). The causal mechanism of 
the dual identity theory refers to a hierarchy of groups, in which one group can be a part of another group, 
which is not applicable to the situation for workers (management is not part of the union, or the other way 
around). Therefore, we do not expect a dual identity effect.
II The right to strike is derived from the European Social Charter, article 6, member 4.
III Article 10 of WAADI (Wet Allocatie Arbeidskrachten door Intermediairs, or Law for Allocation Temporary 
Workers).
IV In addition to the ten trade unions of the CNV, there is a trade union for the self-employed. Since the 
members of this union for the self-employed are not relevant for the research question, the sample did not 
contain members of this particular union.
V Of the respondents, nine were randomly selected to receive a voucher (this represents two percent of the 
respondents). Respondents were not aware of the size of the probability of winning the voucher. 
VI In the dataset, data on past participation is available. We asked the respondents whether they experienced 
a strike in the organization in which they currently work. Only those respondents who did experience a 
strike were asked whether they participated. Willingness to participate in a strike significantly correlates 
with past participation (Pearson’s R = .522; p < .001 for a two-tailed test) for the respondents who had the 
opportunity to participate in a strike. 
VII In a third model, we investigated what happens when only identification is used as a filter of information. 
In the fourth model, we tested the fit of the model when information only has a direct effect on willingness 
to participate in a future strike; in other words, we investigated what happens when identification and 
trust are not used to filter the information workers receive. These two models prove to have a worse fit 
than our conceptual model or than model 2. Hence, we cannot draw conclusions about these models. The 
fit indices of these two models can be found in the appendix. 
VIII The probability test (p) of model 2 is statistically significant. This is likely due to the large sample. However, 
our Chi-square/degrees of freedom ratio is between 1 and 3 (ratio = 2.31) and hence, our model can 
nevertheless be accepted.
IX We also tested our hypotheses via a regression analysis in SPSS, so that we could add several control 
variables into the model that are likely to influence the dependent variable, namely gender, size of the 
organization, level of education, children living at home, type of contract, sector, expected participation of 
others and past participation experience. The results of this regression analysis are comparable to the 
structural equation estimates found in model 2, indicating that the results we find in our model are robust. 
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Appendix
Standardized parameter values of tested models based on LISREL analyses of  
models 3 and 4
Parameter Model 3 Model 4
γ
1,2 
 0.13**  0.13**
γ
1,3 
-0.09* -0.10*
γ
1,4
-0.01 -0.01
γ
1,5
 0.13**  0.13**
γ
1,6
-0.07 -0.07
γ
1,7
-0.07 -0.07
γ
1,8
 0.06  0.06**
γ
1,9
-0.13** -0.13**
 γ
1,10
 0.07  0.07
 γ
1,11
 0.10**  0.10**
 γ
1,12
 0.07  0.07
γ
5,2
 0.44***  n.a 
γ
6,3
 0.51***  n.a
γ
8,2
 n.a  n.a
γ
8,5
 0.56***  0.56***
γ
9,3
 n.a  n.a
γ
9,6
 0.62***  0.62***
Note: * p < .10 (t between 1.65 and 1.96); ** p < .05 (t between 1.96 and 2.58); *** p < .01 (t greater than 
2.58). Fit indices Model 3: [χ2 (58) = 395.70, p = 0.00; GFI .86; AGFI = .81; RMSEA = .120; NFI = .67; CFI = .70; 
PNFI = .59; PGFI = .64]. Fit indices Model 4: [χ2 (62) = 320.78, p = 0.00; GFI .88; AGFI = .85; RMSEA = .100; 
NFI = .72; CFI = .75; PNFI = .68; PGFI = .70].
80
CHAPTER 3
References
Aguinis, H. (2004). Regression analysis for categorical moderators. New York: The Guilford Press. 
Aiken, L. S., & West, S.G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, Inc.
Ashforth, B.E., & Mael, F. (1989). Social identity theory and the organization. Academy of Management 
Review, 14(1), 20-39.
Bronfenbrenner, K. (1997). The role of union strategies in NLRB certification elections. Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 50(2), 195-212.
Bronfenbrenner, K. & Juravich, T. (1995). The impact of employer opposition on union certification win rates: 
A private/public sector comparison. Economic Policy Institute, Working Paper No. 113.
Burke, P.J., & Stets, J.E. (1999). Trust and commitment through self-verification. Social Psychology Quarterly, 
62(4), 347-366.
Butler Jr., J.K. (1991). Toward understanding and measuring conditions of trust: Evolutions of a conditions of 
trust inventory. Journal of Management, 17(3), 643-663. 
Buttigieg, D.M., Deery, S.J., & Iverson, R.J. (2008). Union mobilization: A consideration of the factors affecting 
the willingness of union members to take industrial action. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 46(2), 
345-371.
Charness, G., Rigotti, L., & Rustichini, A. (2007). Individual behavior and group membership. The American 
Economic Review, 97(4), 1340-1352.
Conell, C., & Cohn, S. 1995. Learning from other people’s actions: Environmental variation and diffusion in 
French coal mining strikes, 1890-1935. American Journal of Sociology, 101(2), 366-403. 
Dawkins, C. E., & Frass, J.W. (2005). Decision of union workers to participate in employee involvement: An 
application of the theory of planned behaviour. Employee Relations, 27(5), 511-531. 
De Weerd, M., & Klandermans, B. (1999). Group Identification and political protest: Farmer’s Protest in the 
Netherlands. European Journal of Social Psychology, 29(8), 1073-1095.
Ellemers, N., de Gilder, D., & Haslam, S.A. 2004. Motivating individuals and groups at work: A social identity 
perspective on leadership and group performance. Academy of Management Review, 29(3), 341-369.
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An introduction to theory and research. 
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Gallagher, D. G., & Strauss, G. (1991). Union membership attitudes and participation. In: The State of the 
Unions, edited by Daniel Gallagher and Jack Fiorito. Pp 139-174. Madison, WI: Industrial Relations 
Research Association. 
González, R., & Brown, R. (2003). Generalization of positive attitude as a function of subgroup and super- 
ordinate group identifications in intergroup contact. European Journal of Social Psychology, 33(2), 
195-214. 
González, R., & Brown, R. (2006). Dual identities in intergroup contact: Group status and size moderate the 
generalization of positive attitude change. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42(6), 753-767. 
Griffin, L.J., Wallace, M.E., & Rubin, B.A. (1986). Capitalist resistance to the organization of labor before the 
new deal: Why? How? Success? American Sociological Review, 51(2), 147-167.
Haslam, S.A. (2001). Psychology in organizations: The social identity approach. London: Sage. 
Heery, E., & Simms, M. (2010). Employer responses to union organizing: Patterns and effects. Human Resource 
Management Journal, 20(1), 3-22. 
Hooper, D., Coughlan, J., & Mullen, M. (2008). Structural equation modeling: Guidelines for determining 
model fit. Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods, 6(1), 53-60.
Horan, P.M. (1971). Social positions and political cross-pressures: A re-examination. American Sociological 
Review, 36(4), 650-660. 
Hu, L., & Bentler, P.M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional 
criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation Modeling, 6(1): 1-55. 
Kane, A.A., Argote, L., & Levine, J.M. (2005). Knowledge transfer between groups via personnel rotation: 
Effects of social identity and knowledge quality. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
96(1), 56-71.  
81
TRUST YOUR BOSS OR LISTEN TO THE UNION
3
Kelloway, E. K. (1995). Structural equation modeling in perspective. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 16(3), 
215-24.
Kelloway, E.K. (1998). Using Lisrel for structural equation modeling: a researcher’s guide. London: Sage.
Klandermans, B. (1984). Mobilization and participation: Social-psychological expansions of resource 
mobilization theory. American Sociological Review, 49(5), 583-600.
Klandermans, B. (1997). The social psychology of protest. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.  
Klandermans, B. (2002). How group identification helps to overcome the dilemma of collective action. The 
American Behavioral Scientist, 45(5), 887-900.
Klandermans, B. (2004). The demand and supply of participation: Social psychological correlates of 
participation in social movements. In: The Blackwell companion to social movements, edited by David A. 
Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi. Pp. 360-79. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
Klandermans, B., & Smith, J. (2002). Survey Research: A case for comparative designs. In: Methods of Social 
Movement Research, edited by Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg. Pp. 3-31. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press.
Klandermans, B., van der Toorn, J., & van Stekelenburg, J. (2008). Embeddedness and identity: How 
immigrants turn grievances into action. American Sociological Review, 73(6), 992-1012. 
Krackhardt, D. (1999). The Ties that torture: Simmelian tie analysis in organizations. Research in the Sociology 
of Organizations, 16(1), 183-210.
Kramer, R.M. (1999). Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, enduring questions. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 50(1): 569-598. 
Kramer, R.M., & Tyler, T.R. (1996). Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and research. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
SAGE Publications, Inc.
MacCallum, R.C., Browne, M.W., & Sugawara, H.M. (1996). Power analysis and determination of sample size 
for covariance structure modeling. Psychological Methods, 1(2), 130-149.
Mayer, R.C., Davis, J.H., & Schoorman, D. (1995). An integrative model of organizational trust. Academy of 
Management Review, 20(3), 709-35.
McAdam, D., & Paulsen, R. (1993). Specifying the relationship between social ties and activism. American 
Journal of Sociology, 99(3), 640-667.
McAdam, D., & Rucht, D. (1993). The cross-national diffusion of movement ideas. Annuals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 528(1), 56-74.   
McClendon, J.A., & Klaas, B. (1993). Determinants of strike-related militancy: An analysis of a university 
faculty strike. Industrial and labor Relations Review, 46(3), 560-573.
McDonald, R. P., & Moon-Ho, R.H. (2002). Principles and practice in reporting structural equation analyses. 
Psychological Methods, 7(1), 64-82.
Metochi, M. (2002). The influence of leadership and member attitudes in understanding the nature of union 
participation. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 40(1), 87-111.
Mutz, D.C. (2002). The consequences of cross-cutting networks for political participation. American Journal 
of Political Science, 46(4), 838-855. 
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press.
Peteraf, M., & Shanley, M. (1997). Getting to know you: A theory of strategic group identity. Strategic 
Management Journal, 18(S1), 165-186. 
Powell Jr., B.G. (1976). Political cleavage structure, cross-pressure processes and partisanship: An empirical 
test of the theory. American Journal of Political Science, 20(1), 1-23.  
Rousseau, D.M., Sitkin, S.B., Burt, R.S., & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view 
of trust. Academy of Management Review, 23(3), 393-404. 
Simon, B., & Klandermans, B. (2001). Politicized collective identity. American Psychologist, 56(4), 319-331.
Simon, B., & Ruhs, D. (2008). Identity and politicization among Turkish migrants in Germany: The role of dual 
identification. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(6), 1354-1366. 
Tindall, D.B. (2002). Social networks, identification and participation in an environmental movement: 
Low-medium cost activism within the British Columbia Wilderness Preservation Movement. Canadian 
Review of Sociology, 39(4), 413-425.
82
CHAPTER 3
Van Cruchten, J, & Kuijpers, R. (2008). Vakbeweging en organisatiegraad van werknemers (Labor movement 
and unionizationrate of Employees), Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Sociaaleconomische trends, 1, 7-18.
Van der Velden, S. (2000). Stakingen in Nederland. (Strikes in the Netherlands). Amsterdam: Stichting beheer 
ISSG/NIWI.  
Van Stekelenburg, J., Klandermans, B., & van Dijk, W.W. (2011). Combining motivations and emotion: 
The motivational dynamics of protest participation. Revista de Psicología Social,26(1), 91-104.
Van Zomeren, M., & Spears, R. (2009). Metaphors of protest: A classification of motivations for collective 
action. Journal of Social Issues, 65(2): 661-79.    
Van Zomeren, M., Spears, R., Fischer, A.H., & Leach, C.W. (2004). Put your money where your mouth is! 
Explaining collective action tendencies through group-based anger and group efficacy. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 87(5), 649-64. 
Van Zomeren, M., Spears, R., & Leach, C.W. (2008). Exploring psychological mechanisms of collective action: 
Does relevance of group identity influence how people cope with collective disadvantage? British 
Journal of Social Psychology, 47(2), 353-72. 
Voci, A. (2006). The link between identification and in-group favouritism: Effects of threats to social identity 
and trust-related emotions. British Journal of Social Psychology, 45(2), 265-284. 
Wicks, A.C., Berman, S.L., & Jones, T.M. (1999). The structure of optimal trust: Moral and strategic implications. 
The Academy of Management Review, 24(1), 99-116.
Williams, M. (2001). In whom we trust: Group membership as an affective context for trust development. 
The Academy of Management Review, 26(3), 377-396.
83
TRUST YOUR BOSS OR LISTEN TO THE UNION
3

Based on: 
Born, M.J., Akkerman, A., & Torenvlied. (2013). Peer support in industrial action. How 
social support of colleagues affect workers’ willingness to strike. Revise and Resubmit.
Peer support in industrial action.
How social support of colleagues affects 
workers’ willingness to strike
4

87
PEER SUPPORT IN INDUSTRIAL ACTION
4
4.1. Introduction 
In this study, we investigate the effects of colleagues’ social support on the willingness 
to participate in a strike. Contrary to other studies that investigate the social support 
for participation, we study the reverse: social support for non-participation and the 
social costs of both participation and non-participation. The importance of others on 
the decision to participate in protest has been supported by ample empirical evidence 
(Klandermans, 1984; Van Zomeren & Spears, 2009). Social rewards and sanctions 
by group members or ‘significant others’ constitute an important selective incentive 
for overcoming the free-rider problem in collective action (Janky & Takács, 2010; 
Klandermans, 1984; Olson, 1965). We argue that in a heavily polarized context, the 
social environment of potential protesters consists of ‘significant others’ who fiercely 
favor participation as well as ‘significant others’ who sternly oppose participation in 
a protest. The aim of this study is twofold. First, we investigate the relative importance of 
social support for participation compared to social support for non-participation. 
Second, we investigate the effects of the social costs of participation and non- 
participation. 
 In the heavily polarized context of a labor strike, both unions and some colleagues 
make an appeal to an individual to participate, while the supervisor, management 
and other colleagues simultaneously try to convince an individual to refrain from 
participation. Satisfying one side will result in disappointing the other. We are 
especially interested in this ambiguous and diverting support from colleagues. 
Workers can support their colleagues’ decision to strike in different ways, such as 
joining the strike, facilitating participation, or giving moral support. Colleagues who 
oppose the strike and their colleagues participating in it because they do not agree 
with the protest issues or the means of protest, for example, can support a decision 
for non-participation by giving moral support and offering protection from potential 
(violent) harassment by strikers.  
 Klandermans (1984) acknowledges that workers receive support for participation 
as well as for non-participation. However, the effects of these forms of support have 
yet to be investigated independently. Disentangling both forms of support is important 
because it tells us about their relative strengths: under what conditions does support 
for participation outweigh support for non-participation and vice versa? Such a distinction 
is particularly important in a socially polarized context, in which proponents and 
opponents of a protest compete in mobilizing and demobilizing potential protesters. 
Participation may have social costs as well, especially in a polarized context. Although 
generally implied as an important element in individuals’ cost and benefit calculations 
of protest participation (e.g., Olson, 1965), social costs of participation and their 
effects on participation are seldom hypothesized, operationalized and measured 
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(with an exception of: Opp & Roehl, 1990). In most studies of protest participation, 
the costs of participation are either conceptualized as time, money or energy, but 
rarely are they conceived of in terms of social costs. To be sure, the social costs of 
non-participation, such as the costs associated with free-rider punishment, are a 
well-documented and analyzed aspect of the cost-benefit calculation. We argue that 
participation brings about social costs as well because protest-opposing groups may 
sanction participation, which imposes costs on participation, thereby reducing 
willingness to participate (cf. Opp & Roehl, 1990). The purpose of this paper is to 
simultaneously investigate the potentially different effects of social support for 
participation and social support for non-participation, as well as the social costs of 
participation. 
 The empirical part of our study consists of two parts. First, we investigate the 
effects of social support for participation, social support for non-participation and the 
social costs on the willingness to participate when taken into account simultaneously. 
While investigating these social incentives, we take into account social identification, 
often considered a main determinant of participation (Klandermans, 2002, 2004). 
Second, we control for union membership to explore if this has any effect on our 
proposed relations: members are more likely to participate than non-members (see 
for example: Martin & Sinclair, 2001) and union members might differ in the costs 
they expect; for example, members might expect more costs of non-participation, as 
they consider participation everyone’s duty. We empirically examine these relations 
using a data set of 725 workers, collected in 2010. We test our hypotheses using 
structural equation modeling. 
 This study contributes to mobilization research in two ways. First, for under -
standing the mechanisms behind individual participation in collective actions within 
contexts of opposing social pressures, such as strikes, it is important to understand 
the influence of the social environment that opposes the protest. Moreover, we 
investigate the effects of expected social costs of participation. To the best of our 
knowledge, our study is the first to systematically integrate the costs and benefits of 
non-participation in existing explanatory models.  
4.2. Theory
4.2.1. Social support and expected costs of participation
An individual’s decision regarding participation is the result of an individual analysis 
of costs and benefits (e.g., Klandermans, 1984; Olson, 1965). When the benefits 
outweigh the costs, people are more likely to participate in a protest, such as a strike. 
Costs and benefits such as money and time will be assessed. Individuals will also take 
into account the social costs and benefits associated with participation or non- 
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participation. Examples of social benefits are support by significant others, such as 
family, friends or supervisors (Klandermans, 1984), while punishment, social exclusion, 
or other signals of social disapproval may be seen as social costs (Boyd & Richerson, 
1992; Price, Cosmides & Tooby, 2002). Because these social costs and benefits may 
have a great impact on people’s social wellbeing, it is plausible to assume that 
individuals anticipate the social costs and benefits of their choices of whether to 
participate in a protest. 
 The focus of current mobilization research is mostly on social support from 
significant others in favor of participation (e.g., Klandermans, 1984; Klandermans & 
Oegema, 1987; Stürmer & Simon, 2004), while according to Klandermans (1984), 
social support for non-participation is at least equally likely to play a role. He 
investigated the effect of a Dutch union’s mobilization campaign on its members’ 
willingness to participate in a strike and he analyzed the effect of the social support 
of both participation and non-participation by calculating the sum score of these 
variables. By doing so, the two forms of support are given equal importance, while 
there are conditions under which they may have a distinctive impact on the decision 
to participate. Especially in a polarized context, such as a labor strike, individuals may 
expect to receive support for either decision from different people in their 
environment. The question then arises whether the decision to participate requires 
an equal amount of social support as the decision not to participate in the strike. To 
date, mobilization research has implicitly treated the effects of social support for 
participation and social support for non-participation as equally important. In this 
paper, we investigate support for participation and support for non-participation 
separately to test whether this assumption is supported by empirical evidence and 
thereby gain a better understanding of the exact mechanism of social support on the 
willingness to participate. 
 Moreover, in contrast to previous research (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; 
Stürmer & Simon, 2004) that focuses on support from significant others such as 
friends and family, we alternatively study the effect of support from colleagues in the 
decision to participate in a strike. In his 1984 article, Klandermans also investigated 
colleagues as one of the groups of significant others. Colleagues constitute a crucial 
part of the worker’s social environment. Workers will assess whether their colleagues 
will support their decision to participate; it is this group of others with whom a worker 
will have to work on a daily basis and who might attempt to influence the worker’s 
decision to participate. Previous research on the effects of social support (Klandermans 
& Oegema, 1987; Stürmer & Simon, 2004) finds that social support for participation 
increases the willingness to participate. If significant others support the decision not 
to participate, inaction, that is non-participation, may become the most beneficial 
choice.
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Assuming that colleagues are the relevant significant others in the context of labor 
strikes, we formulate the following baseline hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Higher expected support for participation from colleagues will 
increase a worker’s willingness to participate.
Hypothesis 2: Higher expected support for non-participation from colleagues will 
decrease a worker’s willingness to participate.
The decision to participate or not is not solely based on immediate social support for 
participation or non-participation. Once the strike is settled, workers need to work 
together again. We argue that workers will anticipate these social costs. Although the 
social costs of non-participation, such as free-rider punishment, are broadly 
acknowledged and empirically studied, the effects of social costs of participation are 
seldom empirically investigated (with the exception of Opp & Roehl, 1990). Labor 
strikes are well known to create divides between those workers who participate and 
those who continue to work. These divisions sometimes persist long after the strike is 
settled. Although theoretically, non-strikers are considered to be the free-riders who 
risk social punishment, employees who continue to work appear to have reason to 
blame the strikers, too. First, colleagues may oppose of a strike because it endangers 
relations with customers and clients, which in turn endangers employment. Moreover, 
if employees strongly rely on their team members for their work (and their income), 
those who remain working need to work harder to get their job done without the help 
of their striking team members (Thommes & Akkerman, 2013). If workers expect 
social costs due to their participation, such as ostracism or sanctions for deviating 
from the behavior that colleagues (or team members) prefer, their willingness to 
participate decreases. We formulate two hypotheses, to investigate both costs of 
participation and costs of non-participation. 
Hypothesis 3: Higher expected social costs of participation will decrease a 
worker’s willingness to participate.
Hypothesis 4: Higher expected social costs of non-participation will increase a 
worker’s willingness to participate. 
Thus, we expect that both social support and the expected negative consequences 
affect a worker’s willingness to participate. In addition, they affect each other. 
Colleagues that support the decision are unlikely to sanction this decision after the 
strike by inflicting social costs. On the other hand, if colleagues do not support the 
decision, they can sanction the decision by inflicting social costs even after the strike 
is resolved (Akkerman, Born & Torenvlied, 2013). Thus, we expect a positive relation 
between social costs of participation and social support for non-participation. 
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Hypothesis 5a: Higher expected support for participation from colleagues will 
decrease a worker’s expected social costs of participation.
Hypothesis 5b: Higher expected support for participation from colleagues will 
increase a worker’s expected social costs of non-participation.
Hypothesis 6a: Higher expected support for non-participation from colleagues 
will increase a worker’s expected social costs of participation. 
Hypothesis 6b: Higher expected support for non-participation from colleagues 
will decrease a worker’s expected social costs of non-participation.  
  
4.2.2. The role of social identification
The effect of social support is dependent on how much a worker identifies with his 
colleagues. If a worker is not very attached to his colleagues, the costs of social 
disapproval will be less severe than when he identifies strongly with his colleagues. 
Social identification is considered one of the main predictors of participation 
(Klandermans, 2004). People expect group members to assess situations and stimuli 
in the same way they do themselves and hence, people are likely to follow others 
similar to themselves (McAdam & Rucht, 1993). Because of social identification, the 
opinion of certain others becomes important: through social identification, norms 
within a group are formed, which tell group members the appropriate behaviors 
within certain situations (Akkerman, Born & Torenvlied, 2013; Rink & Ellemers, 2007). 
Through identification with colleagues, guidelines about appropriate behavior in 
times of a looming strike exist within a group of workers. Defecting from the norms 
of the group to which one belongs can have severe consequences for (future) relations 
with group members (Klandermans, Sabucedo, Rodriguez & de Weerd, 2002). We 
argue that receiving support for the decision to participate or not is more important 
when workers identify with their colleagues because defecting from the group to 
which workers belong will pose higher social costs than defecting from a group that 
is less important to them. 
 Because social identification seems to play such an important role in the 
individual’s decision to participate, we include this variable in our analysis. Because 
colleagues can be either in favor or against the strike, it is difficult to form hypotheses 
about the direct effects of identification on the social costs and benefits or on the 
willingness to participate. We do expect indirect effects of social identification on 
willingness to participate, via the expected costs and benefits of participation and 
non-participation. We argue though that the more a worker identifies with his 
colleagues, the more costs and benefits he will expect from his colleagues. In other 
words, defecting from this group a worker highly identifies with will create severe 
costs, whereas following the behavior of this group will create more benefits. On the 
contrary, more identification will cause workers to expect more benefits when they 
follow the lead of their own group. Therefore, we formulated the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 7: Identification with colleagues will affect willingness to participate 
indirectly through the expected costs and benefits (i.e. support for participation, 
support for non-participation, costs of participation and costs of non-participation) 
of participation and non-participation. 
We depict the above relationships in Figure 1. 
4.2.3. The role of union membership
In times of a looming strike, most workers, union members and non-members are 
generally the subject of mobilization campaigns by the union(s). Most research is 
focused on union members or members of a social movement (e.g., Kitts, 2000; 
Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans & van Dijk, 2009). However, in times of a strike, 
there will also be attempts to persuade non-members to participate in the strike. It is 
plausible that union members are in favor of a strike and are more willing to strike 
than their non-member colleagues. Research focusing on willingness to strike often 
focuses on union members, yet it is argued that union members in general are more 
willing to participate than non-members because of the obligations these members 
feel towards the union (e.g., Martin & Sinclair, 2001). Moreover, members and non- 
members may differ in the costs they associate with (non-)participation. Thus, union 
membership may interfere with the theorized mechanisms between social support 
for participation. Therefore, we separately test our model for both members and 
non-members, to explore if there is a difference between these two groups. 
4.3. Methods 
4.3.1. Sample
We test our hypotheses on a pooled dataset of 725 respondents. This dataset consists 
of two samples of respondents. In October 2010, a web-based survey was distributed 
amongst 800 panel members of the Christian Dutch Trade Union Confederation 
(CNV). The panel consisted of a representative set of randomly selected CNV 
members. Respondents who fully completed the questionnaire had the chance to 
win a 25 Euro voucher10. We noted that 468 members completed the questionnaire, 
indicating a response rate of 58%. In December 2010, the same web-based survey 
was sent out to 1500 Dutch employees who were members of a panel that is surveyed 
periodically. The sample selection was stratified based on gender, age and region to 
enhance representativeness of these three criteria. Afterwards, this sample was 
checked on representativeness of gender, age and region. 257 Respondents completed 
the questionnaire, after which access to the questionnaire was closed. These two 
datasets were pooled, providing us with a dataset of 725 Dutch employees, of whom 
177 respondents were non-members. 
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Of our respondents, 68.8% were male (N = 494) and 30.5% were female (N = 221). 
10 respondents did not specify whether they were male or female (1.4%). The average 
age of our respondents was 49.76 years (SD = 11.66). Due to the combination of our 
two datasets, a large number of our respondents were members of the CNV trade 
union confederation (65.9%; N = 478). Additionally, 7.2% of the respondents were 
members of one of the FNV trade union confederations (N = 52), while 18 respondents 
stated they were members of one of the other unions in the Netherlands (2.5%). 
Finally, 177 respondents were not union members (24.4%).  
4.3.2. Measurements
The dependent variable
The main dependent variable in this paper is the willingness to participate in a future 
strike for a wage increase. In the Netherlands, most strikes concern disputes about 
wages (Van der Velden, 2000). The respondents were asked to rate their general 
willingness to participate in a future strike for a wage increase on a Likert scale, 
ranging from 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“highly likely”). While some authors have criticized 
the use of intended participation in a hypothetical future strike to measure individual 
willingness to participate (Gallagher & Strauss, 1991; McClendon & Klaas, 1993), the 
theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) argues that intentions are 
congruent with actions. This theory also argues that intended participation is the best 
predictor of actual participation (Kelloway, 1998). Measuring action participation 
has proved to be complicated, as it is difficult to predict strikes and to gain access 
to strikers (Klandermans & Smith, 2002). Moreover, when investigating actual 
participants, it is difficult to assess how the expected costs and benefits affected their 
participation willingness in hindsight. Hence, we argue that willingness to participate 
in a future strike for a wage increase is the most valid measure available for the 
purpose of this paper. 
Explanatory variables
Social support for participation was measured with one item, namely “If you would 
participate in a strike, how would your colleagues react?” Respondents had to rate 
this item on a five-point Likert scale from 1 (“they would not support my decision to 
participate at all”) to 5 (“they would support my decision to participate very much”). 
For social support for non-participation, we used the item, “If you would NOT 
participate in a strike, how would your colleagues react?” Once again, respondents 
had to rate this item on a five-point Likert scale. 
 Expected social costs of participation was measured with one item. Respondents 
were asked whether they expected that their participation in collective action in the 
future would lead to negative consequences for the relationship with their colleagues. 
Respondents had to rate these negative consequences on a five-point Likert scale. 
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Expected social costs of non-participation was measured with one item. Respondents 
were asked if “colleagues who did not participate could be confronted about their 
behavior by other colleagues”. Respondents had to rate how much they agreed with 
the statement on a five-point Likert scale. 
 Social identification with colleagues was measured with a multidimensional 
scale, consisting of three items, namely “I belong to …”, “I feel related to …” and “I feel 
connected to …” We specifically asked respondents to rate identification with their 
colleagues “in times of a looming conflict about a collective agreement.” The three 
items were rated on a five-point Likert scale and validated by previous research on 
identification with groups (Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, & van Dijk, 2011; Van 
Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004; Van Zomeren, Spears & Leach, 2008). To 
assess the validity of our social identification scale, we performed confirmatory 
factor analyses in AMOS 20. Table 1 shows the individual item reliability as well as the 
composite reliability gained from the factor analysis. Generally, an item reliability of 
.5 and a composite reliability of .6 is required (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). Social identification 
with colleagues met these standards.
4.4. Results
In this section, we report the results of our analyses. First, we evaluate the model fit 
indices. Next, we discuss the tests of our hypotheses. Finally, we describe the 
multi-group (union members vs. non-members) analysis using our models.  
4.4.1. Testing of the model: Model fit
To test our model, we used structural equation modeling. We use the measures of 
overall fit to assess if the hypothesized model is a good indicator of the structures 
underlying the observed data. 
Table 1   Item reliability and the composite reliability of social identification  
with colleagues
Scale Item Item  
reliability
Composite 
reliability
Social identification 
with colleagues
.915
I belong to my colleagues .710
I feel related to my colleagues .897
I feel connected to my colleagues .837
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First, we checked the overall fit of our model. The chi-square of our model is significant 
(χ2 (12) = 26.860; p = .008): a significant chi-square could indicate the fit of the model 
is not good. However, a large sample such as ours is likely to create a significant 
chi-square (Kelloway 1995), so we investigated the model fit further. The chi-square/
degrees of freedom ratio of the full model is below 3 (ratio = 2.24), which indicates a 
satisfactory fit (Hooper, Coughlan & Mullen, 2008). The Goodness-of-Fit index (GFI) is 
a descriptive overall measure of fit. Usually, a threshold of .9 is suggested for the GFI 
(Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Hooper et al., 2008). The GFI of our model is .990 and thus meets 
the required standards. Second, we consider the root-mean-square error of 
approximation (RMSEA), which is less dependent on sample size (Widaman & 
Thompson, 2003). Values close to or below 0.06 indicate a good fit of the model (Hu 
& Bentler, 1999). The RMSEA of our model is .044. Furthermore, we consider the 
normed fit index (NFI) and the comparative fit index (CFI). It is suggested the NFI 
should be 0.95 or higher (Hooper et al., 2008); the cut-off point for the CFI is also .95 
(Hu & Bentler, 1999). Both these indices of our model meet the required standards 
(NFI = .985; CFI = .992). Therefore, we concluded that our model fits the data well and 
we can use the model to test our hypotheses.  
4.4.2. Discussion of hypotheses
Next, we tested the parameters of our model. The results are presented in table 2. 
Hypothesis 1, which states that higher expected support for participation increases a 
worker’s willingness to participate, was confirmed (standardized regression weight = 
.340, p < .01). This finding is in line with previous empirical research (Klandermans, 
1984; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Stürmer & Simon, 2004) and indicates that 
when a worker expects support from colleagues should he choose to participates in 
a strike, he is more willing to participate in this strike. When workers expect support 
for not participating from their colleagues, their willingness to participate decreases 
(standardized estimate = -.071; p = .05), which confirmed hypothesis 2. This finding 
indicates that both forms of support do affect the worker’s willingness to participate. 
As argued, the effects are not equally strong. Hypothesis 3, which states that higher 
expected social costs of participation decrease a worker’s willingness to participate, 
could not be confirmed; we found no significant effect of the expected social costs of 
participation on willingness to participate. However, we did find support for 
hypothesis 4, which states that higher expected social costs of non-participation 
increases the willingness to participate (standardized estimate = .203; p < .01). This 
indicates that when workers expect to be punished for non-participation, they are 
more likely to participate to avoid these costs, which confirms previous research 
(Born, Akkerman & Torevlied, 2013; Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Francis, 1985; Price et al., 
2002). 
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We did find support for hypothesis 5a, which indicates that expected support from 
colleagues in favor of participation decreases the expected social costs of participation 
(standardized regression weight = -.189, p <.01). Hypothesis 5b, which states that 
expected support in favor of participation increases the costs of non-participation, is 
also supported (standardized regression weight = .173, p <.01). In addition, hypothesis 
6a is confirmed: when support for not participating is expected, workers do expect 
higher social costs when they participate (standardized regression weight = .091; p < 
.05). We found significant results for the opposite as well (hypothesis 6b): when 
workers expect more support for non-participation, they expect less costs of 
free-riding (standardized regression weight = -.079, p <.05).
 For the effects of social identification, we first investigated the indirect effects, as 
they are depicted in our model. Hypothesis 7 states that identification with colleagues 
will affect willingness to participate indirectly through the expected costs and 
benefits of participation and non-participation. We investigated this hypothesis 
separately for support for participation, support for non-participation, costs of 
participation and costs of non-participation. We found a significant positive effect of 
identification with colleagues on a worker’s willingness to participate, via expected 
support for participation in a strike (estimate = .029; S.E. = .012; p < .05). Moreover, 
we found a significant indirect effect of social identification on participation 
willingness, via expected support for non-participation (estimate = -.006; S.E. = .004; 
Table 2  Parameter values of the conceptual model 
Parameter Parameter value
(standardized)
S.E. t value
γ
 32
 .105*** .028 2.577
γ 42 .011 .026 .273
γ
 43
-.189*** .037 -4.833
γ
 45
.091** .044 2.338
γ
 52
 .101** .023 2.482
γ 62 -.047 .030 -1.170
γ
 63
.173*** .043 4.407
γ
 65
-.079** .052 -2.006
γ
 12
-.029 .031 -.782
γ
 13
.340*** .045 9.133
γ
 14
.005 .046 .144
γ
 15
-.071** .052 -1.962
γ
 16
.203*** .040 5.564
Note: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
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p < .05). When we consider the direct effects in the model, we found that social 
identification significantly increases expected support for participation (standardized 
estimate = .105; p < .01) and significantly increases expected support for non-partici-
pation (standardized estimate = .101; p < .05). These results are a first indication that 
social identification indeed affects the support for their participation decision 
workers expect from their colleagues and as such affects their participation 
willingness. We found no effects of social identification on participation willingness 
via expected costs of participation and expected costs of non-participation. 
     
4.4.3. The difference between union members and non-members
The next step was to control for a possible effect of union membership to gain deeper 
insight into whether our variables had a different effect on union members than they 
did on non-members. We compared the full model for union members and 
non-members. 
 Once we included the moderator variable in our model, i.e., we divided our 
sample into members and non-members, the RMSEA of our full model improved 
somewhat. The chi-square/degrees of freedom ratio of the full model is below 3 
(ratio = 1.95), which indicates a good fit (Hooper et al., 2008). The other indices still 
met the required standards. When comparing samples of unequal sizes, as is the case 
in our analyses (N members = 474; N non-members = 167), the Tucker-Lewis index 
(TLI) should be considered (Byrne, 1991). The cut-off point for this index is .90. The TLI 
in our model is .970 and hence the model meets the required standards: [χ2 (24) = 
46.878 p = .003; GFI .982; RMSEA = .039; NFI = .975; CFI = .987; TLI = .970].
 To test for the moderator effect, the first step is to calculate the chi-square 
difference between a model in which the parameters are allowed to vary and a model 
in which all the parameters are restricted. This test investigates the null hypothesis 
that the moderator variable does not have any effect on our parameters. In our case, 
this null hypothesis is not rejected (Δχ2 = 18.546; ΔDF = 15; p = .235). This means that 
the complete models do not differ; however, there might be differences between 
parameters. Next, we performed a hierarchical procedure (Homburg & Giering, 2001; 
Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). The models compared are nested and hence the 
general model has one degree of freedom less than the restricted model. The 
chi-square value of the restricted model will therefore be higher than that of the 
general model (Homburg & Giering, 2001). A significant difference between the two 
models is found when the chi-square difference is higher that 2.17 at the 10% level, 
higher than 3.84 at the 5% level and higher than 6.63 at the 1% level. Finding this 
difference indicates that the moderator has a significant effect on the parameters. 
The results of the moderator analysis are presented in table 3.         
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We found significant effects of union membership with relation to three of our 
parameters. The effect of identification with colleagues on expected social costs 
differs significantly (Δχ2 = 4.824; p < .05) between union members and non-members. 
We find no significant effect for union members, but a positive significant effect for 
non-members (standardized estimate = .177, p < .05). This finding indicates that for 
non-members, social identification leads to the expectation of more costs of 
participation. This could be caused by an inexperience of these non-members; these 
non-members may be less willing to strike and expect their colleagues not to go on 
strike either. Union members, however, might be surrounded by more colleagues 
who are willing to participate and hence expect fewer costs from those around them. 
Moreover, a significant difference (Δχ2 = 2.882; p < .10) was found for the effect of 
identification with colleagues on support for non-participation. For members, identification 
does not have a significant effect on expected support for non-participation. However, 
for non-members, we found that identification with colleagues leads to more 
expected support for non-participation (standardized regression weight = .241; 
p < .01). This difference could be caused by the fact that non-members will expect 
more support for non-participation from those people with whom they identify, 
whereas union members might expect colleagues to participate in general, and hence, 
they do not expect support for non-participation. 
Table 3  Results of the moderator analysis
Membership Chi-square 
difference 
(ΔDF=1)
Non-members Members
γ
 32
 = .224*** (t = 2.807) γ
 32
 = .082* (t = 1.748) Δχ2 = 1.212
γ 42 = .177** (t = 2.097) γ 42 = -.038 (t = -.820) Δχ
2 = 4.824**
γ
 43
 = -.154* (t = -1.951) γ
 43 
= -.215*** (t = -4.791) Δχ2 = 0.192
γ
 45
 = .008 (t = .107) γ
 45
 = .099** (t =2.216) Δχ2 = 0.926
γ
 52
 = .241*** (t = 3.030) γ
 52
 = .058 (t = 1.228) Δχ2 = 2.882*
γ 62 = -.071 (t = -.858) γ 62 = -.080* (t = -1.716) Δχ
2 = 0.126
γ
 63
 = .268*** (t = 3.441) γ
 63
 = .166*** (t = 3.677) Δχ2 = 1.244
γ
 65
 = .032 (t = .409) γ
 65
 = -.105** (t = -2.324) Δχ2 = 2.437*
γ
 12
 = -.091 (t = -1.160) γ
 12
 = -.004 (t = -.099) Δχ2 = 0.817
γ
 13
 = .368*** (t = 5.113) γ
 13
 = .313*** (t = 7.218) Δχ2 = 1.407
γ
 14
 = .003 (t = .037) γ
 14
 = .004 (t = .088) Δχ2 = 0.000
γ
 15
 = -.048 (t = -.666) γ
 15
 = -.085** (t = -2.009) Δχ2 = 0.171
γ
 16
 = .166** (t = 2.281) γ
 16
 = .220*** (t = 5.170) Δχ2 = 0.167
Note:* Δχ2 significant at 10% level; ** Δχ2 significant at 5% level; *** Δχ2 significant at 1% level
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Lastly, we found a significant difference (Δχ2 = 2.437; p < .10) for the effect of expected 
support for non-participation on the expected costs of non-participation. For non- 
members, we find no significant effect. Yet, for members we find a significant negative 
effect (standardized regression weight = -.105; p < .05). Hence, members expect 
that support for non-participation will significantly decrease the costs of free-riding. 
Perhaps, members are more inclined to expect punishment for free-riding and thus 
they specifically feel they need support from their colleagues for this behavior. 
Non-members might not expect their colleagues to punish them when they do not 
participate.
4.4. Discussion
In this paper, we investigated the relationship between support for participation and 
support for non-participation, expected social costs of participation, expected costs 
of non-participation and willingness to participate. We argued that in the time of a 
looming strike, workers will assess whether their colleagues will support their decision 
to go on strike. An important addition within our research is that workers may receive 
support for not participating, which will affect the expected social costs. Moreover, 
we investigate the relationship between social identification and social support. 
 Our research contributes to the research of willingness to participate in strikes in 
three ways. First, we offer a more in-depth investigation of support for the decision 
of whether or not to participate. We look not only at the effect of receiving support 
for participation but also at what happens when workers receive support for non-par-
ticipation, and we found that these variables affect an individual’s willingness to 
participate differently. In addition, we investigate how these two variables affect the 
expected social costs of participation and costs of non-participation, as well as how 
these variables are affected by social identification. Lastly, we add a new group of 
significant others, namely colleagues. Especially within the context of a looming labor 
strike, workers will expect support for both participation and non-participation from 
colleagues. Hence, we took the first step in investigating the role of colleagues in a 
situation in which a worker experiences support for both participation as well as 
non-participation.
We found that receiving support for participation indeed increases willingness to 
participate. We also found evidence that receiving support for non-participation 
decreases the willingness to participate. When workers expect support for non- 
participation, they expect that their relationships with colleagues will be negatively 
affected by participation in a strike. After all, a worker will have to continue the 
work-relationships he or she has with colleagues after the strike, and going against 
what colleagues expect them to do can have severe consequences. We found no 
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effect of costs of participation, but in line with previous research, we did find that 
expected costs of non-participation, will increase the willingness to participate. It is 
likely that workers then choose to participate to avoid the costs they expect of 
free-riding. 
 We thus found that both support for participation and support for non-participation 
affect a worker’s willingness to participate. Whereas in previous research the 
emphasis is mostly on support for participation (e.g., Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; 
Stürmer & Simon, 2004), Klandermans (1984) investigated both forms of support. 
However, he used a sum score, giving both forms of support equal weight. Whereas 
he realized that both forms should be investigated simultaneously, we argue that our 
research, which investigates these issues independently, is a first and important step 
in investigating the different effects these two forms of support have on willingness 
to participate. We found that the positive effect of support for participation is 
stronger than the negative effect of support for non-participation. This means that 
given the context of labor strikes, the appeals made by colleagues in favor of 
participation are more influential than the appeals of colleagues against participation. 
This mechanism was found for union members as well for non-members. This raises 
the question of why there are more colleagues necessary to keep a worker from 
striking as there are needed to make a worker participate. A possible explanation for 
the difference in strength of both forms of support could be the way workers frame 
the situation when a strike is looming. When a strike is looming, so-called ‘collective 
action frames’ arise: these frames give meaning to the situation and are meant to 
mobilize people and to gather support for participation, which will lead to participation 
in the action (Snow & Benford, 2000; Snow, Vliegenthart & Corrigall-Brown, 2007). 
An example of these frames is offered by Mannarini, Roccato, Fedi and Rovere (2009). 
They investigated protests against the siting of a new railway and found that people 
were pressured to participate in the protest because the majority of their environment 
seemed to be against the new railway. The frame amongst potential participants was 
that participation was the right course of action and hence people felt pressured to 
conform to this frame. Thus, participation depends on how the social environment 
perceives the situation. When a strike is looming, we expect the frame is a choice to 
‘participate’: going against this behavior expected by colleagues will require more 
support than participation will need. 
 Findings that support our suspicion that framing the situation could be the cause 
of the difference in strength of the two forms of support, are our findings regarding 
social identification. We found that social identification positively affects the support 
workers expect to receive from their colleagues. Identification with a group creates 
norms about how to behave (Rink & Ellemers, 2007). Moreover, social identification 
makes workers want to behave on behalf of the group (De Weerd & Klandermans, 
1999). In turn, workers are likely to expect that others in the own group will support 
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the decision they make. Thus, social identification will lead to more expected support 
from group members. While we offer a first indication that these two forms of 
support have different effects, future research should replicate the model to 
investigate if this is also the case in other settings. 
 Members and non-members differ significantly on three parameters. First, 
significant differences were found for the effect of identification with colleagues on 
expected costs for future relations with colleagues. For members, identification does 
not have a significant effect on expected social costs. However, for non-members, we 
found that identification with colleagues leads to higher expected social costs. This 
implies that for those workers who are not members of a union, participation is 
perceived as more costly for relationships with colleagues with whom the worker 
identifies. Moreover, a significant difference was found for the effect of identification 
with colleagues on support for non-participation. For members, identification does 
not significantly affect expected support for non-participation, whereas for non- 
members, we found that identification with colleagues leads to more support for 
non-participation. One explanation is that non-members expect that their (close) 
colleagues are more willing to support non-participation than union members expect 
from their colleagues. Lastly, members and non-members differ on the effect of 
expected support for non-participation on the expected costs of non-participation. 
Members expect that support for non-participation decreases the costs of free-riding. 
Members may be more inclined to expect punishment for free-riding and as such, 
specifically feel they need support from their colleagues for this type of behavior. 
A limitation of our research is the oversampling of union members amongst our 
respondents. The sample of union members is much larger than the number of 
non-members in our dataset, but with the Tucker-Lewis index, we checked whether 
this damages our model and found that this does not seem to be the case. We 
investigated whether these members from different unions significantly differ 
according to our variables. We found no indication for significant differences in our 
independent variables. Although the members from different unions do differ 
significantly in their score on the dependent variable, we see no reason to believe 
that this has affected the findings regarding the mechanisms under investigation. 
 Another limitation of our research is that we did not investigate nested groups. 
Especially when investigating the relationship between social support and willingness to 
participate, the specific social context, including the dominant opinion of colleagues, 
may play a vital role. In future research, it is important to investigate this distinction. 
Notes
X Of the respondents, 9 were randomly selected to receive a voucher (this represents 2% of the respondents). 
Respondents were not aware of the probability of winning the voucher. 
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5.1. Introduction
How do social networks affect protest participation? Several scholars have attempted 
to answer this question (e.g., Campbell, 2013; Kitts, 2000; for an overview, see Krinsky 
& Crossley 2014; Lim, 2008; Passy & Giugni, 2001). It has long been acknowledged 
that individuals do not make the decision to participate in protests in a “social 
vacuum” (Van Zomeren & Spears, 2009, p.667). An important proposition is that 
“social networks serve as channels of […] mobilization” (Lim, 2008, p.961). The 
recruitment of individuals and the coordination of action depend on a network 
structure (Diani, 2012; Dixon & Roscigno, 2003; Kim & Bearman, 1997; Klandermans, 
1984). Social networks, both formal movement networks and personal networks, are 
important channels for mobilization because networks facilitate access to information 
and help individuals to weigh the impact of their options (Diani, 2004; Klandermans 
& Oegema, 1987; Mannarini, Roccato, Fedi & Revere, 2009; Van Laer, 2007). When 
individuals are asked to participate in protests by someone with whom they have a 
(personal) connection, the likelihood of participation increases (Lim, 2008). When 
individuals must make decisions about participation, they look to their social 
environment for guidance (Diani, 2012). People’s social networks are the basis of this 
environment (Passy & Giugni, 2001; Passy & Monsch, 2014). 
 One proposition about the effect of networks on social movement participation 
is that a homogenous network favoring participation boosts participation, whereas a 
network consisting of groups with opposing opinions or interests has a hindering 
effect (Kitts, 2000; Tindall, 2002). Individuals who have these opposing groups in 
their network are likely to receive “varied information, opinions, and evaluations” 
(Tindall, 2002, p.418). Without opposition, an individual is likely to make a decision in 
favor of participation (McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; Tindall, 2002), whereas people who 
do experience opposition from others in their network who are important to them 
are likely to make the decision not to participate (Mutz, 2002). Santoro, Vélez and 
Keogh (2012) find that cross-cutting ethnic ties can also positively affect participation 
in ethnically-focused political and cultural protest, which suggest that the effect of 
homogenous networks on protest participation may be less straightforward, than 
that it always leads to inactivity.
 In times of protest, it is not uncommon for individuals to be confronted 
with people in their social network who are in favor of the protest and people who 
oppose  the protest. Our research question, therefore, is as follows: what mechanisms 
determine the decision to participate in protests if people have ties to different 
opposing groups? 
 We empirically investigate the effect of network ties on participation during a 
labor strike of a cleaning brigade. The empirical part of our paper consists of two parts. 
First, we study the effect of three different communication networks of workers (i.e., 
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private communication, work-related communication and strike-related communication) 
on their participation in a strike. We investigate the conditions under which each 
network affects protest participation. Second, we introduce trust as a moderator and 
investigate whether trust affects similar strike behavior. We use social network data 
on 59 employees in an organization in which a strike occurred and where not all 
workers participated in the strike. Thus, our respondents have a theoretical chance of 
being exposed to opposing pressures from their colleagues. Our data was collected in 
2012 using face-to-face structured interviews. We tested our hypotheses on a dataset 
of 3422 dyads.
 Our research contributes to the understanding of individual participation and the 
role of networks as channels for protest diffusion. First, we investigate the effects of 
different communication networks and a trust network on protest participation, 
offering an initial explanation of the effect of these communication networks (Diani, 
2003). Second, most prior research has focused on networks of activists only. 
Research designs with little or no variation in the individuals’ social context regarding 
participation allows for limited generalization (Kitts, 2000; McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; 
Siegel, 2009). Our empirical research allows for an analysis of a mixed social context 
of participants and non-participants.
5.2. Theory
5.2.1. Social networks and mobilization
During mobilization for protest, social networks play a vital role by serving as channels 
of information (Snow, Zurcher & Ekland-Olson, 1980). Individuals acquire information 
through their networks about the protest, the behavior of others and possible costs 
and benefits of participation and non-participation (Kitts, 2000). Thus, via their 
(personal) ties in their networks, individuals gather information about the opinions of 
others and about others’ participation or intention to participate. Moreover, through 
networks, issues about the conflict are integrated into the “day-to-day experiences” 
of potential participants (Dixon & Roscigno, 2003, p.1296). Interactions with others in 
the network will create feelings of solidarity, which promote participation. This 
participation will then be motivated by social approval. Encounters with other (future) 
participants in the network will increase the costs of non-participation (Fernandez & 
McAdam, 1989). 
 The above research suggests that network relations will promote mobilization 
and that network actors will attempt to convince others to participate in protests. 
Contact with mobilizing ties is a necessary step toward participation (Kitts, 2000); 
without network actors who attempt to influence an individual to participate, 
participation in protest is highly unlikely. However, the above research seems to imply 
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that all interactions between actors in social networks are targeted toward 
participation and ignores interactions with actors who oppose participation in 
protests. People belong to multiple, potentially differing social groups, and individuals 
are potentially exposed to opposing views and pressures towards protest participation. 
Therefore, we argue that the effect of network ties can also de-motivate people for 
protest participation. When a protest is looming, a potential protester might find 
him- or herself surrounded by a group of people with mixed stances on the protest. 
Some will encourage participation, whereas others will discourage participation in 
the protest. The effect of these so-called “opposing pressures” in a network on an 
individual’s decision to participate have been investigated by several scholars (e.g., 
Kitts, 2000; Santoro et al., 2012; Tindall, 2002). So far, however, the results are 
equivocal. Kitts (2000) and Tindall (2002) found that opposing pressures from ties in 
a network moderate protest and social movement participation. The individual 
receives mixed information, which may lead the individual to avoid making a decision 
at all (and thus to not participate). The form of opposition in these studies is based on 
opinions about the protest, and the opposing pressures consist of different opinions 
about the protest. Santoro et al. (2012) find that opposing ties, or “cross-cutting ties”, 
lead to more political participation. They investigate the effect of ties with both one’s 
own ethnic minority group and with the dominant group and find that the existence 
of these so-called cross-cutting ties (e.g., ties with people from the other ethnicity 
group) increases the likelihood of participation because it exposes individuals to 
intergroup hostility, which motivates them to act on behalf of their own group. This 
hostility is necessary to transform conflict into overt (collective) action. Their research 
focused on hierarchical groups (i.e., minorities or majorities based on nationality), 
and opposition between groups was caused by a difference in demographics. The 
study demonstrates that ties with opposing groups or individuals can increase the 
probability of participation. Although these authors’ theory is based on more or less 
fixed characteristics (nationality), the proposed mechanism might also be applicable 
to opposition based on differences in opinions. Confrontation with opposite opinions 
might bring conflict to the surface and make the individual more prone to participate.
One situation, in which individuals are faced with possible opposing pressures and 
must make decisions about whether to join industrial protest, is a labor strike. When 
the union calls for a strike, employees are likely to experience opposing pressures 
from their social ties about whether they should participate. Dixon and Roscigno 
(2003) summarize the literature and argue that communication networks are a 
necessary conduit for strikes. Moreover, they argue that, as is the case for social 
movement participation, strike participation is dependent on the worker’s 
embeddedness in his or her work network. A worker’s network is not restricted to 
ties with a union but consists of management and colleagues. Colleagues play a 
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fundamental role in the mobilization for a strike because they largely determine both 
the success of a strike and its social costs. People will participate only if they expect 
enough other people to participate (Granovetter, 1978; Kitts, 2000), and a work 
network creates immediate and future costs associated with not striking when 
colleagues do (cf. Dixon & Roscigno, 2003). Although the importance of social 
networks has been acknowledged, the effect of the countervailing pressures in 
day-to-day employment relations has not been addressed.
This study aims to investigate the effect of network embeddedness in groups with 
opposing pressures on individuals’ decision to participate in protest. Individuals faced 
with uncertainty will look to others for guidance on their own behavior. People will 
look to others whom they consider successful or legitimate for directions about how 
to act and will imitate the behavior of these people. This isomorphism (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983) leads to a homogenization of behavior between these individuals; 
people are more likely to follow the behavior of those who are most like themselves 
(McAdam &Rucht, 1993). Macy, Kitts and Flache (1997, p.7) stress the idea of “friends 
conform” — that is, individuals follow or imitate those to whom they feel attracted. 
However, the individuals to whom an individual feels close to might not be 
homogenous in their opinions or behavior. Therefore, the mechanism of isomorphism 
does not answer the question of how ties to heterogeneous network actors affect 
behavior, particularly with regard to participation. We argue that important clues to 
these questions are found in the type of communication ties. We distinguish three 
types: protest communication ties, private communication ties and work 
communication ties. These types differ in the type of information that is exchanged 
as well as the social support with which they are potentially associated. Moreover, we 
argue that trust is an important moderator of the effect of informational ties on the 
decision to participate. 
5.2.2.  Which communication ties matter? Protest ties, private ties  
and work ties
One of the preconditions for influence is the diffusion of information between 
network ties (Lim, 2008; Marsden & Friedkin, 1993; Myers, Zhu & Leskovec, 2012; 
Passy & Giugin, 2001). Based on this information, actors can make comparisons about 
the behavior and attitudes of others (Marsden & Friedkin, 1993). When a protest is 
looming, network actors will influence each other by exchanging information about 
the protest, their own contributions and the contributions of others. These protest 
communication ties are specifically directed at the protest, and we argue that these 
ties are channels for influence through information diffusion. By talking about an 
(upcoming) protest event, actors exchange not only information about their own 
intended behavior but also about opinions and views about the protest. Such an 
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exchange of opinions is known for its converging effect (Bakshy, Marlow, Rosenn & 
Adamic, 2012; Marsden & Friedkin, 1993). Thus, social networks affect an individual’s 
‘cognitive toolkit’ (Passy & Monsch, 2014). Lim (2008) argues that ties based on 
political activism are most effective for mobilization. The specific purpose of these 
ties (i.e., the attempt to influence others to show the same behavior regarding the 
protest) makes this type of tie particularly effective for mobilization. We expect that 
colleagues with whom a worker communicates about a protest will have a positive 
effect on acting the same during protest. We also expect that the effect of this 
communication increases with the strengths of protest communication ties. 
Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The strength of protest-related communication positively affects 
similar strike behavior. 
These protest communication ties are unlikely to be the only ties between workers 
who have interacted before the protest. Therefore, we further distinguish between 
private communication ties and work-related communication ties. Talking about 
private or work matters does not necessarily imply that information about the protest 
is exchanged, but it may affect the decision to participate through another mechanism: 
social support or social pressure. People will participate in collective action when 
they are asked to do so by someone they know personally, and influence is more 
likely when the tie between two workers is stronger (Kitts, Macy & Flache, 1999). 
Research shows that an individual is more likely to imitate the behavior of others he 
or she considers to be a friend than the behavior of “strangers” (Kitts, Macy & Flache, 
1999; Lim, 2008). Whereas protest ties work via protest information diffusion, we 
argue that private and work-related ties work via social support and pressure; these 
networks create social pressure for the worker to not defect from the alter(s). Not 
behaving like alter or a group of alters can have severe consequences, such as the loss 
of friendship or the loss of a long-standing cooperative relationship with one’s peers. 
We expect that the strength of private and work-related communication ties will 
have a direct positive effect on the likelihood that two people will show similar 
behavior in the case of network embeddedness in groups with opposing views on 
protest participation. Hence we predict, 
Hypothesis 2a: The strength of private communication ties positively affects similar 
strike behavior.
Hypothesis 2b: The strength of work-related communication ties positively affects 
similar strike behavior.
When private communication and work communication ties already exist between 
workers, it is likely that these ties will affect protest communication ties. Although 
protest networks can develop independently of pre-existing networks, these 
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pre-existing ties will make mobilization for protests easier. Existing communication 
ties offer the opportunity to diffuse information about the protest (Kerr & Siegel, 
1954, in: Dixon & Roscigno, 2003). We expect private and work communication tie 
networks to affect the likelihood of protest ties.
Hypothesis 3: The presence of private and work-related communication ties 
positively affects the presence of protest communication ties. 
5.2.3. Trust networks
Previous research has shown that people follow the behavior of those they trust. 
Interaction between two actors in a network creates personal trust between these 
two actors, which leads to adherence to norms (McClurg, 2003). That is, when 
workers interact, a bond of trust forms between these workers that leads to an 
increased likelihood of imitation of behavior and the formation of coalitions (Mislove 
et al., 2007). Trusted others provide guidelines about the ‘right’ way to act and about 
who is reliable in times of protest (Kane, Argote & Levine, 2005). We expect that trust 
will have a direct effect and that workers will be more likely to imitate the behavior of 
those they trust. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypotheses 4: Higher levels of trust positively affect similar strike behavior.
5.2.4. Moderation effect of trust
In addition to the direct effect of trust on participation, trust may moderate the 
effects of the three communication ties. To begin with its effect on protest 
communication, we argue that when a worker trusts another person, it is likely that 
information from the other person is perceived as more valid for the decision of 
whether to participate (e.g., Granovetter, 1985; Klandermans, 1984; Passy & Giugni, 
2001; Snow et al., 1980). Klandermans (1997) argues that to be mobilized, it is 
necessary that the source of information is perceived as trustworthy. Born, Akkerman 
and Torenvlied (2013a) find that trust is used as a filter for information. Passy and 
Giugni (2001) state that trust is crucial; when a worker receives information but the 
source of information is not trusted, his or her participation is very unlikely. Trust in 
networks can thus facilitate the decision to participate by reducing the costs of 
participation and by providing necessary support (Benson & Rochon, 2004). We 
expect a similar effect when the information is directed toward non-participation. 
Hypothesis 5a: The positive effect of protest communication ties on same strike 
behavior increases when trust is higher.
Second, we examine an interaction effect between trust and the private and work- 
related communication networks. Trust affects the expectations of other’s behavior 
(Ostrom, 2003), for instance about whether alter keeps his or her promise to support 
the ego. Such a promise may concern an agreement to go on strike. For a worker who 
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can rely on the participation of others, engaging in a strike is less risky than for a 
worker who is uncertain about his or her colleague’s word to join the strike (and thus 
runs the risk of an uncomfortable confrontation in the picket line). Likewise, the 
promise of a colleague to refrain from striking and keep working constitutes an 
important determinant of a worker’s decision. Showing up at work while others are 
on strike unexpectedly, may come as an unpleasant surprise: a worker does not want 
to be the single colleague defecting from a norm to participate, nor does he or she 
wants to responsible for all the work. Therefore, the trust that others stick to their 
word and show support during a vulnerable situation such as labor strike, will increase 
the effect of the social support and peer pressure executed though social ties. 
Moreover, Ostrom (2003) argues that (face-to-face) communication increases shared 
norms on reciprocity, which in turn strengthen the effect of trust on cooperation 
(Ostrom, 2003). We therefore expect an interaction effect of trust and communication: 
Hypothesis 5b: The positive effect of private communication ties on same strike 
behavior increases when trust is higher. 
Hypothesis 5c: The positive effect of work communication ties on same strike 
behavior increases when trust is higher. 
5.3. Methods
5.3.1. The case study: A cleaning brigade
Our study was conducted in a cleaning company which was affected by a sector strike 
under the motto “Clean enough!” (“Schoongenoeg!”, which is a figure of speech for 
“We had enough!”) in 2012. The strike lasted 105 days (from January 2nd, 2012 to April 
17th, 2012) and was the longest strike in the Netherlands since 1933. The strike’s goals 
were a moderate wage increase of about 5% and it was labeled as a strike for respect: 
compared to the national minimum wage, even experienced and older cleaners in the 
Netherlands earn only a maximum amount of about 120% of the national minimum 
wage (which was € 8.72 per hour in 2011). Further, the collective agreement of the 
cleaning sector differed from regular collective agreements in some ways: while in 
other industries absenteeism due to sickness is paid for, the collective agreement of 
the cleaning sector did not provide such an arrangement by neither the insurance 
company nor the employer. Employees and unions wanted to change especially this 
part of the former collective agreement and labeled the issue about the payments in 
time of sickness as an issue of “respect”. They asked for the same regulations that 
apply to almost all other Dutch employees who receive their whole salary during the 
first days of sickness absenteeism. After settlement, the strike resulted in an increase 
of salaries by 4.85%, better training opportunities and a general agreement for 
supervision of cleaners concerning their stress at work and improved working conditions 
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for temporary agency workers. Further, employer and union agreed to set up an 
experiment to pay the first days of sickness absenteeism for a certain period of time. 
 The cleaning firm participating in the study at hand belongs to one of the five 
biggest cleaning companies in the Netherlands. In particular, one on-site managed 
cleaning brigade in one Dutch firm was analyzed. To ensure anonymity of the affected 
parties, the client’s firm will be called “Office”. At times of the study, the cleaning 
company at Office provided an exceptional working sphere compared to other 
cleaning companies: while fluctuation is usually pretty high in the cleaning sector of 
about 15% to 35% each year (EFCI, 2010; FNV Bondgenoten, 2011), the fluctuation rate 
at the cleaning company analyzed was below 5%. In total, 60 employees work at the 
cleaning company at Office, 6 additional employees are hired via a temporary 
employment agency. 
 Cleaners are organized in five teams. Four teams are responsible for either one 
particular building or several groups of buildings. One team serves as a cross-depart-
mental brigade and operates heavy electrical machines and devises. Mostly, individual 
cleaners have specific tasks, e.g., are cleaning their own route with certain rooms. 
However, most buildings also require some team work in the sense that halls or other 
bigger conference rooms are cleaned up jointly by several cleaners. 
5.3.2. Data collection
We conducted structured interviews in March and April of 2012. Of the 66 cleaners in 
the cleaning brigade, 7 cleaners refused to participate in the study, leading to a total 
of 59 respondents. Of our respondents, 13 cleaners participated in the strike, 45 
cleaners did not participate, and one cleaner participated but returned to work 
before the strike was settled. The cleaners were personally interviewed with a paper- 
and-pencil survey. The questionnaire contained closed questions about individual 
characteristics, such as age, gender, and education; work-related questions, such as 
the respondent’s working position, tasks and (possible) conflicts with colleagues and 
supervisor; questions about strike behavior, attitudes and (participation) norms; and 
network questions. Further, some open questions were included about relevant 
episodes of the work environment, relations to supervisors and relations amongst 
the cleaners. Concerning the cleaner demographics, not only the low turn-over rate 
in the company (about 1% per year) was exceptional, but also the gender composition 
(14 cleaners were male, 45 cleaners were female). The average age was 41.4 years. 
76% of all interviewed cleaners were born in the Netherlands, 24% were born outside 
the Netherlands (the main other countries of origin are Turkey, Morocco and Poland). 
Concerning hierarchy, we have four cleaners in our sample that also execute 
supervising functions. All other cleaners are equal in terms of their hierarchical status 
within the company. 
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5.3.3. Measurements
The dependent variable was a dyad of same strike behavior between two workers. 
When there is influence from one worker on another, this situation results in these 
workers showing similar behavior (c.f. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch, 1998; 
Marsden & Friedkin, 1993). The dependent variable was grouped into three nominal 
categories: 0 = both workers do not strike; 1 = workers show different strike behavior; 
2 = both workers strike. The reference category for this variable was category 1, in 
which workers show different strike behavior, so we could compare this group of 
workers to the two categories in which workers behaved alike with regard to their 
strike behavior.  
 To measure the different types of communication networks (i.e., private 
communication ties, work-related communication ties and protest-related 
communication ties), we asked the cleaners about their contact with others in their 
network prior to the strike. We offered the cleaners a list with the names of all of their 
colleagues and asked them to indicate how frequently they talked about private 
matters, talked about work matters and talked about the strike in the three month 
previous to the first strike day. Private communication was measured with the item 
“How often do you discuss private matters with …”; work-related communication was 
measured with “How often do you discuss work-related matters with …”; and 
strike-related communication was measured with “How often did you discuss the 
strike with …”. Respondents could rate the intensity of the contact between “1” 
(minor communication) and “7” (very frequent communication). Colleagues with 
whom the respondents had no contact at all were rated “0”. All communication ties 
were determined retrospectively by asking the respondents to score the ties as they 
were in the three month prior to the strike. 
 We based our measurement of trust on Glaeser et al. (2000), who argue that this 
is the way to measure actual trusting behavior rather than attitudinal trust. The trust-
worthiness of colleagues was measured with one item: “Would you lend € 50 to…”. 
Lending money or not is motivated by the expectation that the one who borrowed 
the money will return the money. Such expectations are based on sharing norms, e.g., 
on the importance of keeping (implicit) promises. Respondents were offered a list of 
all of their colleagues and were asked to specify to which colleagues they would lend 
money. This dummy variable consists of two categories, “no trust” (= 0) and “trust” 
(= 1). 
 We also included several control variables which are regularly found to account 
for network context and homophily in networks. First, we controlled for union 
membership. As argued above, ties based on activism appear to be most effective in 
mobilizing people for protest (Lim, 2008). Ties to affiliations such as a social movement 
or the union are effective means of mobilization, and union members are more 
inclined to participate in the strike (Akkerman, Born & Torenvlied, 2013). Second, we 
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included a context variable indicating whether the cleaners work in same building to 
control for spatial proximity (cf. Snow et al., 1980). Cleaners who never work in the 
same building, are less likely to interact with each other than cleaners who work in 
the same building, although regular meetings were held for all workers, in particular 
during the strike. Thirdly, nationality varied within our group of respondents, which 
might create, for example, language barriers. Having the same nationality not only 
facilitates communication, it indicates similarity in cultural background and shared 
norms, e.g. about protesting and contesting employer authority. Finally, we controlled 
for identical gender (c.f. Ibarra, 1992; Louch, 2000). For all of these network context 
variables, we created binary variables indicating whether two workers on the same 
dyad were similar to each other (0 = not similar; 1 = similar).
5.4. Analyses and results
5.4.1. Introduction
We start our analyses with a descriptive examination of the four networks. We 
present the network graphs of the protest, private and work communication networks 
and the trust network, after which we report on several commonly used network 
descriptives. Next, we proceed with answering to what extent network embeddedness 
affects protest participation. We first analyze our data with a Multiple Regression 
Quadratic Assignment Procedure (MRQAP) with the double-semi-partialing-permuta-
tion-method (Dekker, Krackhardt & Snijders, 2003). MRQAP analysis (in contrast to 
linear regression) addresses the issue of dyadic autocorrelation, i.e., the potential 
interdependence that exists between observations. One common problem for 
analyzing social network data is the interdependency between observations. The 
likelihood that actor B has a relation with actor A is not independent from the relation 
actor A has with actor B. This dyadic autocorrelation problem violates the assumption 
of independence between measurements of OLS regression, increasing the risk of a 
Type I error (incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis) (ibid., 2003). MRQAP is a 
non-parametric method that is robust against the autocorrelation of relational data 
(Bowler & Brass, 2006; Kilduff & Krackhardt, 1994). The basic idea of any QAP analysis 
is that multiple permutations are done, which leads to multiple distributions of the 
coefficients, which forms a sampling distribution to which the empirical coefficients 
obtained from the observed data set are compared (Dreiling & Darves, 2011). With 
this technique, we examine whether the embeddedness in the communication 
networks and the trust network affects the probabilities that both actors in the dyads 
act in concert during a strike (1 = either both on strike or both refrain from striking) or 
behave differently (0 = one of the actors is on strike, while the other is not). For the 
MRQAP analyses, we used unique, directed dyads (N=3422).
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Although this analysis informs us about similarity in strike behavior, it only 
distinguishes between two potential behavioral options, while in reality there are 
three distinctive options: the two actors behave differently; the two actors refrain 
from striking; and the two actors both join the strike. Because it is theoretically 
possible that the decisions for participating together versus not participating together 
are caused by different mechanisms (e.g., information or social pressure), we lose 
information using the dichotomous variable in the MRQAP analyses. While the 
MRQAP analysis can handle continuous and dichotomous dependent variables 
(Borgatti, Everett & Johnson, 2013), it is not able to analyze multinomial categorical 
dependent variables. Therefore, we retest our hypotheses with a Multinominal 
Logistic Regression (MLR) analysis, which is more informative on the question what 
joint behavior is chosen and how these choices are affected by the four networks. 
With the MLR analysis, we analyze predictors for a dependent that consists of 
“unordered group classifications” (Petrucci, 2009, p.194). Advantages of an MLR 
analysis are that it does not require normally distributed predictors, both continuous 
and categorical independent variables can be used simultaneously, and odds ratios 
are used as estimators. Odds ratios are helpful to interpret categorical independent 
variables (ibid., 2009). The MLR analysis, however, does not control for autocorrelati-
on due to the dyadic structure of social network data, as explained above. In order to 
keep the interdependence between relations in the regression analyses as low as 
possible with dyadic data, we used the non-directed dyads in the MLR analysis, by 
symmetrizing the relation between two actors on a dyad (using the lowest score), 
resulting in 1711 cases. Comparing the results of both methods, we conclude that the 
results of our findings are fairly stable.  
5.4.2. Description of the networks
The starting points of our analyses are the networks as they are depicted in figure 1, 
figure 2, figure 3 and figure 4. These figures are a visualization of whether, prior to 
 the strike, strikers and non-strikers had ties with each other or mostly had ties among 
their “own” group (i.e., workers who show the same behavior). The graph in figure 1 
on strike-related communication shows a strong division between the later groups of 
strikers and non-strikers. Whereas the later strikers had contact with workers who 
eventually went on strike as well as with workers who did not, several non-strikers 
interacted only with other future non-strikers. The graph in figure 2 shows the private 
communication network. Private communication seems to be somewhat divided 
between strikers and non-strikers; there are a number of later non-strikers who only 
had contact with other later non-strikers. The later strikers, however, had contact 
with workers from both groups. The graph in figure 3 shows the work-related 
communication network. Strikers and non-strikers seem to be connected mostly with 
workers who later show the same behavior (i.e., striking or non-striking). Two workers 
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Figure 1   Strike-related communication in network
 = striker;  = non-striker.
Figure 2   Private communication in network
 = striker;  = non-striker.
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Figure 3   Work communication in network
 = striker;  = non-striker.
Figure 4   Trust in network
 = striker;  = non-striker.
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only had contact with each other (i.e., they form a separate “network” together), and 
both of these workers would become strikers. Figure 4 shows that trust networks are 
somewhat divided among strikers and non-strikers. The different clusters are linked 
by some workers, but they seem to consist of mostly later strikers or mostly later 
non-strikers. There are two small groups that consist of later non-strikers only. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the networks and shows that the overall 
density of the communication networks is rather low. Reciprocity is lowest for the 
strike communication network (reciprocity = .7014) and highest for the work-related 
communication network (reciprocity = .8000). The reciprocity of the trust ties is 
.5263; approximately half of the ties are reciprocal. 
5.4.3. Network relations and similar participation behavior during a strike
First, we estimate our models with MRQAP analyses. We start with discussing the 
effects of the network context variables, reported in table 2 under model 1. We find 
that when both workers in the dyad have the same membership status (i.e. are both 
union members or both non-members), this positively and significantly increases 
the likelihood of the same strike behavior (standardized coefficient = .333; p = .000). 
In this model, we find no significant effects for spatial proximity (i.e., whether two 
workers work in the same building or not), nor for nationality or gender.
5.4.3.1. The role of communication 
Next, we focus on the role of communication ties between workers. In our second 
model, reported in table 2 under model 2, we test hypothesis 1, which predicts that 
the strength of protest communication ties positively affects same strike behavior. In 
our MRQAP analysis, we find no significant effect of protest communication on the 
likelihood of same strike behavior. This indicates that information exchange about 
the protest is not enough for one worker to influence the strike behavior of another. 
Contrary to private and work communication, the content of the communication 
probably matters here: they might have argued about it because of different opinions 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics of the communication and trust networks
Density Average  
Degree
No.  
of ties
Arc based  
reciprocity
Protest communication 0.311 17.966 448 .7014
Private communication 0.379 21.983 670 .7661
Work communication 0.356 20.629 486 .8000
Trust 0.061 3.542 209 .5263
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or agreed because of the same opinion. This finding contradicts an important 
assumption in mobilization theory which considers protest networks as one of the 
main determinants of participation. The results with regard to our control variables 
remain the same as in the first model.
 Next, we test hypothesis 2a and hypothesis 2b (shown in table 2, under model 3). 
Hypothesis 2a predicts that private communication positively affects same strike 
behavior. We find that private communication ties positively and significantly affects 
similarity in strike behavior (standardized coefficient = .08, p = .011). It indicates that 
when two workers have stronger ties in the private communication network, they are 
more likely to show the same strike behavior. Thus, as we expected, the social 
pressure that workers might experience from their private ties to act in a certain way 
increases the likelihood that two workers will show the same behavior during a strike. 
We find no significant results for hypothesis 2b, which predicts that work-related 
communication positively affects imitation. These findings, combined with the results 
of the protest communication network, suggest that social pressure in private ties 
has more impact on mobilization than information about the strike. Private 
communication ties have the strongest effect on the same strike behavior. It may be 
easier to diverge from colleagues than it is to diverge from friends. In this model, we 
find a negative, significant effect of working in the same building (standardized 
coefficient = -.04; p = .091). For now, this finding, that working in the same building 
negatively affect same strike behavior, is difficult to interpret. The results of the MLR 
analysis in the next section will shed some more light on this finding.
 Hypothesis 3 predicts that private and work-related communication positively 
affects protest communication ties. We find that private communication ties are 
significantly positively associated with protest communication ties (standardized 
coefficient = .23, p = .000). Moreover, when colleagues communicate about work, 
they are also more likely to communicate about the strike (standardized coefficient = .37, 
p = .000). This finding confirms our expectations that a protest network is (partly) 
dependent on the existence of other ties between workers. This supports hypothesis 3.
Next, we investigate the effect of trust on same strike behavior. Hypothesis 4 predicts 
that trust is positively related to same strike behavior. Table 2 shows the results of 
this test under model 4. We find that ties between two workers in the trust network 
positively and significantly affect same strike behavior (standardized coefficient = 
.053, p = .021). Hypothesis 4 is therefore supported. Thus, when two workers trust 
each other, the likelihood of these two workers showing the same strike behavior 
increases. Private communication remains positive and significant as well. This is an 
important finding that indicates that a trust relation and private communication both 
are important when workers want other workers to show the same behavior. This 
relation seems more important than communication about the protest itself, and 
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personal relations seem to trump protest-related information exchange. The results 
regarding our network variables remain consistent. 
5.4.3.2. The full model
In the last model, we add our interaction variables to further investigate the 
moderating effect of trust on the effect of different types of communication, to test 
hypothesis 5a (the positive effect of protest communication ties on same strike 
behavior increases when trust is higher), hypothesis 5b (the positive effect of private 
communication ties on same strike behavior increases when trust is higher) and 
hypothesis 5c (the positive effect of work communication ties on same strike behavior 
increases when trust is higher). Model 5 in table 2 shows the results. We find no 
significant effects of interaction between any of the communication networks and 
the trust network. The effects from the prior models, remain consistent. This means 
that trusting each other does not increase the effects of information (protest 
communication ties) or social pressure (private and work related communication 
ties), at least not significantly. These findings refute hypotheses 5a through 5c.
 Summarizing the results of our MRQAP analyses, we find that private communication 
ties and trust ties positively and significantly affect the likelihood that two workers 
will show the same strike behavior. That is, when two workers communicate about 
private matters or indicate that there is a trust relation between them, these two 
workers are significantly more likely to do the same when a strike occurs. This is an 
important and new finding in strike-related network research. Until now, protest- 
related networks were considered a main determinant of participation in protest. 
However, we found that private ties or a trust relation are important determinants 
for workers to decide what to do when a protest looms. 
5.4.4. Both on strike, or both not on strike?
In this section, we report on the retesting of our hypotheses by performing several 
MLR analyses. Re-testing our hypotheses with MLR allows us not only to investigate 
the difference between workers showing similar or different strike behavior but also 
offers the opportunity to investigate whether there is a difference between workers 
who both participate and workers who both do not participate. Thus, MLR allows us 
to test whether participating together is caused by different mechanisms than not 
participating together. 
 A first step before performing MLR is to check for multi-collinearity (Petrucci, 
2009). The correlations between the different independent variables can be found in 
table 3. Although the independent variables all correlate significantly to one another, 
there is no multi-collinearity problem. The highest correlation is between private 
communication and work communication (r = .655).
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strike. The reference category for this variable is category 1, in which workers show 
different strike behavior, so we compare this group of workers to each category in 
which workers showed similar behavior. We followed the sequence of models as we 
did for the MRQAP analyses. The chi-squares and likelihood ratio tests of our models 
can be found in table 4. When the significance of the likelihood ratio test is less than 
.05, a good model fit can be assumed (Petrucci, 2009). 
Table 2  Results of the MRQAP analyses
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Union membership .333*** .322*** .330*** .330*** .329***
Building -.010 -.021 -.036* -.039* -.039*
Nationality .035 .036 .037 .037 .037
Gender -.018 -.017 -.018 -.020 -.020
Protest communication .035 .016 .010 .001
Private communication .085** .067** .074**
Work communication -.030 -.033 -.041
Trust .053** .052**
Protest comm.*trust -.001
Private comm.*trust -.014
Work comm.*trust .019
R2 .112 .114 .118 .120 .120
Table 3  Correlation analysis of independent variables
1 2 3
1. Protest communication
2. Private communication .466**
3. Work communication .510** .655**
4. Trust .366** .467** .394
Note: ** = p< .01; 
The dependent variable was not included in the correlation analysis because this 
variable is categorical.
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5.4.4.1. The non-strikers 
We begin by comparing the group in which two workers in the dyad were both 
non-strikers with the group in which workers showed different strike behavior. The 
results of these analyses are reported in table 5. In the discussion of the MLR analyses, 
we focus on the full model (model 5, in table 5). We find that in the full model, the 
three communication networks do not have a significant effect on the likelihood that 
both workers in the dyad did not participate. Hence, for this group, we reject 
hypothesis 1 (the strength of protest-related communication ties positively affect the 
same strike behavior) hypothesis 2a (the strength of private communication ties 
positively affect same strike behavior) and hypothesis 2b (the strength of work- 
related communication ties positively affect same strike behavior).
 We find that trust is important for two workers to both not participate. The more 
two workers in a dyad trust each other, the more likely they are to both not participate, 
or put differently, the less they trust each other, the less likely it is that they both 
refrain from striking (B = .916; Exp(B) = 2.499, p = .054). When there is a trust relation 
between two workers, they are 2.5 times more likely to both not participate than to 
show different strike behavior. Hypothesis 4, therefore, is accepted for non-participation: 
higher levels of trust positively affect the same strike behavior. We found no evidence 
Table 4  Model fit of the models
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests
Model AIC BIC -2 log likelihood Chi-squarea df Sig.
Model 1
 Intercept only
 Final 
363.758
153.550
374.648
207.999
359.758
133.550 226.208 8 .000
Model 2 
 Intercept only
 Final 
553.853
333.233
564.472
398.571
549.583
309.233 240.350 10 .000
Model 3
 Intercept only
 Final
783.246
565.818
794.135
652.935
779.246
533.818 245.427 14 .000
Model 4
 Intercept only
 Final
811.741
593.481
822.630
691.488
807.741
557.481 250.260 16 .000
Model 5
 Intercept only 811.741 822.630 807.741
 Final 599.226 729.902 551.226 256.514 22 .000
Note: a “Computed by subtracting -2 log likelihoods of the final model from intercept. A larger chi-square 
suggests a greater contribution of the independent variables to the dependent variable than the 
intercept-only model. Statistical significance (<.05) suggests good model fit.” (Petrucci, 2009, p.200).
127
PEER INFLUENCE ON PROTEST PARTICIPATION
5
for interaction between the communication networks and the trust networks as 
none of interaction effects are significant. The hypotheses about the interactions 
between communication networks and trust are therefore rejected. As in the MRQAP 
analyses, equal union membership increases the likelihood of both workers not 
striking (B = 1.270; Exp(B) = 3.559, p = .000), and the chances of both of these workers 
not participating are approximately 3.5 times greater than these workers showing 
different strike behavior. Lastly, we found that having the same nationality increases 
the likelihood of both workers not participating (B = .367; Exp(B) = 1.444, p = .008).
5.4.4.2. The strikers
When we compare the group of workers who both strike with the workers in a dyad 
who show different behavior, we find different results than we find for the non-strikers. 
Whereas trust networks trigger similarity in non-participation, communication 
networks trigger similarity in participation. When two workers communicate about 
the strike, the likelihood of these two workers both participating increases (B = .216; 
Exp(B) = 1.124, p = .073). This finding confirms hypothesis 1, which states that the 
strength of protest communication ties positively affect joint strike participation. 
 The same applies to private communication ties: when two workers communicate 
about private matters, these workers are more likely to strike together (B = .305; 
Exp(B) = 1.356, p = .073). This confirms hypothesis 2a (the strength of private 
communication ties positively affect same strike behavior). We find a negative effect 
for work communication ties; when two workers communicate about work, they are 
more likely to show different strike behavior than they are to both go on strike (B = 
-.327; Exp(B) = .721, p = .079). Hypothesis 2b, which states that the strength of work 
communication ties positively affects same strike behavior, is therefore rejected. 
Talking more about work, reduces the changes that two cleaners both go on strike, or 
put differently: the less two cleaners talk about work, the changes increase that they 
both chose to go on strike, compared to acting differently.
 For the group of strikers, we find no effect of trust or of interaction effects. When 
we consider our control variables, we find a significant effect of union membership (B 
= 2.624; Exp(B) = 13.788, p = .000). When two workers in a dyad hold the same union 
membership status, they are approximately 13 times more likely to both join the 
strike than to show different strike behavior. Moreover, when two workers work in 
the same building, they are almost 3 times as likely to both go on strike (B = 1.058; 
Exp(B) = 2.880, p = .012).
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Table 5  Results of the MLR analyses
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
3 category strike behavior B Exp(B) Sig. B Exp(B) Sig. B Exp(B) Sig. B Exp(B) Sig. B Exp(B) Sig.
Both workers do not strikea
Intercept -.282 .066 -.279 .070 -.306 .048 -.316 .042 -.327 .035
Same membership 1.287 3.621 .000 1.286 3.619 .000 1.281 3.600 .000 1.274 3.576 .000 1.270 3.559 .000
Same Building -.164 .849 .419 -.152 .859 .479 -.269 .764 .246 -.298 .743 .203 -.297 .743 .207
Same nationality .337 1.401 .014 .337 1.401 .014 .356 1.427 .010 .361 1.434 .009 .367 1.444 .008
Same gender -.013 .987 .905 -.014 .986 .898 -.016 .984 .887 -.013 .987 .910 -.010 .990 .930
Protest communication -.010 .990 .849 -.042 .491 .491 -.049 .952 .430 -.068 .934 .339
Private communication .130 .097 .097 .080 1.083 .330 .159 1.172 .109
Work communication -.024 .737 .737 -.040 .961 .582 -.062 .940 .448
Trust .631 1.879 .033 .916 2.499 .054
Protest comm.*trust .033 1.034 .836
Private comm.*trust -.277 .758 .122
Work comm.*trust .104 1.109 .555
Both workers strikeb
Intercept -3.486 .000 -3.594 .000 -3.641 .000 -3.651 .000 -3.615 .000
Same membership 2.599 13.456 .000 2.628 13.845 .000 2.631 13.886 .000 2.622 13.765 .000 2.624 13.788 .000
Same building 1.494 4.453 .000 1.025 2.787 .004 .894 2.446 .022 .862 2.367 .029 1.058 2.880 .012
Same nationality -.303 .739 .290 -.340 .712 .241 -.313 .731 .281 -.304 .738 .295 -.325 .723 .267
Same gender -.170 .884 .513 -.154 .857 .558 -.168 .845 .524 -.164 .849 .535 -.144 .866 .293
Protest communication .291 1.337 .000 .256 1.292 .006 .248 1.282 .009 .216 1.241 .073
Private communication .242 1.274 .050 .196 1.217 .127 .305 1.356 .073
Work communication -.109 .897 .388 -.122 .885 .339 -.327 .721 .079
Trust . .580 .221 .052 1.054 .949
Protest comm.*trust .096 1.101 .669
Private comm.*trust -.325 .722 .239
Work comm.*trust .477 1.612 .100
Note: *The reference category is worker 1 does not strike, worker 2 strikes.
a   These data compare“both workers do not strike” and the reference group  
(“Workers show different strike behavior”).
b   These data compare “both workers strike” and the reference group  
(“Workers show different strike behavior”).
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Table 5  Results of the MLR analyses
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
3 category strike behavior B Exp(B) Sig. B Exp(B) Sig. B Exp(B) Sig. B Exp(B) Sig. B Exp(B) Sig.
Both workers do not strikea
Intercept -.282 .066 -.279 .070 -.306 .048 -.316 .042 -.327 .035
Same membership 1.287 3.621 .000 1.286 3.619 .000 1.281 3.600 .000 1.274 3.576 .000 1.270 3.559 .000
Same Building -.164 .849 .419 -.152 .859 .479 -.269 .764 .246 -.298 .743 .203 -.297 .743 .207
Same nationality .337 1.401 .014 .337 1.401 .014 .356 1.427 .010 .361 1.434 .009 .367 1.444 .008
Same gender -.013 .987 .905 -.014 .986 .898 -.016 .984 .887 -.013 .987 .910 -.010 .990 .930
Protest communication -.010 .990 .849 -.042 .491 .491 -.049 .952 .430 -.068 .934 .339
Private communication .130 .097 .097 .080 1.083 .330 .159 1.172 .109
Work communication -.024 .737 .737 -.040 .961 .582 -.062 .940 .448
Trust .631 1.879 .033 .916 2.499 .054
Protest comm.*trust .033 1.034 .836
Private comm.*trust -.277 .758 .122
Work comm.*trust .104 1.109 .555
Both workers strikeb
Intercept -3.486 .000 -3.594 .000 -3.641 .000 -3.651 .000 -3.615 .000
Same membership 2.599 13.456 .000 2.628 13.845 .000 2.631 13.886 .000 2.622 13.765 .000 2.624 13.788 .000
Same building 1.494 4.453 .000 1.025 2.787 .004 .894 2.446 .022 .862 2.367 .029 1.058 2.880 .012
Same nationality -.303 .739 .290 -.340 .712 .241 -.313 .731 .281 -.304 .738 .295 -.325 .723 .267
Same gender -.170 .884 .513 -.154 .857 .558 -.168 .845 .524 -.164 .849 .535 -.144 .866 .293
Protest communication .291 1.337 .000 .256 1.292 .006 .248 1.282 .009 .216 1.241 .073
Private communication .242 1.274 .050 .196 1.217 .127 .305 1.356 .073
Work communication -.109 .897 .388 -.122 .885 .339 -.327 .721 .079
Trust . .580 .221 .052 1.054 .949
Protest comm.*trust .096 1.101 .669
Private comm.*trust -.325 .722 .239
Work comm.*trust .477 1.612 .100
Note: *The reference category is worker 1 does not strike, worker 2 strikes.
a   These data compare“both workers do not strike” and the reference group  
(“Workers show different strike behavior”).
b   These data compare “both workers strike” and the reference group  
(“Workers show different strike behavior”).
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In the introduction of the results section we motivated the use of two statistical tools 
for testing our hypotheses. We used the less informative MRQAP to estimate the 
effects on joint or different behavior, which corrected for interdependency of 
observation in a dyadic data structure. We re-tested our hypotheses with MLR, in 
order to discriminate between joint strike behavior and joint non-strike behavior, 
even though an MLR analysis procedure does not correct for autocorrelation in the 
data structure. Table 6 compares the outcomes of the two procedures. Any effects 
not present in the MRQAP, but present in the MLR can be caused by overestimation 
of the effects due to autocorrelation (leading to Type I errors). Feeling less confident 
about effects showing up in the MLR only, we focus our conclusion on similar results 
of both methods. 
Bearing this in mind, we can conclude that communication networks and trust 
networks differ in their effects on same strike behavior. Whereas trust is most 
important for non-participation, communication networks are most important for 
two workers to participate together. This distinction between the two groups could 
also explain why we find no significant effect of protest communication ties in our 
MRQAP analyses. The number of dyads of workers who both did not participate is 
Table 6  Comparing the outcomes of the MRQAP and the MRL
MRQAP MLR Outcomes 
MRQAP  
vs MLR
Similar strike 
behavior 
vs different 
behavior
Both non-strike 
vs different  
strike behavior
Both on strike  
vs different  
strike behavior
Equal  
outcome
Hyp. 1 protest ties n.s n.s. + -
Hyp. 2a private ties + n.s. + yes
Hyp. 2b work ties n.s. n.s. - -
Hyp. 4 trust ties* + + n.s yes
Hyp. 5a-c Interactions 
communication ties with trust
n.s. n.s. n.s. yes
Same union membership + + + yes
Same building - n.s. + -
Same nationality n.s. + n.s. -
Same gender n.s. n.s. n.s. yes
Note: *Hypothesis 3 concerns the association between protest communication ties and private and work 
related communication ties, and is not subjected to the retests.
131
PEER INFLUENCE ON PROTEST PARTICIPATION
5
larger than the number of dyads of participants, which could have overpowered the 
effects of the communication network ties. However, our analyses show that protest 
communication is not the most important factor for two workers to show similar 
strike behavior. When one worker wants to convince another not to participate in 
a strike, a trust relation is important, whereas for participation in a strike (in addition 
to protest communication), having a private relation is important. These effects of 
private communication ties and trust ties are new findings in strike research. 
5.5. Conclusion and Discussion
We began our research with the question of how network relations with different 
groups affect an individual’s decision to participate in protests. Our research shows 
that private communication ties and trust network ties increase the likelihood of 
same strike behavior. This is not limited to participation; workers seem to decide like 
others with whom they have close contact, and ties can influence workers toward 
non-participation. 
 We found that private communication ties increase the likelihood of same strike 
behavior, especially participation in a strike. Trust also increases the likelihood of 
same strike behavior, but this is mostly important for non-participation. When two 
workers trust each other, this significantly increases the odds that these two workers 
will both not participate in a strike. These are important findings for two reasons. 
First, they indicate that mobilization for non-participation needs to be conducted via 
different channels than mobilization for participation. Whereas private communication 
ties are important for mobilization for participation, trust seems to be especially 
important when one worker wants to influence another to refrain from striking. 
Workers will act like others they trust. Born, Akkerman and Torenvlied (2013b) 
indicated that support for non-participation increases the probability of inaction. 
This research also shows that workers tend to show the same behavior as trusted 
others. Second, these findings are important because they show that protest 
networks might not be the main determinant with regard to strikes. In our overall 
model, we found no effect of protest communication ties. We did find an effect of 
protest communication ties on the likelihood of two workers both striking, but this 
effect was smaller than that of private communication ties. Private ties might create 
an additional pressure for workers to act like others because workers do not want to 
defect from those with whom they have (close) relations. These pressures seem to be 
more important than the information provided through protest communication ties. 
 In our Dutch case study, labor relations may have been relatively good, and 
engaging in strikes in such cases probably involves taking a high risk, for instance of 
disturbed relations afterwards (Thommes and Akkerman, 2013; Thommes, Vyrastekova 
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& Akkerman, 2015). This has two implications for the external validity of our cases 
study. First, investigating such a ‘difficult’ case for mobilization provides a conservative 
test of our hypotheses. This allows for a generalization of our conclusions to contexts 
in which protest is more common and inflicts lower risk of loss deterioration of social 
relations among workers and between management and workers. In addition, studying 
protest participation in organizations in which employees have a daily opportunity to 
build trust relations, may overestimate the effect of trust. Even though trust in this 
network is not particularly high, trust may be less common in other protest contexts 
(for instance in demonstrations, in which potential participants have lower levels of 
previous interaction). Therefore, the levels of trust found in labor relations may be 
uncommon in other forms of protest. 
 Our study contributes to the understanding of individual participation and the 
role of networks in two ways. First, we investigated the effects of network relations 
with different groups on an individual’s decision to participate in protests. We studied 
what individuals decide in times of protest when they are related to with both strikers 
and non-strikers and found that private communication and trust have a significant 
effect on same strike behavior. This result is a first step in explaining and predicting 
the effects of the different pressures workers may experience. Second, our research 
addresses the persistent selection bias in previous empirical studies by investigating 
an entire network that consists of both strikers and non-strikers. This approach 
allowed us to investigate actual participants and to shed light on why workers choose 
not to participate. By investigating a complete network, we provide a first step toward 
solving this methodological problem.  
 Our research has several limitations that should be addressed in future research. 
First, we investigated the network at one point in time; however, networks are not 
static (Takács, Janky & Flache, 2008). Although we included controls in order to 
account for homophily-tendencies in the networks, longitudinal data would have 
some advantages over this static approach. We are only able to offer conclusions 
about the relationships as they were at the time of our data collection, but 
relationships change over time and are affected by collective action, as shown by 
Thommes and Akkerman (2013). It would be interesting to investigate the effects of 
opposing ties in longitudinal research. Additionally, although the results of the 
MRQAP analyses and the MLR analyses are quite similar, it must be noted that a 
MRQAP analysis is more suitable to address the independence of our network 
measures. However, the MLR analyses offer a first step in explaining the difference 
between mobilization for participation and mobilization for non-participation. Lastly, 
due to the timing of our research, the results regarding protest communication must 
be interpreted with caution. At the time of data collection, the strike was already 
ongoing. Although we specifically asked respondents to rate the communication as it 
was three months before the strike happened and we present an initial, important 
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indication of what causes the imitation of protest behavior, we cannot state with 
certainty whether workers showed similar behavior because they communicated 
about the strike (see also Bakshy et al., 2012) as retrospective answers might be less 
reliable. Thus, our research offers a first step in investigating associational networks, 
while the causal effect of protest communication must be interpreted with some 
caution.
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6.1. Introduction
When protest looms, people are put under pressure by opposing groups. Both 
opponents and proponents of the protest will attempt to influence the participation 
decision of potential participants. One way to influence this decision is to provide 
information about the protest and the conflict issue. Information from these (possibly) 
contradictory sources can drive individuals in different directions. However, theories 
that explain participation in collective protest (i.e., a protest aimed at improving the 
conditions of a group of individuals as a whole (Taush & Becker, 2013; Van Zomeren, 
Spears & Leach, 2012; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddan, 1990)) mostly focus on the effect 
of information from the mobilizing actor (e.g., Klandermans, 2002). Counter-mobilizing 
actors (e.g., actors who want to prevent the protest) are seldom investigated 
explicitly. Without taking into account multiple, possibly contradictory sources of 
information, variation in participation behavior is difficult to explain. Therefore, the 
main objective of this thesis is to determine how an individual’s participation is 
affected by information from different, opposing actors. 
 The empirical context of this thesis is a specific type of collective protest, namely, 
labor strikes. Strikes provide a convenient social context to compare the participation 
decisions of individuals. In the context of a strike, individuals (in this thesis operationalized 
as workers) are likely to be confronted with information from both opponents (e.g., 
management) and proponents (e.g., the union) of the strike. Moreover, in previous 
research, variation on the dependent variable is often absent (Buttigieg, Deery & 
Iverson, 2008; Kitts, 2000; Martin, 1986; McAdam & Paulsen, 1993). This makes 
variation in participation difficult to explain. In a strike, non-participants may be 
easier to find because they work in the same organization as workers who decide to 
participate. This makes the problem of selection on the dependent variable easier to 
overcome. 
 Thus, my hypotheses are based on the assumption that multiple groups will 
try to influence workers’ participation decisions when a strike looms. To test my 
hypotheses, I used different strategies of data collection and analysis. In chapters 2, 3 
and 4, I used survey data from Dutch workers, which was collected in 2010. For the 
analysis of this data, I applied univariate and bivariate analyses and structural 
equation modeling. In chapter 5, I used network data collected in 2012 and employed 
Multiple Regression Quadratic Assignment Procedure (MRQAP) to test the 
hypotheses. In this final chapter, I will answer the main question raised in chapter 1, 
based on the results obtained from the different studies (section 6.2.). Next, I will 
discuss the theoretical contributions (section 6.3.) and I will discuss (section 6.4.) the 
implications of my studies.
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6.2. Answering the research question 
The literature review in chapter 1 indicates that we lack understanding about the way 
individuals make decisions related to participation in collective protest when provided 
with information from opponents as well as proponents of a (looming) protest. Extant 
theories explaining participation in collective protest mostly focus on the effect of 
information from the proponents of a collective protest. These proponents are also 
conceptualized as the ‘mobilizing actors’ (e.g., Klandermans, 2002). Information 
from sources other than proponents has not yet been specified and incorporated 
into explanatory models of participation in collective protest. Without taking into 
account multiple sources of information—sources that offer possibly contradictory 
information—variation in participation behavior is difficult to explain. Thus, the main 
question of this thesis was: how is an individual’s participation decision affected by 
information from different actors?
 To answer this question, four research questions were formulated to guide the 
remainder of my thesis. I explored the possible opposing sources of information in 
individuals’ networks, and examined how these sources are assessed by the individual. 
Next, I investigated how individuals filter the information they receive from different 
sources. Third, I tested how social support for participation or non-participation 
affected the participation decision of workers. Last, I investigated which mechanisms 
determine the decision to participate in a protest if people have ties to opposing 
groups. The results to these questions are explored below.
In chapter 2, I explored workers’ sources of information when a strike is imminent and 
how these different sources are assessed by individual workers. Individuals who have 
to make a participation decision face uncertainty. The first step to reduce this 
uncertainty is the collection of additional information (Hewstrone & Stroebe, 2001; 
Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). Without information, it is difficult to calculate the costs and 
benefits of participation and it becomes unlikely that an individual will participate at 
all (Klandermans, 1997; Schussman & Soule, 2005). Information can come from 
different sources; it can come from informal, personal relations or through 
non-relational sources, such as the media (Biggs, 2005; McAdam & Rucht, 1993). 
These different sources of information can have different, sometimes contradictory, 
substantive views on the protest. Consequently, individuals will be subjected to 
information in favor of the protest as well as information opposing the protest. Their 
use of the information depends on access to the information and the assessment of 
the source of information (Mohanty & Suar, 2014; O’Reilly, 1982). By investigating 
whether individuals obtain information from possibly opposing sources of information 
and how these sources are assessed, I systematically identified the sources of 
information workers use when they face a participation decision. 
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My exploratory study showed that workers receive information from multiple and 
opposing sources simultaneously when a strike is imminent. I defined the most 
common sources of information, both inside the organization with the looming strike 
and outside the organization. The sources inside the organization are: management 
(the counter-mobilizing actor), shop stewards (workers who are union officials), 
colleagues (divided into two groups: direct colleagues and other, more distant 
colleagues) and work councils (elected bodies in an organization who represent the 
workers). Sources outside the organization are: unions (the mobilizing actor), workers 
with the same profession who work in other organizations and media. Workers report 
that they receive information from all the sources I defined. The amount of information 
workers receive differs between sources: workers receive the most information from 
their direct colleagues, whereas they receive the least information from people with 
the same profession who work elsewhere. Moreover, I found that workers receive 
contradictory information when a strike looms; my exploratory study showed 
that both management and the union (the opponent and the proponent of the strike, 
respectively) both provide information to workers when a strike is looming. 
Importantly, management is reported to be “more silent” when a strike is looming. 
In other words, workers report they receive less information from management 
during times of conflict than when there is no conflict. The provision of information 
from management could be helpful in keeping workers from striking, but workers 
report that this information is not forthcoming. Additionally, I found that union 
members are more likely to receive contradictory information than their non-union 
counterparts.
 When workers receive information from multiple sources simultaneously, they 
need to assess this information. Two mechanisms for this assessment are social 
identification and trust. Social identification is considered one of the main predictors 
of participation (e.g., Klandermans, 2002, 2004). Trust helps individuals assess whom 
they can rely on when a protest looms (Kane, Argote & Levine, 2002). My study 
showed that workers can identify with more than one group simultaneously, as 
argued by previous research (Charness, Rigotti & Rustichini, 2007; Ellemers, de Gilder 
& Haslam, 2004). I found similar results for trust: workers can trust both management 
and the union simultaneously. Union members are more likely to experience 
simultaneous identification with and trust in opposing sources than non-members. 
The study in chapter 2 showed that workers use multiple sources of information 
when a strike looms. However, the study did not show how workers address this 
contradictory information, or how information from opposing sources is filtered. 
How workers use social identification and trust as filters of information to assist them 
in making a participation decision is the focus of chapter 3. In chapter 3, I studied the 
effect of information from two contradictory sources, the union and management, 
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on individuals’ willingness to participate in a looming strike, and how two filters of 
information, social identification and trust, are used. In chapter 1, I argued that one 
way workers might assess the usefulness of information is on the basis of social 
identification: information from members of their own group is evaluated more 
positively, and workers are likely to use information from sources comparable to 
themselves (McAdam & Rucht, 1993). The second possible filter of information I 
defined is trust: workers will only use information if they perceive the source to be 
trustworthy (Klandermans, 1997). 
 In chapter 3, I tested hypotheses regarding information from both the union and 
management. As expected, I found that information from the union significantly 
increases willingness to participate. However, I found that information from 
management had no effect on worker willingness to participate in a potential strike. 
This implies that offering information only pertaining to the conflict is not a successful 
strategy for management to keep workers from participating. 
 Next, I focused on the effect of social identification. Previous studies that 
investigated the relationship between social identification and participation focused 
on one group exclusively: the mobilizing actor, such as a social movement or the 
union. However, as I argue in both chapter 1 and chapter 3, social identification is not 
restricted to one social group exclusively: individuals are part of different groups and 
can identify with these different groups simultaneously (Charness et al., 2007; 
Ellemers et al., 2004). Indeed, in chapter 2, I found that workers can identify with 
these sources simultaneously. I expected that, in times of a strike, workers will not 
only identify with the union but also with management of the organization they work 
for. As such, I investigated how identification affects the willingness to participate of 
a worker who identifies with the two groups simultaneously. The positive effect of 
social identification with the union on willingness to participate was confirmed, which 
is consistent with previous research (e.g., Klandermans, 2002, 2004). However, while 
I expected identification with management to negatively affect workers’ willingness 
to participate, I found no significant effect.
 Third, I studied the effect of trust on willingness to participate in a strike. As 
stated above, trust is assumed to enable individuals to decide on whom they should 
rely in times of conflict (Kane et al., 2005). Sources of information, such as the union 
and management, need to be perceived as credible (Klandermans, 1997) for their 
information to be used. I expected trust in the union to positively affect willingness to 
participate, but I did not find such an effect. Trust in management, however, does 
have a significant negative effect on willingness to participate, as I hypothesized; this 
result implies that management needs to be perceived to be credible for workers’ 
participation decisions to be affected. This result differs from the strategies 
recommended to the union for successfully impacting workers’ willingness to 
participate, which focus on social identification and provision of information.
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I also used structural equation modeling to test whether social identification and 
trust are used as filters of information. I found that trust is used as a filter of information, 
but only for information from management. Information from the union is not filtered 
by trust. 
 With regard to my main question, how an individual’s participation decision is 
affected by information from opposing sources, chapter 2 and chapter 3 show that 
workers receive information simultaneously from both proponents and opponents of 
a strike. Moreover, information from these opposing sources is filtered by different 
mechanisms. Thus, if different actors (i.e., opponents and proponents) want to mobilize 
potential participants, they cannot rely on similar strategies to affect individuals’ 
participation decision. 
In addition to the main mobilizing actor (e.g., the union) and the counter-mobilizing 
actor (e.g., management), several “significant others” (cf. Klandermans, 1984) are 
important in workers’ participation decisions. Potential participants assess whether 
these significant others will approve or disapprove of the protest (Klandermans, Ibid.). 
For workers, colleagues are important significant others. Therefore, in chapter 4, 
I studied how social support from colleagues affects the individual worker’s willingness 
to participate. Like the majority of studies on the effect of social support on 
participation, I focused on social support for participation, but I also studied support 
for the opposite: social support for non-participation. A worker’s social environment 
can include colleagues in favor of protest and those opposed to it; satisfying one side 
of this spectrum will result in the disappointment of the other side, and social 
consequences might possibly result. Social costs and benefits imposed by group 
members or significant others are an important selective incentive to overcoming the 
free-riding problem (Olson, 1965; Janky & Takács, 2010). Therefore, I also studied the 
effect of social costs potentially imposed by colleagues on both participation and 
non-participation. While reasons for non-participation have been investigated before 
(e.g., Klandermans, 1984; Klandermans & van Stekelenburg, 2014), the focus is often 
on a lack of support for participation instead of support for non-participation.
 By use of structural equation modeling, I found that both forms of support had the 
hypothesized effects: perceived social support for participation significantly increased 
workers’ willingness to participate in a strike. This is consistent with previous empirical 
work (e.g., Klandermans & Stekelenburg, 2014; Stürmer & Simon, 2004). However, as 
expected, perceived social support for non-participation significantly decreased 
workers’ willingness to participate. This result suggests that support for non-partici-
pation is different from a lack of support for participation—as it is commonly opera-
tionalized in mobilization research. Another important finding is that the effects of 
the two forms of support are not equally strong: the positive effect of support for 
participation is stronger than the negative effect of support for non-participation.
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When making a participation decision, individuals calculate the costs and benefits of 
behavior (Klandermans, 1984; Olson, 1965). These costs and benefits can be defined 
as time and money. However, in a polarized context, it is likely that participation will 
lead to social costs as well, such as sanctions for deviating from the behavior that 
colleagues (or team members) prefer or damaging relationships with colleagues the 
worker still has to cooperate with in the future, after the protest has settled. These 
social costs can significantly impact an individual’s social wellbeing, as they affect 
future relationships with significant others. While it is assumed that social costs are 
an important element in the calculation of costs and benefits of participation (e.g., 
Olson, 1965), the social costs of participation and their effect on participation are 
seldom hypothesized or measured. The costs of protest participation are often 
conceptualized as time, money or energy, but they are rarely conceptualized as social 
costs (with the exception of Opp & Roehl, 1990). I argued that participation has costs 
as well: significant others who oppose the protest may sanction participation, and the 
risk of these possible negative reactions, such as the end of a friendship or a positive 
work relationship or problems in future team work, might reduce workers’ willingness 
to participate (cf. Opp & Roehl, ibid). My findings support previous research (e.g., 
Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Francis, 1985; Price, Cosmides & Tooby, 2002; Thommes & 
Akkerman, 2013): when workers expect to be sanctioned for non-participation, their 
willingness to participate increases. I found no support for my hypothesis that social 
costs of participation decrease participation willingness. Social identification affects 
the support workers expect from their colleagues and as such affects their willingness 
to participate. 
In chapter 5, I studied which mechanisms determine the decision to participate in 
protests if people have ties to different, opposing groups. Research has been conducted 
to investigate the effect of a network that consists of opposing groups, i.e., a 
heterogeneous network, and different effects have been proposed. Some predict 
that a homogenous network boosts participation and a heterogeneous network 
hinders participation (e.g., Kitts, 2000; Tindall, 2002), as opposing groups in a network 
will provide “varied information, opinions, and evaluations” (Tindall, 2002, p.418). 
Santoro, Vélez and Keogh (2012) found that cross-cutting ethnic ties can also positively 
affect participation in ethnically focused political and cultural protest, which suggests 
that the effect of homogenous networks on protest participation may be less straight-
forward than previously thought because it does not always lead to inactivity. 
 In chapter 5, I empirically investigated the effect of network ties on participation 
during a labor strike of a cleaning brigade in the Netherlands. I investigated whether 
communication and trust were mechanisms that affected same strike behavior, i.e., 
whether workers behave similarly when a strike happens. I started by investigating 
the effect of three different communication networks of workers: a protest-related 
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communication network, a private communication network and a work-related 
communication network. In mobilization research, protest ties are often considered 
to be the main determinant of participation (e.g., Lim, 2008).I expected these ties to 
lead to same strike behavior because of the reception of similar information. Talking 
about private or work-related issues might also affect participation behavior through 
the mechanism of social support or pressure: participation is more likely when an 
individual is asked to participate by someone they know personally, and influence is 
more likely when the tie between people is stronger (Kitts, Macy & Flache, 1999).
 Next, I focused on the effect of trust to explain how workers make their participation 
decision when they have strong communication ties with both opponents and 
proponents of the strike. Trust between two network actors leads to adherence to 
norms (McClurg, 2003), and when workers interact, a bond of trust forms between 
these workers that leads to an increased likelihood of imitation of behavior and 
formation of coalitions (Mislove et al., 2007). I expected that workers would show the 
same strike behavior as the network ties they trusted. Moreover, I investigated 
whether trust moderates the effect of communication ties. Information is perceived 
as more valuable for decision making when the source is perceived as trustworthy 
(Granovetter, 1985; Klandermans, 1984; Passy & Guigni, 2001; Snow, Zurcher & 
Ekland-Olson, 1980). In chapter 3, I found that trust is used as a filter of information 
and within networks, information is assessed (partly) on the basis of how trustworthy 
the source of information is.
 I found no significant effect of protest-related communication ties on similar 
strike behavior. As mentioned above, these ties are often considered one of the main 
determinants of participation, yet the lack of a significant effect in my study indicates 
that the exchange of information about the protest between network ties is not 
sufficient to influence behavior. Next, I investigated the effect of private communication 
ties and work-related communication ties. I found that private communication ties 
increase the likelihood of same strike behavior. Thus, support or pressure from a 
private tie to act in a certain way is more important than the provision of information 
through protest networks. I found no significant effect of work-related communication 
ties. Consistent with the theory about trust, I found that trust positively and 
significantly affects the likelihood that two workers will show similar strike behavior. 
I found no moderating effects of trust. Especially for those who did not participate, 
trust was a crucial mechanism: the higher the trust between two individuals, the 
more likely it was that they would both refrain from participation. 
 Overall, the results of chapter 5 indicate that pressure from private ties and trust 
are important mechanisms for workers to mirror the behavior of others around them 
that have information about the protest. This is an important new finding in 
strike-related research. Protest-related networks are considered a main determinant 
of participation, but these results indicate that private networks have a greater effect 
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on influencing same strike behavior than protest-related networks. Thus, protest 
networks might not be the main determinant of participation in strikes. The findings 
about private ties contribute to this literature by making a distinction between 
communication networks and by improving our understanding about which networks 
are important. Private ties create pressure for workers to follow the behavior of 
others, as they do not want to damage personal relationships. In chapter 4, I found a 
similar result: when workers expected their strike behavior to have social costs in 
their relationships with colleagues, their willingness to participate decreases. 
How an individual’s participation decision is affected by information from different 
actors depends on the source of the information and the relationship of the individual 
to that source. People receive information from different groups (chapter 2). This 
information is then filtered by different mechanisms: for information from the 
mobilizing actor (e.g., the union) social identification is used as a filter of information. 
This is consistent with previous research and strengthens the assumption that social 
identification with the mobilizing actor increases likelihood of participation. However, 
for actors that are counter-mobilizing, such as management, trust is an important 
mechanism. For these protest opposing actors to affect an individual’s willingness to 
participate, information has to be filtered by trust, i.e., the counter-mobilizing actor 
has to be perceived as credible. 
 Peers, such as colleagues, can affect workers’ participation decisions by building 
on personal relationships. Both private relations and trust create pressure that 
influences the participation decision. Individuals are likely to mirror the behavior of 
those peers that they identify with, whether in participation or non-participation. 
Membership in a protest network is not the main or the only factor; private 
relationships and trust are more likely to influence an individual’s participation 
decision than protest-related relationships. Thus, different actors have to use 
different strategies to affect an individual’s participation decision; the way an 
individual’s participation decision is affected, depends on the one who tries to affect 
the individual’s decision. For the mobilizing actor, social identification is important, 
whereas for the counter-mobilizing actor, trust is an important mean to influence an 
individual’s decision. For peers, social support and pressures are of importance and 
peers should build on personal relations.
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6.3. Theoretical contributions: bringing in the opponent
In this thesis, I investigated how an individual’s participation decision is affected by 
information from opposing actors. I showed that different actors attempt to influence 
potential participants’ decisions and that different mechanisms are needed to affect 
the participation decision depending on the source of the information. By including 
the opponent, I was able to study how different mechanisms known to affect 
individuals’ participation decisions, i.e., information, social identification and trust, 
work under opposing pressures. Thus, this thesis offers two main theoretical 
contributions: first, I show that mechanisms proposed in previous research do not 
exert the same effect for opponents as they do for proponents. Second, my thesis 
shows that participation is caused by different mechanisms than non-participation. I 
will elaborate on these contributions below. 
 Individuals need information about the reason for the protest, not only about 
costs and benefits of participation but also about the prevalent social norms of 
participation that effectively determine social costs and benefits of participation. 
This information tells individuals how they are expected to behave in a particular 
situation. In other words: it indicates prevalent group norms (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; 
Fehr & Fishbacher, 2004; Opp, 2001). However, potential participants can receive 
information from both opponents and proponents of the protest and be subjected to 
opposing group norms. Thus, information about expected behavior and costs and 
benefits of the choice to participate can push individuals in different directions. I 
showed that opposite groups provide information (see chapter 2) and that individuals 
are thus likely to receive contradictory information. Moreover, I also showed that this 
information can have a contradictory effect on the willingness to participate (see 
chapter 3). My contribution to current theory is to show that potential participants 
can be confronted with information about norms that prescribe participation as well 
as norms that prescribe non-participation. Receiving opposing information creates a 
far more complicated set of costs and benefits from which individuals have to make 
a choice.
 One mechanism to filter opposing information about different norms, and 
corresponding costs and benefits, is social identification. Social identification is a 
main determinant of participation (Kelly, 1998). In this thesis, I showed that individuals 
can identify not only with the mobilizing actor, such as the union but also with other 
groups (e.g., management or colleagues). An important finding in my thesis is that 
identification with these different groups affects the participation decision differently. 
The widely accepted expectation that identification with the mobilizing actor 
increases the likelihood of participation is confirmed in this thesis (see chapter 3), yet 
I also showed that social identification with opposing groups simultaneously (those in 
favor and those against participation) affects the way information is filtered. For 
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actors who attempt to counter-mobilize, social identification, as a filter of information, 
does not exert an effect on the likelihood of participation (chapter 3). This is a new 
theoretical insight about the filtering of information in times of mobilization. Thus, I 
build on current theory by adding social identification with multiple groups simultaneously, 
providing new insights about the effect of this mechanism and showing that the 
effect of social identification is not as straightforward as previously assumed. 
 A second filter of information is trust. When individuals have to make a 
participation decision, they use trust to assess the source of information. Especially in 
times of conflict, trust helps people decide whom to rely on (Kane et al., 2005). The 
source of information has to be perceived as credible (Klandermans, 1997) for the 
information from this source to be used in decision-making. I found that trust in a 
counter-mobilizing actor, such as management, is crucial to reducing participation 
willingness and is used to filter information from these counter-mobilizing actors. 
Thus, I found trust to be an important mechanism for counter-mobilization (see 
chapter 3).
 Therefore, a new theoretical implication from my thesis is that the proposed 
mechanisms that affect individuals’ participation decision are not as straightforward 
as previously assumed. Depending on the source of information (i.e., a proponent or 
opponent of the protest), these mechanisms do not exert similar effects on individuals’ 
decisions. 
A second important theoretical implication of my thesis is that participation and 
non-participation are caused by different mechanisms. Throughout my thesis, I 
tested not only how the proposed mechanisms affect participation but also how they 
affect non-participation. I argued that through information, individuals are subject to 
potentially opposing group norms. These norms affect the costs and benefits of an 
individual’s choice (Coleman, 1990a); deviating from the prevalent group norm creates 
social costs, whereas following the norm provides benefits. The social costs of 
deviating from the group norm or the social benefits from following the norm create 
the necessarily selective, individual incentive to participate (Olson, 1965). I argued 
that in addition to a participation norm (which is the norm often considered in 
collective action research), individuals can be subjected to a contradictory non- 
participation norm. The second norm makes non-participation the most beneficial 
and rational choice. Indeed, I found that participation and non-participation are 
caused by different mechanisms (see chapter 4 and chapter 5). Moreover, I found that 
when individuals expect to receive support for their decision not to participate, the 
likelihood of their participation decreased (after all, participation will then lead to 
negative consequences). Additionally, social identification with those who support 
participation and those who do not support participation affects the importance of 
these groups to the individual, and the expected social costs and benefits of 
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participation may lead to non-participation (see chapter 4). Mechanisms that affect 
similar behavior with regard to protest (i.e., making the same participation decision) 
differ for participation and non-participation (see chapter 5). I found that private 
communication and trust between two individuals increases the likelihood that both 
individuals will make the same participation decision. For those who did not 
participate, trust was a crucial mechanism: the higher the trust between two 
individuals, the more likely it was that they would both refrain from participation. I 
offer the new theoretical insight that trust may be a necessary condition for non-par-
ticipation. This is consistent with the theoretical implication mentioned above that 
trust is a crucial mechanism for counter-mobilization. Moreover, communication 
(e.g., information in chapter 3; communication networks in chapter 5) is important for 
individuals to make the decision to participate.  
 
6.4. Discussion 
My thesis contributes to theory and research about individuals’ participation in 
collective protest. However, two issues of my research need to be addressed: the 
empirical context and the use of intended behavior.
 In chapter 1, I argued that strikes provide a convenient context to compare 
individual participation decisions. The goals of a strike (such as a wage increase) and 
the investments participants have to make are more or less equal between strikes. 
Moreover, strikes provide a context in which individuals are confronted with actors 
who have opposing stances on the strike. Finally, strikes are one of the most 
consistently occurring forms of protest. The empirical context of labor strikes allowed 
the investigation of the effect of information from both opponents and proponents 
of protest, while controlling for the opportunity to participate and avoiding selecting 
on the dependent variable.
 However, the generalization of my results must be put in proper perspective. 
Strikes are comparable to other forms of routine protest, such as marches or 
demonstrations. Strikes are also an example of collective protest which is costly for 
participants, and as such strikes can be compared with other situations of collective 
action: actions “which combine the expression of grievance and the demand for 
change directed at a powerful adversary” Biggs (2015., p. 2). However, in other forms 
of protest relations with other potential participants may markedly differ from work-
relations. Within an organization, team members are mutually dependent on each 
other to make the strike successful and must also work together again after the strike 
has been settled. In other forms of protest, however, the significant others are 
often part of daily life instead of work life. The consequences of participation or 
non-participation may be more severe. For example, when a protest aimed at the 
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government is looming, information could be censored and might be more difficult to 
acquire. Moreover, participation can lead to more severe costs, such as a prison 
sentence, e.g., a well-known critic of the Russian government was given a prison 
sentence of 35 years in December 2014. His conviction led to a mass demonstration 
during which more arrests were made (Gorst & Williams, 2014). Non-participation, in 
turn, could lead to continued oppression from the government or a backlash from 
those who do participate in the protest. The support necessary to follow others can 
differ in these extreme forms of protest. Moreover, the mechanisms of social 
identification and trust could have a different effect when a potential participant is 
dependent on fellow citizens or even fellow country members to make the protest a 
success (i.e., direct contact in such a large group is less likely). In less severe forms of 
protest, where a lack of support for participation or non-participation does not have 
direct personal consequences, the strength of effects could also differ. For example, 
several protests erupted when a famous lion was lured outside a national park in 
Zimbabwe and was killed. The protest in front of the hunter’s dental office aiming for 
the arrest of the hunter was peaceful and took place without real opposition against 
the participants (see for example: Stellar, 2015). The necessary support for 
participation or non-participation in this type of protest is likely to differ from those 
situations in which protest could lead to a prison sentence. Thus, in different protest 
settings, the effects of my main mechanisms on participation and the reasons for 
non-participation may exert different effects.
 Thus, while I assume that my findings can be generalized to other forms of 
protest, to strengthen the findings and implications of my thesis, future research 
would benefit from replication with more or less severe forms of protest. Future 
research should replicate the use of filters or information and the effect of the main 
mechanisms on participation and non-participation in different protest settings. 
Second, the conceptualization of the dependent variable in this study merits careful 
discussion. In chapter 3 and chapter 4, the dependent variable was self-reported 
willingness to participate in a future strike. Thus, I studied intentional behavior 
instead of actual behavior. In the studies, I controlled for past participation, which is 
considered to be a strong predictor of actual participation in a future protest. 
However, the use of a hypothetical future protest is criticized by several authors (e.g., 
Gallagher & Strauss, 1991; McClendon & Klaas, 1993) who contend that intended 
behavior is not the same as actual behavior. My study in chapter 5 allowed me to 
make statements about actual participation behavior because I used data from a full 
network of colleagues during an actual strike. It needs to be noted that this strike was 
already underway when I collected my data. Results from chapter 3 and chapter 4 
were replicated in the study in chapter 5.
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Thus, while the use of intended behavior is a useful method as a proxy for actual 
behavior (cf. Fishbein & Azjen, 1975; Kelloway, 1998), different types of research 
strategies are necessary to make statements about actual behavior, such as a 
longitudinal research design that would aim to collect data at the moment a protest 
breaks out. In my studies, I controlled for past participation and my network study 
allowed me to study actual participation. This indicates that the results of my studies 
would be the similar to the situation where an actual protest takes place. However, 
the strength of effects may differ because information about the costs and benefits 
of participation or non-participation differ from the expectations individuals have in 
a hypothetical situation. My respondents could have underestimated or overestimated 
the consequences of deviating from the behavior of their group. My studies showed 
differences between workers with previous experience and workers without previous 
experience. In an actual strike situation, pressures from sources of information who 
attempt to influence the individual could be different than the respondents in my 
studies expected and could affect the strength of the effects I found. Thus, future 
research would benefit from a focus on actual behavior to replicate my findings and 
to study if the effects are the same when focusing on actual protest behavior. 
Moreover, longitudinal research is recommended for future studies as this would 
allow a study of the mechanisms prior to, during and after the protest. 
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Bringing in the opponent
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Introduction
When a protest, such as a strike or a demonstration, is looming, people are put under 
pressure by opposing groups. Some actors want to mobilize people for participation, 
while others attempt to withhold these people from participation. One of the ways to 
influence an individual’s decision is providing information about the conflict, for 
example about why protest is necessary or not, or about the costs and benefits of 
participation. Information from opponents and proponents can drive individuals in 
different or even opposite directions. It is then up to the individual to make a decision 
based on this, often contradictory, information. 
 Basically, we do not know how individuals make participation decisions when 
faced with information from both opponents and proponents simultaneously. 
Without taking into account multiple sources of information—that offer (possibly) 
contradictory information—it is difficult to explain variation in participation behavior.
 In this thesis, I aimed to explain how people make a participation decision by 
taking into account their social context in which several groups with potentially 
opposing demands about participation try to influence individuals’ decision by 
providing them with information. This improves our knowledge of how individuals 
make a participation decision when they are confronted with information from both 
opponents and proponents of protest. The main question I investigated, is how is an 
individual’s participation decision is affected by information from different actors?
 The empirical context of this thesis is a specific type of protest, namely, labor 
strikes. Strikes provide a convenient social context to compare the participation decisions 
of individuals. In the context of a strike, individuals are likely to be confronted with 
information from both opponents (e.g., management) and proponents (e.g., the union) 
of the strike. 
 Four research questions were formulated to answer the main question of how an 
individual’s participation decision is affected by information from multiple actors. 
These questions guided the remainder of this thesis.
Question 1: Do individuals obtain information from possible opposing sources of 
information in their network and how are these sources of information assessed? 
Making a decision about whether to participate in a protest or not, is probably for 
most people an uncertain situation. A way to cope with such a situation and reduce 
uncertainty is the use of information. Without information it is fairly impossible to 
calculate the costs and benefits of participation and as such, it is unlikely an individual 
will participate at all. Information can come from different sources; from sources in 
favor of the protest (for example, mobilizing actors such as a union or social 
movement) and sources opposing the protest (e.g. a counter-mobilizing actor, such 
as the government or management). These different sources can have different, 
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sometimes contradictory, views on the protest. Consequently, individuals will be 
subjected to information in favor of the protest as well as information opposing the 
protest. In chapter 2, I explored workers’ sources of information when a strike is 
imminent and how these different sources are assessed by individual workers. My 
exploratory study shows that workers indeed receive information from multiple and 
opposing sources simultaneously when a strike is imminent. The amount of 
information workers receive differs between sources: workers receive the most 
information from their direct colleagues, whereas they receive the least information 
from people with the same profession who work elsewhere. Moreover, I found that 
workers receive contradictory information when a strike looms; my exploratory study 
showed that both management and the union (the opponent and the proponent of 
the strike, respectively) both provide information to workers when a strike is looming. 
Importantly, management is reported to be “more silent” when a strike is looming. In 
other words, workers report they receive less information from management during 
times of conflict than when there is no conflict. The provision of information from 
management could be helpful in keeping workers from striking, but workers report 
that they do not receive this information. Additionally, I found that union members are 
more likely to receive contradictory information than their non-union counterparts.
 When workers receive information from different sources, they will have to make 
their participation decision based on this contradicting information. In other words, 
the information from opposing sources needs to be assessed. To make this assessment, 
two mechanisms can be used. The first is social identification, one of the main 
predictors of participation. Identification with the source of information increases 
the likelihood that information from this source is evaluated as useful and that the 
information is used for decision making. A second mechanism used to assess 
information is trust. Trust helps individuals assess whom they can rely on when a 
protest looms. Because of trust, people will share knowledge and exchange 
information. However, both social identification and trust are not limited to one 
group. The study in chapter 2 showed that workers can identify with more than one 
group simultaneously. Moreover, the study showed workers can trust opposing 
sources simultaneously.
Question 2: What filters of information are used?
The study in chapter 2 showed that workers use multiple sources of information when 
a strike looms. However, the study did not show how this contradictory information 
is filtered when workers receive information from opposing sources. In chapter 3, 
I investigated how social identification and trust are used as filters for information, 
by testing hypotheses about the relationships between information, identification, 
trust, and willingness to participate in a strike by use of structural equation modeling. 
Specifically, I found that information from and identification with the union are highly 
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important determinants of participation. Regarding information from management, 
trust is the most important determinant for preventing workers from participation. 
Information from different sources is filtered by different mechanisms: for the 
mobilizing actor (e.g. the union) social identification is an important determinant. 
This is in line with previous research and adds to the support for the hypothesis that 
social identification with the mobilizing actor increases the likelihood of participation. 
However, for actors that are opposed of the strike, such as management, trust is an 
important mechanism. For these protest opposing actors to affect an individual’s 
participation willingness, information has to be filtered by trust, i.e., the counter- 
mobilizing actor has to be perceived as credible. Information from different sources 
is filtered by different mechanisms: for the mobilizing actor (e.g., the union) social 
identification is used as a filter of information. This is in line with previous research 
and strengthens the assumption that social identification with the mobilizing actor 
increases the likelihood of participation. However, for actors that are counter-mobilizing, 
such as management, trust is an important mechanism. For these protest opposing 
actors to affect an individual’s participation willingness, information has to be filtered 
by trust, i.e., the counter-mobilizing actor has to be perceived as credible. These 
findings indicate that workers use different mechanisms for filtering information, 
depending on the source of information. This is a new discovery in mobilization research.
Question 3: How does social support from colleagues affect participation willingness? 
In addition to the main mobilizing actor (e.g., the union) and the counter-mobilizing 
actor (e.g., management), several other groups are important in workers’ participation 
decision. The importance of these ‘significant others’ in the decision to participate in 
protest has been supported by ample empirical evidence. Potential participants will 
make an assessment whether or not these significant others will approve or 
disapprove of protest and their own decision to participate or not. In mobilization 
research it is often (implicitly) implied that participation is the norm workers have to 
follow. In the case of a strike, this would mean that social support for participation 
from colleagues constitutes an important benefit of participation. The lack of support, 
on the contrary, may prevent workers from striking. However, support for non- 
participation may also have an effect on the participation decision. In chapter 4, 
I investigated the effects that colleagues have on a worker’s willingness to participate 
in a strike. I empirically explored the effects of social support, expected social costs 
and social identification on willingness to participate. Using structural equation 
modeling techniques, I found that both forms of support had the hypothesized 
effects: perceived social support for participation significantly increased workers’ 
willingness to participate in a strike. Moreover, perceived social support for non- 
participation significantly decreased workers’ willingness to participate. Another 
important finding is that the effects of the two forms of support are not equally 
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strong: the positive effect of support for participation on willingness to strike is 
stronger than the negative effect of support for non-participation.
 In addition to costs of non-participation (in other words, free-riding), participation 
brings about social costs as well: protest-opposing colleagues may sanction participation. 
My findings support previous research: when workers expect to be sanctioned for 
non-participation, their willingness to participate increases. I found no support for 
my hypothesis that social costs of participation decrease participation willingness.
Question 4: Which mechanisms determine the decision to participate in protests if 
people have ties to different opposing groups? 
A network structure is a prerequisite for any form of collective action, such as a strike, 
to diffuse. Networks serve as channels of information and facilitate access to 
information about, for example, the possible costs and benefits of (non-)participation 
and about norms within the group. As such, they help people weigh the options of 
their decision. Within a network of colleagues, people may decide to act differently 
in times of a strike (i.e., not all colleagues make the same choice). Previous research 
about the effect of a network that consists of opposing groups, i.e., a heterogeneous 
network proposed different effects. 
 In chapter 5, I investigated how different communication networks and a trust 
network between workers are mechanisms that affect same strike behavior, i.e., 
whether workers behave similarly when a strike happens. I found that private 
communication networks and trust networks lead to similar strike behavior. Contrary 
to previous research, I found no significant effect of protest-related communication 
ties on similar strike behavior. These ties are often considered one of the main 
determinants of participation, yet the lack of significant effect in chapter 5 indicates 
that the exchange of information about the protest is not sufficient to influence 
behavior. Private ties and trust networks create pressure for workers to follow 
the behavior of others, as they do not want to damage personal relationships. 
An important finding is that private communication networks are important for 
participation, whereas trust networks are important predictors of non-participation. 
Answering the main question
How an individual’s participation decision is affected by information from different 
actors depends on the source of the information and the relationship of the individual to 
that source. People receive information from different, opposing, groups. This information 
is then filtered by different mechanisms: for information from the mobilizing actor 
social identification is used as a filter of information and social identification with the 
mobilizing actor increases likelihood of participation. However, for actors that are 
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counter-mobilizing trust is an important mechanism. For these protest opposing 
actors to affect an individual’s willingness to participate, information has to be filtered 
by trust, i.e., the counter-mobilizing actor has to be perceived as credible. 
 Peers, such as colleagues, can affect workers’ participation decisions by building 
on personal relationships. Both information from private relations and trust networks 
create pressure that influences the participation decision. Individuals are likely to 
mirror the behavior of those peers that they identify with, whether in participation or 
non-participation. Membership in a protest network is not the main or the only 
factor; private relationships and trust are more likely to influence an individual’s 
participation decision than protest-related relationships. Thus, different actors have 
to use different strategies to affect an individual’s participation decision; the way an 
individual’s participation decision is affected, depends on the one who tries to affect 
the individual’s decision. For the mobilizing actor, social identification is important, 
whereas for the counter-mobilizing actor, trust is an important mean to influence an 
individual’s decision. For peers, social support and pressures are of importance and 
peers should build on personal relations.  
Contributions and discussion
This thesis offers two main theoretical contributions: first, mechanisms proposed in 
previous research do not exert the same effect for opponents as they do for 
proponents. Second, this thesis shows that participation is caused by different 
mechanisms than non-participation. 
 I showed that potential participants can be confronted with information that 
prescribes participation as well as information that prescribes non-participation. 
Receiving opposing information creates a far more complicated set of costs and 
benefits from which individuals have to make a choice. Identification can be used to 
filter this information from different sources. An important finding in my thesis is that 
identification with these different sources affects the participation decision 
differently. The widely accepted expectation that identification with the mobilizing 
actor increases the likelihood of participation is confirmed in this thesis. For actors 
who attempt to counter-mobilize, social identification, as a filter of information, does 
not exert an effect on the likelihood of participation. I found that trust in a counter- 
mobilizing actor, such as management, is crucial to reducing participation willingness 
and is used to filter information from these counter-mobilizing actors. These findings 
indicate that social identification is important for mobilization whereas trust is an 
important mechanism for counter-mobilization.
 A second important theoretical implication of this thesis is that participation and 
non-participation are caused by different mechanisms. Throughout this thesis, I tested 
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not only how the proposed mechanisms affect participation but also how they affect 
non-participation. I found that when individuals expect to receive support for their 
decision not to participate, the likelihood of their participation decreased. Moreover, 
I found that private communication and trust between two individuals increases the 
likelihood that both individuals will make the same participation decision. Private 
communication ties are especially important for participation in a strike. For those 
who did not participate, trust was a crucial mechanism: the higher the trust between 
two individuals, the more likely it was that they would both refrain from participation. 
I offer the new theoretical insight that trust may be a necessary condition for non- 
participation.
Two issues of the research need to be addressed. First, the generalization of the 
results must be put in proper perspective. Strikes are comparable to other forms of 
routine protest, such as marches or demonstrations. Strikes are also an example of 
collective protest which is costly for participants. However, in other forms of protest, 
relations with other potential participants may markedly differ from work-relations. 
The consequences of participation or non-participation may be more or less severe. 
For example, participation in a protest against a government could lead to a prison 
sentence. As such, in different protest settings, the effects of my main mechanisms 
on participation and the reasons for non-participation may exert different effects. To 
strengthen the findings and implications of this thesis, future research would benefit 
from replication with more or less severe forms of protest.
 Second, the conceptualization of the dependent variable in this study merits 
careful discussion. In several chapters (chapter 2, chapter 3 and chapter 4), the 
dependent variable was self-reported willingness to participate in a future strike, in 
other words: intentional behavior instead of actual behavior. The use of intended 
behavior is a useful method as a proxy for actual behavior. In chapter 5, I studied 
actual participation behavior and in this chapter, results from previous chapters are 
replicated. Yet, future research would benefit from a focus on actual behavior to 
replicate my findings and to study if the effects are the same when focusing on actual 
protest behavior. Moreover, longitudinal research is recommended for future studies 
as this would allow a study of the mechanisms prior to, during and after the protest.
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Samenvatting
Rekening houden met de tegenstander
Studies over hoe informatie van tegenstanders en voorstanders van protest 
het participatiebesluit van individuen beïnvloedt

167
SAMENVATTING
Introductie
Wanneer een protest, bijvoorbeeld een staking of een demonstratie, dreigt plaats te 
vinden, zijn er verschillende groepen, met tegengestelde belangen, die druk 
uitoefenen op potentiële participanten. Sommige groepen willen mensen mobiliseren 
voor participatie, terwijl andere groepen participatie juist willen voorkomen. Een 
manier om het besluit van individuen te beïnvloeden, is het verstrekken van informatie 
over het conflict, informatie waarom protest noodzakelijk is of niet, of over de kosten 
en baten van participatie. Informatie van voor- en tegenstanders van protest kan het 
individu verschillende, zelfs tegenstrijdige, kanten op sturen. Het is dan aan het 
individu zelf om op basis van deze tegenstrijdige informatie een besluit te nemen. 
 Tot nu toe weten we niet hoe individuen een participatiebesluit nemen wanneer 
zij tegelijkertijd geconfronteerd worden met informatie van zowel voorstanders als 
tegenstanders van protest. Doordat de combinatie van meerdere bronnen van 
informatie – die (mogelijk) tegenstrijdige informatie geven – in eerder onderzoek 
buiten beschouwing is gelaten, is variatie in participatiegedrag moeilijk te verklaren. 
 Het doel van dit proefschrift is het bieden van een verklaring over hoe mensen 
een participatiebesluit nemen door de sociale omgeving in beschouwing te nemen; 
een omgeving waarin verschillende groepen, met mogelijk tegenstrijdige belangen 
en eisen wat betreft participatie, het besluit van het individu proberen te beïnvloeden. 
Dit vergroot de kennis over hoe individuen een besluit nemen onder druk van zowel 
voor- als tegenstanders van protest. De hoofdvraag van mijn onderzoek is daarom als 
volgt geformuleerd: hoe wordt het participatiebesluit van een individu beïnvloed door 
informatie van verschillende actoren?
 De empirische context van dit proefschrift is een specifieke vorm van protest, 
namelijk (arbeids)stakingen. Stakingen bieden een goede context om de participatie 
van individuen te vergelijken. In deze context is het namelijk zeer waarschijnlijk dat 
individuen worden geconfronteerd met informatie van zowel tegenstanders 
(bijvoorbeeld het management) als voorstanders (bijvoorbeeld de vakbond) van de 
staking. 
 Om de hoofdvraag, hoe het participatiebesluit van individuen wordt beïnvloed 
door informatie van meerdere actoren, te kunnen beantwoorden, heb ik vier onder-
zoeksvragen geformuleerd. Deze vier vragen vormen de basis van het proefschrift. 
Vraag 1: Krijgen individuen in hun netwerk informatie van mogelijk tegenstrijdige 
bronnen van informatie en hoe worden deze bronnen beoordeeld? 
Het nemen van een besluit over wel of niet participeren in een protest levert voor 
veel mensen een onzekere situatie op. Een manier om met deze onzekerheid om te 
gaan en deze te verkleinen, is het gebruiken van informatie. Zonder informatie is het 
vrijwel onmogelijk te bepalen wat kosten en baten van participatie zullen zijn. Als 
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gevolg van een gebrek aan informatie is het onwaarschijnlijk dat een individu zal 
besluiten te participeren. De benodigde informatie kan van verschillende bronnen 
komen; zowel van bronnen die voorstander zijn van het protest (mobiliserende 
actoren, bijvoorbeeld de vakbond of sociale bewegingen) als van bronnen die het 
protest willen voorkomen (contramobiliserende actoren, bijvoorbeeld de regering of 
het management). Deze bronnen kunnen verschillende, soms zelfs tegenstrijdige, 
visies op het protest hebben. Het gevolg hiervan is dat individuen worden geconfronteerd 
met informatie die het protest promoot en tegelijkertijd informatie ontvangen met 
als doel het protest te voorkomen. 
 In hoofdstuk 2 heb ik de bronnen van informatie verkend waar individuen 
mogelijk mee worden geconfronteerd wanneer een staking dreigt. Daarnaast heb ik 
bekeken hoe deze bronnen door individuele werknemers beoordeeld worden. Mijn 
verkennende studie laat zien dat werknemers bij een dreigende staking informatie 
ontvangen van meerdere, tegengestelde bronnen. De hoeveelheid informatie die 
werknemers ontvangen verschilt per bron: werknemers ontvangen de meeste 
informatie van hun directe collega’s. De minste informatie komt van werknemers uit 
dezelfde beroepsgroep (maar werkzaam in andere organisaties). Tevens laat de studie 
zien dat werknemers worden geconfronteerd met tegenstrijdige informatie: zowel 
het management als de vakbond (de tegenstander en voorstander van de staking) 
voorzien werknemers van informatie wanneer een staking uit dreigt te breken. Een 
belangrijke bevinding in deze studie is dat werknemers aangeven dat het management 
“stiller” wordt als er een staking dreigt. Met andere woorden: werknemers stellen 
dat zij juist minder informatie krijgen van het management ten tijde van een dreigende 
staking dan in een situatie zonder conflict. Met het verstrekken van informatie zou 
het management kunnen proberen werknemers ertoe te bewegen niet te participeren 
in de staking. Werknemers geven aan dat het management geen gebruikt maakt van 
deze strategie. Tevens heb ik in deze studie gevonden dat vakbondsleden meer 
tegenstrijdige informatie ontvangen dan werknemers die geen lid zijn van een vakbond, 
omdat zij naast informatie van de werkgever ook (meer) informatie van hun vakbond 
krijgen.
 Als werknemers informatie ontvangen van verschillende, tegengestelde, bronnen, 
moeten zij hun besluit baseren op deze tegenstrijdige informatie. Met andere 
woorden: de informatie van tegengestelde bronnen moet beoordeeld worden. Voor 
deze beoordeling kunnen werknemers twee mechanismen gebruiken. Het eerste 
mechanisme is sociale identificatie, één van de belangrijkste voorspellers van 
participatie. Identificatie met de bron van informatie vergroot de kans dat informatie 
wordt beoordeeld als nuttig en wordt gebruikt voor besluitvorming. Een tweede 
mechanisme dat wordt gebruikt voor de beoordeling van informatie, is vertrouwen. 
Vertrouwen helpt individuen te beoordelen op wie zij kunnen rekenen wanneer een 
staking dreigt. Vertrouwen maakt dat men onderling kennis en informatie deelt. 
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Echter, zowel sociale identificatie als vertrouwen zijn niet beperkt tot één groep. De 
studie in hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat werknemers zich tegelijkertijd met meer dan één 
groep kunnen identificeren. Hetzelfde geldt voor vertrouwen: werknemers kunnen 
tegelijkertijd meerdere, zelfs tegengestelde bronnen vertrouwen.
Vraag 2: Welke filters van informatie worden gebruikt?
De studie in hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat werknemers meerdere bronnen van informatie 
gebruiken ten tijde van een op handen zijnde staking, dat zij zich kunnen identificeren 
met verschillende bronnen en verschillende bronnen vertrouwen. Deze studie laat 
echter nog niet zien hoe informatie van tegengestelde bronnen gefilterd wordt. In 
hoofdstuk 3 heb ik onderzocht hoe sociale identificatie en vertrouwen gebruikt 
worden om informatie te filteren, door hypothesen te toetsen over de relaties tussen 
informatie, identificatie, vertrouwen en stakingsbereidheid. Hiervoor heb ik gebruik 
gemaakt van “structural equation modeling”. Informatie van en identificatie met de 
vakbond zijn belangrijke voorspellers van participatie. Wanneer werknemers 
informatie ontvangen van het management is vertrouwen de belangrijkste voorspeller 
voor het niet meedoen aan een staking. Informatie van verschillende bronnen wordt 
dus door verschillende mechanismen gefilterd: voor de mobiliserende actor (zoals de 
vakbond) is sociale identificatie belangrijk. Dit is in lijn met eerder onderzoek en het 
versterkt de aanname dat identificatie met de mobiliserende actor de kans op 
participatie vergroot. Daarentegen is juist vertrouwen belangrijk voor actoren die de 
staking willen voorkomen. Om de actiebereidheid van individuen te beïnvloeden, 
wordt informatie van tegenstanders gefilterd door vertrouwen dat individuen hebben 
in de informatiebron. Anders gezegd: de contramobiliserende actor moet als 
betrouwbaar gezien worden. Deze resultaten laten zien dat werknemers gebruik 
maken van verschillende filters van informatie en dat het filter dat gebruikt wordt 
afhankelijk is van de bron van informatie. Dit is een nieuwe bevinding in mobilisatie 
onderzoek. 
Vraag 3: Hoe beïnvloedt sociale steun van collega’s de actiebereidheid?
Naast de mobiliserende actor (bijvoorbeeld de vakbond) en de contramobiliserende 
actor (bijvoorbeeld het management) zijn er andere groepen die invloed hebben op 
het participatiebesluit van werknemers. Het belang van deze “significante anderen” 
bij de besluitvorming wordt bevestigd door eerder empirisch onderzoek. Potentiële 
participanten zullen een beoordeling maken of deze significante anderen het protest 
en de besluit om te participeren ondersteunen of juist afkeuren. In onderzoek naar 
mobilisatie wordt vaak (impliciet) gesteld dat participatie de norm is. Tijdens een 
staking betekent dit dat sociale steun voor deelname een belangrijke opbrengst van 
participatie is. Het uitblijven van steun kan werknemers er juist van weerhouden te 
participeren. Echter, steun voor niet-participeren kan het participatie besluit ook 
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beïnvloeden. In hoofdstuk 4 heb ik het effect van collega’s op stakingsbereidheid 
onderzocht. Door middel van “structural equation modeling” technieken laat ik zien 
dat beide vormen van steun de verwachte effecten hebben: steun voor participatie 
vergroot de actiebereidheid van werknemers. Steun voor niet-participeren verkleint 
de actiebereidheid. Een belangrijke bevinding is dat de effecten van beide vormen 
van steun niet even sterk zijn: het positieve effect van steun voor participatie op 
 actiebereidheid is sterker dan het negatieve effect van steun voor niet-participeren. 
 Participatie kan sociale kosten met zich meebrengen: collega’s die het protest 
afkeuren kunnen participatie bestraffen. Mijn bevindingen bevestigen eerder onderzoek: 
als werknemers verwachten dat niet-participeren zal worden bestraft, zal hun actie-
bereidheid toenemen. Ik vond geen bevestiging voor mijn hypothese dat sociale 
kosten van participatie de actiebereidheid doen afnemen. 
Vraag 4: Welke mechanismen bepalen het besluit om te participeren in protest als 
mensen relaties hebben met verschillende, tegengestelde, groepen? 
Een netwerkstructuur is een voorwaarde voor de verspreiding van elke vorm van 
collectieve actie, zoals stakingen. Netwerken dienen als informatiekanalen en 
faciliteren toegang tot informatie, zoals informatie over de kosten en baten van (niet) 
participeren of informatie over normen die heersen in een groep. Netwerken kunnen 
dus een hulpmiddel zijn wanneer mensen hun participatiebesluit moeten maken. In 
een netwerk van collega’s kunnen mensen verschillende participatiebesluiten maken 
wanneer een staking aanstaande is (met andere woorden: niet alle collega’s maken 
dezelfde keuze). Eerder onderzoek naar het effect van netwerken die uit tegengestelde 
groepen bestaan, ofwel: een heterogeen netwerk, laat verschillende effecten zien. 
 In hoofdstuk 5 heb ik onderzocht hoe verschillende communicatienetwerken en 
een vertrouwensnetwerk mechanismen zijn die leiden tot hetzelfde stakingsgedrag 
van twee individuen. Met andere woorden: twee individuen vertonen hetzelfde gedrag; 
beide staken of beide staken niet. Uit mijn resultaten blijkt dat privé- communicatie-
netwerken en vertrouwensnetwerken leiden tot hetzelfde stakingsgedrag van twee 
werknemers. In tegenstelling tot eerder onderzoek, vond ik niet het verwachte effect 
dat protestgerelateerde communicatieconnecties leiden tot hetzelfde stakingsgedrag. 
Dit terwijl deze connecties juist worden gezien als één van de belangrijkste voor- 
spellers van participatie. Het uitblijven van significante effecten in hoofdstuk 5 duidt 
erop dat het uitwisselen van informatie over het protest niet voldoende is om gedrag 
van een ander te beïnvloeden. Privé-communicatienetwerken en vertrouwens-
netwerken creëren druk voor werknemers om het gedrag van anderen te volgen, om 
te voorkomen dat persoonlijke relaties beschadigen. Een belangrijke bevinding is dat 
privé-communicatienetwerken belangrijk zijn voor participatie, terwijl vertrouwens-
netwerken juist belangrijke voorspellers zijn van niet-participeren.
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Beantwoorden van de hoofdvraag
Hoe het participatiebesluit van een individu wordt beïnvloed door informatie van 
verschillende actoren is afhankelijk van de bron van informatie en de relatie die het 
individu met deze bron heeft. Mensen ontvangen informatie van verschillende, 
tegengestelde, groepen. Deze informatie wordt dan gefilterd door verschillende 
mechanismen: voor informatie van de mobiliserende actor wordt sociale identificatie 
als filter gebruikt. Daarnaast vergroot identificatie met de mobiliserende actor de 
actiebereidheid. Daarentegen is vertrouwen een belangrijk mechanisme voor contra-
mobiliserende actoren. Om de actiebereidheid van werknemers te beïnvloeden, 
wordt de informatie van contramobiliserende actoren gefilterd  door vertrouwen. 
Met andere woorden, de contramobiliserende actor moet als betrouwbaar beschouwd 
worden. 
 “Peers” (‘gelijken’), zoals collega’s, kunnen het participatiebesluit van andere 
werknemers beïnvloeden door gebruik te maken van persoonlijke relaties. Zowel 
informatie van privé connecties als informatie verkregen uit een vertrouwensnetwerk 
creëren een (sociale) druk die het participatiebesluit beïnvloedt. Individuele 
werknemers zijn geneigd het gedrag te kopiëren van de “peers” waar zij zich mee 
identificeren, of het nu participatie of juist niet-participeren betreft. Tevens blijkt dat 
privé connecties en vertrouwen tussen werknemers hebben meer effect op de 
participatie besluit dan protest gerelateerde relaties. Concluderend: verschillende 
actoren dienen gebruik te maken van verschillende strategieën; de manier waarop 
potentiële participanten beïnvloed worden door anderen in hun keuze om al dan te 
participeren, hangt af van degene die probeert te beïnvloeden. Voor de mobiliserende 
actor is sociale identificatie belangrijk, voor de contramobiliserende actor blijkt 
vertrouwen belangrijk te zijn; voor “peers” blijken persoonlijke relaties, sociale steun 
en druk juist belangrijk te zijn. 
Bijdrage en discussie
Dit proefschrift biedt twee belangrijke theoretische bijdragen. Ten eerste: de mechanismen 
die worden voorgesteld in eerder onderzoek hebben niet hetzelfde effect als ze 
gebruikt worden door voorstanders van protest dan wanneer ze gebruikt worden 
door tegenstanders. Ten tweede blijkt uit dit proefschrift dat participatie wordt 
veroorzaakt door andere mechanismen dan niet-participeren. 
 De eerste theoretische implicatie behelst dat ik heb aangetoond dat potentiële 
participanten geconfronteerd kunnen worden met informatie die gericht is op 
participatie en informatie de juist niet-participeren beoogt. Het ontvangen van deze 
tegenstrijdige compliceert de set van kosten en baten waartussen individuen een 
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keuze moeten maken. Identificatie kan gebruikt worden om informatie van de 
verschillende bronnen van informatie te filteren. Een belangrijke bevinding in mijn 
proefschrift is dat identificatie met de bron van informatie niet voor alle bronnen 
hetzelfde effect heeft. De tot dusverre aangenomen hypothese dat identificatie met 
de mobiliserende actor de actiebereidheid vergroot wordt ook in mijn proefschrift 
niet verworpen. Voor contramobiliserende actoren heeft sociale identificatie als filter 
van informatie juist geen effect op de actiebereidheid. Voor deze actor is vertrouwen 
cruciaal om de actiebereidheid te verkleinen. Vertrouwen wordt gebruikt om 
informatie van de contramobiliserende actor te filteren. Deze bevindingen wijzen 
erop dat sociale identificatie belangrijk is voor het mobiliseren van participatie, 
terwijl vertrouwen belangrijk is om participatie te voorkomen. 
 De tweede belangrijke theoretische implicatie van dit proefschrift is dat 
participatie en niet-participeren veroorzaakt worden door verschillende mechanismen. 
In dit proefschrift heb ik niet alleen getoetst hoe deze mechanismen participatie 
beïnvloeden, maar heb ik ook specifiek het effect op niet-participeren onderzocht. Ik 
heb gevonden dat wanneer individuen steun verwachten voor hun besluit om niet te 
participeren, de actiebereidheid inderdaad afneemt. Daarnaast blijkt uit mijn 
proefschrift dat privé communicatie en vertrouwen tussen twee individuen de kans 
vergroten dat deze twee individuen hetzelfde gedrag vertonen. Privé-communicatie 
is belangrijk voor participatie. Voor degenen die besloten niet te participeren, was 
vertrouwen cruciaal: hoe hoger het vertrouwen tussen twee individuen, hoe groter 
de kans dat zij beiden afzien van participatie. Dit biedt het nieuwe theoretische 
inzicht dat vertrouwen een benodigde conditie lijkt te zijn om de keuze voor niet- 
participeren te maken. Anders geformuleerd: vertrouwen in actoren die tegen een 
protest zijn, is een belemmering voor participatie. 
Er zijn twee punten van mijn onderzoek die benoemd moeten worden. Ten eerste 
moet de generalisatie van mijn resultaten in perspectief geplaatst worden. Stakingen 
zijn vergelijkbaar met andere vormen van protest, zoals demonstraties. Daarnaast 
zijn stakingen een voorbeeld van collectief protest dat kosten voor participanten met 
zich meebrengt. Echter, bij andere vormen van protest zijn de relaties die het individu 
heeft met andere potentiële participanten anders dan arbeidsrelaties. De 
consequenties van participatie kunnen daarom juist meer of minder heftig zijn. Bij 
bijvoorbeeld een protest tegen de regering kan participatie leiden tot gevangenis-
straf. Dit kan ertoe leiden dat de effecten die de mechanismen uit dit proefschrift op 
participatie of juist niet-participeren hebben anders blijken in de context van andere 
vormen van protest. Toekomstig onderzoek zou zich daarom moeten richten het 
repliceren van de voorgestelde relaties in dit proefschrift in andere vormen van 
protest. 
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Ten tweede behoeft de conceptualisatie van de afhankelijke variabele in dit onderzoek 
enige discussie. In meerdere hoofdstukken (hoofdstuk 2, hoofdstuk 3 en hoofdstuk 4) 
was de afhankelijke variabele een zelf-gerapporteerde actiebereidheid tijdens een 
toekomstige staking. Met andere woorden: het gaat hier om intentioneel  gedrag in 
plaats van daadwerkelijk gedrag. Intentioneel gedrag wordt gezien als een bruikbare 
methode om daadwerkelijk gedrag te voorspellen. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt daadwerkelijk 
participatiegedrag bestudeerd; in dit hoofdstuk worden de resultaten uit de 
voorgaande hoofdstukken bevestigd. Echter, toekomstig onderzoek zou baat hebben 
bij een focus op daadwerkelijk gedrag om de resultaten uit dit proefschrift te 
repliceren en te onderzoeken of de effecten constant blijven wanneer daadwerkelijk 
protestgedrag onderzocht wordt. Daarnaast wordt longitudinaal onderzoek aangeraden. 
In dit soort onderzoek kunnen de mechanismen uit dit proefschrift voor, tijdens en na 
protest onderzocht worden. 
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Dankwoord 
Eindelijk is mijn proefschrift af, na jaren hard werken. Er zijn een aantal mensen die ik 
wil bedanken; zonder hun steun was het niet zo ver gekomen. 
Lieve mama, de afgelopen jaren heb je altijd naar me geluisterd als ik er doorheen zat 
en het werken aan mijn proefschrift even niet meer zag zitten. Je sprak opbeurende 
woorden en herinnerde me er constant aan dat ik er spijt van zou krijgen als ik mijn 
proefschrift niet zou afronden. Bedankt voor je steun en voor het feit dat je altijd naar 
mijn verhalen luistert. En zeker niet alleen als het gaat over mijn proefschrift. Het 
leven is niet altijd makkelijk, dat weten we beiden, maar ik weet dat je van me houdt. 
Daar ben ik je dankbaar voor. Ik houd van je! 
Er zijn twee mensen zonder wie dit proefschrift er echt niet was gekomen: mijn 
promotoren. Agnes, vanaf dag één heb je laten weten dat je erin geloofde dat ik in 
staat was een proefschrift te schrijven. Je hebt me de ruimte gegeven om aan mijn 
proefschrift te werken op mijn tempo (vooral nadat ik een andere baan had), maar op 
de momenten dat ik het hard nodig had, voerde je de druk op en motiveerde je me 
om verder te gaan. Je was kritisch over mijn werk, maar altijd op een manier dat ik er 
niet aan hoefde de twijfelen dat het (na veel schrijven en herschrijven) goed zou 
komen. Je hebt me regelmatig door moeilijke momenten gesleept. Bedankt daarvoor! 
Ook naast het onderzoek hebben we het leuk gehad. Conferenties, elke ochtend een 
wandeling naar het DE-café voor koffie en etentjes nadat ik niet meer op de universiteit 
werkte. Ondanks dat mijn interesses anders zijn dan die van jou en de rest van onze 
conflict-groep (voetbal ;-)), waren we een hecht clubje. Bedankt voor de afgelopen 
jaren, zonder jou was het niet gelukt! 
 René, je was minder op de voorgrond dan Agnes (afstand, een andere universiteit), 
maar je was er altijd. Jij was degene die met meer afstand mijn papers becommentarieerde 
en je had een nieuwe, frisse blik op mijn werk, omdat je er niet dagelijks mee bezig 
was. Ik ben ervan overtuigd dat dit mijn proefschrift beter heeft gemaakt. Af en toe 
werd ik weleens moedeloos van wéér een email met commentaar, maar dan maakte 
je me duidelijk dat het heel normaal is dat ik me tegen het einde van het proces zo 
voelde. Ook jij hebt altijd duidelijk gemaakt dat je erin geloofde dat mijn proefschrift 
er zou komen. Bedankt voor je begeleiding en steun!
Dan de rest van mijn familie en mijn vriendinnen. Eerst mijn broers: Bastiaan, de 
afgelopen jaren heb je me constant gevraagd hoe het ging met mijn proefschrift en 
liet je me weten dat je erin geloofde dat ik het ook daadwerkelijk zou afronden. 
Matthijs, jij hebt altijd hetzelfde vertrouwen laten blijken en zorgde voor de nodige 
afleiding (je bent altijd in voor een leuk gesprek over sport of een pittige discussie 
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over politiek). Dit terwijl er genoeg veranderde in jullie eigen levens: een nieuwe 
baan, een nieuwe studie. Jullie hebben allebei doorgezet. Ik ben trots op jullie. 
Er zijn een aantal vriendinnen die ik apart wil noemen. Ik begin met mijn twee paranimfen, 
Else en Annemarie. Ik ben dankbaar dat jullie naast we willen staan tijdens deze 
mijlpaal. Lieve Else, we zijn al zo lang vriendinnetjes en hebben al zoveel meegemaakt 
samen. Ik weet nog goed hoe ik mezelf heb uitgenodigd voor jouw verjaardag, die je 
eigenlijk niet echt vierde, en dat was het begin van een vriendschap die enorm 
belangrijk voor me is! Bedankt voor alles de afgelopen 15 jaar: je onvoorwaardelijke 
steun, je vertrouwen in mij, de weekenden die we samen doorbrachten aan mijn 
eettafel (jij studerend (wat ben ik trots op je, dat je die stap hebt durven nemen!) en 
ik werkend aan mijn proefschrift), de terrasjes en de stedentripjes. Het leven kent ups 
en downs, maar jij bent er altijd voor me (en ik hopelijk voor jou). Ik houd van je en 
ben blij dat jij mijn vriendinnetje bent! Lieve An, we kennen elkaar nu een paar jaar en 
al snel was je heel belangrijk voor me. Het afgelopen jaar ben je heel bewust bezig 
geweest met wat jij wilt op werk-gebied en heb je een carrière switch gemaakt. 
Ik vind het dapper dat je die keus gemaakt hebt. Je mag trots zijn op jezelf! Ik ben het 
in ieder geval. Bedankt voor je steun en vriendschap de afgelopen jaren. En natuurlijk 
voor de vele gezellige avonden. Ik geniet van onze momenten samen. Er gaan er nog 
velen volgen, dat weet ik zeker! 
 Anníka, mijn ‘middelbare school-vriendinnetje’. Jij bent al heel lang in mijn leven 
en wat hebben we veel meegemaakt: samen ploeteren om ons wiskunde-examen te 
halen, vakanties naar Zeeland en Kroatië, talloze stapavonden. We zien elkaar 
misschien wat minder dan we allebei zouden willen, maar áls we elkaar zien is het als 
vanouds. Ik hoop dat je weet hoe blij ik ben met onze vriendschap en hoe trots ik op 
je ben! De afgelopen jaren kenden flink wat tegenslagen en ik heb er heel veel 
bewondering voor hoe jij daar, samen met Bob, mee om bent gegaan. Bedankt dat je 
er voor me bent als het nodig is. Ik hoop dat we er in de toekomst nog steeds voor 
elkaar zijn en nog vele leuke momenten gaan meemaken. Susan, van huisgenootje tot 
vriendinnetje. Door de afstand zien we elkaar niet zo heel vaak, maar ik geniet van 
onze middagen en avonden samen. Je steekt je mening niet onder stoelen of banken 
en dat waardeer ik! Je helpt me om anders naar de dingen te kijken en daar word ik 
blij van. Bedankt daarvoor! Laten we de traditie van onze etentjes in stand houden. 
:-) Evelinn, thank you for making me think out-of-the-box and doing the unexpected 
(like our trip to Tanzania)! 
Natuurlijk zijn er, naast mijn promotoren, meer mensen op de universiteit die ik wil 
bedanken. Ik begin met de rest van de onderzoeksgroep: Alex, Giedo, Kirsten en 
Roderick. Alex, je was mijn kamergenoot op de universiteit. Al heel snel nadat we 
allebei met ons promotieonderzoek waren begonnen, kwamen we erachter dat we 
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niet heel veel gemeen hebben, behalve het feit dat we allebei van katten houden ;-). 
Twee totaal verschillende mensen op één kantoor, maar toch hebben we het gezellig 
gehad. Bedankt voor de gezelligheid en de kritische vragen die je me stelde over mijn 
onderzoek. Giedo en Kirsten, jullie sloten later aan, maar maakten de groep compleet. 
Ook jullie bedankt voor jullie steun, hulp en input. Roderick, we hebben maar kort 
samengewerkt, maar ook jij was onderdeel van onze club. Bedankt daarvoor. 
 Verder wil ik het team Politicologie van de Radboud Universiteit bedanken voor 
de jaren dat ik onderdeel heb uitgemaakt van het team, voor de samenwerking en de 
gezelligheid naast het harde werken. Er is één collega die ik in het bijzonder wil 
noemen: Andrej, bedankt voor de lunches, kopjes koffie en onze discussies over taal 
(Engels en Nederlands). 
 
Voor mijn proefschrift heb ik data verzameld bij verschillende organisaties en panels. 
Zonder deze data had ik nooit een proefschrift kunnen schrijven. Bedankt voor jullie 
medewerking. Ook ben ik dank verschuldigd aan de verschillende mensen die hebben 
meegedacht over mijn onderzoek en organisaties waar ik verschillende van mijn 
papers heb kunnen presenteren. 
Als laatste mijn collega’s in Apeldoorn. Team HRM, jullie waren altijd belangstellend 
naar mijn proefschrift en dat waardeer ik. Mijn huidige team: jullie hebben het heel 
gemakkelijk gemaakt om mij onderdeel te laten voelen van het team en ook jullie zijn 
altijd belangstellend. Met name mijn verschillende kamergenoten (Arianne en Jos het 
eerste jaar, nu Huub en Mounia) hebben regelmatig naar mijn gezucht en frustraties 
moeten luisteren en jullie hadden dan altijd een opbeurend woord. Bedankt daarvoor! 
Ik wil nog iemand apart bedanken: Marjan. Bedankt dat je me de ruimte hebt gegeven 
om naast mijn baan aan mijn proefschrift te werken, voor je hulp met de Nederlandse 
samenvatting (zo heb je me bijvoorbeeld bewust gemaakt van het verschil tussen 
‘beslissing’ en ‘besluit’) en voor je constante belangstelling. 
Marieke
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